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Chapter I
Introduction
1.1 Statement of the Problem
The emergence of Islamic banks in the 1970s set the beginnIng of a new era
in the financial system of the Muslim world. More than sixty Islamic banks can
be found all over the world today. With the exception of Iran and Pakistan where
the whole banking system has been Islamized, the other Islamic banks operate in
dual financial systems side by side with the interest-based banks.
This thesis focuses on Islamic banking in Malaysia. Only one Islamic bank;
namely Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad has been established in Malaysia since 1983.
Since the bank is coming to the end of its ten year monopoly in the supply of
Islamic banking services; it is likely to lose its potential position in the banking
sector.
A key feature of this thesis is an assessment of Bank Islam over the first eight
years of its operation. It is pertinent to look at the performance of Bank Islam to
this date. Whilst information on performance is relevant both to Bank Islam and
its decisions regarding future marketing strategies; it is also relevant to potential
competitors in the banking sector who are making decisions about entering this
market post 1993.
The other key element of this thesis is a survey of Muslim bank depositors in
Malaysia. The survey was designed with a view to try and understand why, in a
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country whose population is predominantly Mwlim (5 per cent), Bank IIam has
only captured a very marginal share of dposits. After eIg1t years in existence only
2 per cent of total commercial bank deposits were held in Bank Islam It raises the
question of whether Malaysian Muslims are not depositing in the banking system
at all or whether they desire banking services but are not prImanly motivated by
the religious factor to bank with Bank Islam.
1.2 Outline of Chapters
The thesis develops as follows:
It starts with a survey of the overall IslamIc economic system focusing on the
justification for the system to Muslims and secondly on the Issue of the prohibition
of nba which forms the foundation of Islamic banking. (Chapter II). The study then
proceeds through a literature survey of the development of Islamic banking both
in theory and practice (Chapter III); to a presentation of the Malaysian economy
and the Malaysian financial system - the context in which Islamic banking was
developed in Malaysia (Chapters W and V).
The actual development of Islamic banking in Malaysia is the story of the
evolution and framework of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. This is the focus of
Chapter VI. The performance of Bank Islam given the economic climate and the
financial system in which it was forced to operate is assessed in Chapter VII. The
main thrust is to examine the extent to which Bank Islam has succeeded in offering
an alternative form of banking in a well-established interest- based environment;
and if so how has it achieved it? Has its operation been geared purely with the
economic objective of profits or does its Islamic character differentiate it from the
other commercial banks in the country?
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Chapter II
The Economic System of Islam
2.1 Introduction
No banking system can exist in an ideological vacuum. The conventional bank
ing system dominating the financial world today has been fashioned according to
the spirit of capitalism in which the rate of interest plays an important role. Islamic
banking is no exception. Muslim economists unanimously agree that an Islamic
banking system in its pure form can only be envisaged in an Islamic economy. As
a prelude to the study of Islamic banking this chapter attempts to provide the
justification for Islamic banking by examining the philosophical foundation and
conceptual framework of such an economy. To achieve this aim the chapter is di-
vided into the following main sections. Sections 2 and 3 following this introduction
will respectively examine the ideological foundation of Islam and its implications
for the economic behaviour of the individual in order to justify the need for Is-
lamic banking by Muslims. Sections 4 and 5 will discuss the prohibition of mba
and its economic rationalizations respectively. The Islamic alternatives to mba will
be examined in Section 6.
2.2 Ideological Foundation
An economic system may be defined as the sum total of devices (or institutions
and patterns of behaviour) which through their interaction give effect to economic
choice. These economic devices are based on a set of law which embodies the philo-
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in the form of the Quran or The Holy Book and the Sunnah or the traditions of
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). These two sources form the chief
sources of Islamic law known as the Shariah from which the economic principles for
the Muslim society are also derived. Because of their exogenous nature, the eco-
nomic principles in these two major sources are constant and permanent in nature.
They are not subject to change either in time or space and are therefore applicable
to all Muslim societies at any age and at any level of economic development.
Besides the above two main sources, the ideological foundations of the Islamic
economic system are also derived from the exercise of reason and logic or ijtihad.3
Ijtihad involves the process of rethinking, reinterpretation and also analogical de-
ductions by reasoning of the principles and injunctions in the Q'uran and the Sun-
nah. It deals with a question of the Shariah that emerges in society from time
to time either in the form of new social or moral problems that require solutions
which have not been clearly defined in the two chief sources of the Shariah.
Ijtihad, therefore, forms a vital instrument that provides flexibility and dy-
namism into the Islamic economic system. It allows the Muslim community to
deal with the economic problems of their time and exercise their judgement in
providing solutions which are relevant to their current circumstances without de-
viating from the permanent principles in the Quran and the Sunnah. A well-known
example of ijtihad in Islamic history is the judgement passed by Umar Al-Khattab
(the second Caliph) during the year of the famine, that no thief's hand should
be amputated when there is the slightest doubt that the crime was committed
because of hunger and not of greed. In this example the exercise of ijtihad had
The main branches of ijtihad are qiyas (analogy), ijma' (consensus) and istihsan (deviation from
qiyas on the basis of public interest).
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the struggle for economic well-being which conforms to the moral values in the
Shariah constitutes an act of virtue and the economic activity performed assumes
an act of worship or ibadah. Such rationality is of course completely alien and
perhaps unacceptable in the conventional economic system. This is not unusual
because an understanding of the Islamic economic system cannot be gained until
the ideological bases of the system embodied in the Islamic woridview are fully
revealed.
It must be admitted that the task of elaborating the Islamic woridview will
entail a discussion of the vast matrix of concepts, principles and ethical values
found in the Quran and the Sunnah; which lies beyond the limitations of this
study. However, as all these concepts are derived or linked to the fundamental
concept of Tawhid or the oneness and the sovereignity of Allah, our discussion will
focus on this principle and its immediate corollaries.
2.2.2.1 Tawhid
Tawhid is the key concept which forms the basis of the Islamic faith. It signifies
a complete submission of a Muslim to only one god and his rejection of other sources
of value. There are two sides to the process of Tawhid. Firstly the total submission
of man to Allah alone implies the uniqueness of His attributes. It negates the
existence of other creators worthy of worship and confirms that all other beings
have to be different from Allah in every respect. As noted by Al-Habshi;
The oneness or tawhid is not only confined to number but also implies the oneness or
uniqueness in all His sublime qualities or attributes. All other beings have to be different from
Allah in every respect. In its simplest form the difference can be in terms of degree. For example,
1991:42.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to examine the use of knowledge of self and others of a single group
(n= 7) of children with high-functioning autism (HFA)/Asperger's syndrome (AS) in different
contexts. Understanding of the self and others is defined as the ability to appreciate one's own
and others' mental states. A mixed methodology, which combines experimental and naturalistic
techniques was used. Thus, the fieldwork involved 5 stages: (1) experimental testing of first-
and second-order theory of mind, (2) interviews on self-understanding, (3) analysis of mental
state language in children and teachers in different contexts, (4) analysis of mental state
language in children and their parents, and (5) ethnographic observations of the use, or
absence, of skills related to social understanding of self and others. Two comparison groups
were selected: 6 adults with Asperger's syndrome took part in stages (1) and (2) of the
fieldwork and 8 children with moderate learning difficulties (MILD), matched on chronological
age and verbal ability with the target group took part in all, except the final, stages of data
collection. The main findings were: (1) Although more children with HIFAJAS passed the first
than the second order theory of mind task, there were no significant differences between them,
the MILD group and the AS group. (2) All subjects described physical, active and
psychological aspects of themselves but unlike adults with AS and MILD children, the target
group did not refer to their social skills and social relationships as an important component in
their self-understanding. (3) Some of the data indicated the importance of context. For
example, numerous differences were observed between two contexts at school. In addition,
HFA and MLD children used less mental state language at home than at school, tnd this was
associated with less use by their parents than their teachers. Other results, however, v."re less
clear. Thus, HFA/AS children referred to others' mental states more often at school than at
home even though their teachers did not differ in the frequency of these. (4) In general, results
from the opportunistic event sampling were consistent with those from experimental testing
and language analysis. They did, however, help to elucidate the importance of context in the
application of theory of mind. These results were interpreted in terms of the interaction
between theory of mind and context, severity of autism and intelligence level within the
HFA/AS group.
x
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Autism has been identified as a perplexing life-long developmental disorder. The autistic
handicap is primarily characterised by a "triad of impairments" in social interaction,
communication and imagination (Wing & Gould, 1979). However, there is a great deal of
controversy regarding the severity of symptoms in this condition. It has been suggested
that autism covers "a continuum" of behavioural features, extending from severely
handicapped to highly able autistic persons (Wing, 1988). Regarding the upper end of this
continuum, there is a debate on whether a distinct clinical disorder defined as Asperger's
syndrome (AS) (Asperger, 1944) is a milder form of typical autism, as described by
Kanner (1943). This thesis has set out to investigate knowledge of self and others in
individuals with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome. Awareness of self and
others in high-level autism has received a great deal of attention in the last decade.
Psychological research has attempted to explore the possible underlying causes of autism.
In particular, a cognitive perspective has proposed that autism is the result of lack of
"theory of mind" (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Frith, 1989a, 1989b), the innate ability to read
one's and others' minds. In other words, it is suggested that autism represents a condition
where the ability to be aware of and predict mental states (i.e., thoughts, wishes, desires,
beliefs, intentions) is either missing (severe autism) or delayed (high-functioning autism).
Thus, the understanding of self and others is limited to physical features and does not
extend to mental dimensions as well. The evidence for this hypothesis is based on a series
of rigorous experimental research projects on a series of psychological states (Baron-
Cohen, 1989b, 1989c; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, 1986). However, the strength
of the hypothesis of a fundamental "theory of mind" deficit in autism has been
undermined by current evidence that there is "a talented minority" of individuals with
high-level autism/Asperger's syndrome that are able to succeed on advanced theory of
mind tests (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1994c; Ozonoff et at, 1991a). However, the critical
issue is to explain their persisting difficulties in social encounters.
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Another line of cognitive research, focused on the language about mental states used by
high-functioning autistic children in a naturalistic setting (Tager-Flusberg, 1992), has
offered further evidence for the "cognitive deficit" hypothesis. In particular, the aim of
that American study has been to look into the ways that verbally able autistic children at
pre-school age talk about themselves and others in their spontaneous interactions with
their mothers at home. The target group was observed to use significantly fewer terms
about attention and cognition than the comparison group of children with Down's
syndrome. Also, autistic children appeared to describe more often their own perceptions,
desires, and cognitions; yet, they referred equally to their own and others' emotions.
In contrast, a social-affective theory has argued that autism is best viewed as a case where
the inborn ability to form emotional relationships with people is lacking (Hobson, 1990b,
1992, 1993a, 1994). In particular, Hobson (1994) explicitly states that the innate tendency
to perceive others' bodily actions and respond to affective attitudes in others, and
therefore "share experiences", suggested as the basis for mental understanding of the
social world, is deficient. Thus, autism is a disorder with a primary social-affective
deficit. Moreover, Hobson (1993a) suggests that individuals with autism have limited
capacities for self-reflective awareness: they do not have a concept of themselves and
others as persons with mental attitudes; their knowledge of their own self and others is
confined largely to physical characteristics rather than affective mental states. This
hypothesis has been supported through experimental research on recognition and
expression of emotions (Hobson, 1986a, 1986b), joint attention skills (Kasari et al, 1990)
as well as social interactions of autistic children (Sigman et al, 1986; Sigman & Mundy,
1989).
It is clear that the strands of the existing literature make a powerful case for an
impairment (either cognitive or affective) in the ability of able autistic children to reflect
on their own and others' mental states. In essence, it is predicted that the understanding of
self and others in the majority of the autistic population will not go beyond non-mental
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aspects of themselves and others. Even bright autistic persons are not expected to have a
rich mental life and deep inner experiences (Huriburt et al, 1994).
Understanding oneself and others is a fundamental human concern that starts early and
continues throughout life. The nature of self (cognitive and emotional) has a deep and
strong effect on the action and behaviour of individuals. Also, the context of social
interaction provides a valuable framework for the cognitive/affective development of self
in normal and atypical persons. These views on the role and importance of self and the
context in which it evolves have been the theoretical grounds for this research. Further,
my hope was that the study of this central area of social cognition would allow me to take
a new look at the intricate clinical picture of autism. Moreover, the dominant
methodological paradigms in the study of autism have used experimental techniques and
these raise questions about whether their findings can be generalised to natural situations.
Therefore, the need to compare autistic children's performance in different settings has
guided my choice of this particular research design.
The primary aim in this thesis has been to gain an understanding of how children with
high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome think about themselves and others. The
objective has been less to prove and test a hypothesis than to examine the quality of
knowledge about self and others in different contexts. It needs to be made clear that the
notion of "self' adopted in this study is in line with the dominant cognitive paradigm in
autism. That is, the definition of "self" in this research includes only awareness of mental
states (i.e., beliefs, feelings, desires, perceptions).
Moreover, this study purports to investigate whether the use of knowledge of self and
others, reflected in language about their own and others' mental states, is associated with
the social context and the participants in it. Hence, the aim is to extend current knowledge
about autistic children's understanding of their own and others' inner states by looking
further at these children's verbal interactions within real-life social settings.
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Thus, this research will draw theoretical attention to the contribution of the social
environment in the use of the ability of autistic persons to be aware of their own and
others' psychological states. In particular, it will attempt to investigate whether significant
others encourage or inhibit the cognitively constrained ability for introspection in high-
level autism. Research on the development of mental understanding has demonstrated
that the role of socialising agents in normal children is critical (Dunn, 1988, 1993). It
would be interesting to explore this theoretical position in an autistic group, as the
fundamental deficit lies in social interaction. Curiously, there has not been much research
in this direction.
Consequently, it was necessary to look for methods that would provide empirical
information on the nature of awareness of self and others in high-functioning
autism/Asperger's syndrome demonstrated in experimental situations as well as real-life
social contexts. Information is drawn from five sources:
1. Experimental Situation. A group of children with high-functioning
autism/Asperger's syndrome was tested on two different tasks of theory of mind,
that have been extensively used in the cognitive tradition, and compared with adults
with Asperger's syndrome and children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD).
2. Semi-structured Interviews. All groups were individually administered an interview
on self-understanding. They were asked to describe spontaneously different aspects
of themselves.
3. Systematic Observations of the Use of Language on Mental States of the Self and
Others in the Natural Context of School. Conversations between children and their
teachers during one-to-one and group sessions at school were observed for the
target group and the comparison group of children with MLD.
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4. Systematic Observations of the Use of Language on Mental States of the Self and
Others in the Natural Context of Home. Verbal interactions between children with
HFA/AS and their parents were observed at home. Similar data were obtained from
the same group of children with MILD.
5. Observations of Use/Non-Use of Mental Understanding of the Self and Others
derived from Ethnographic Observations in the Context of School. Informal
observations of mentalising behaviours in the school setting were carried out for the
target group only. This ethnographic information was used as complementary
evidence to the other types of data.
On the whole, this study has aimed to look at knowledge of self and others in high-
functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome from a wider perspective that combines
experimental with naturalistic techniques. This methodological synthesis, based on a
theoretical perspective that regards cognitive and social development in clinical
populations as closely interrelated, may provide a more comprehensive understanding of
the issue, if it is indeed the case that autistic children affect and are affected by social
interactions. Hence, there is a shift of emphasis: from individualistic approaches that
measure autistic children's cognitive abilities in the context of artificial/experimental
situations to social perspectives that examine the application of cognitive skills by autistic
children in their interactions with others in natural contexts. This research is intended to
carry out this task.
The thesis is organised in four parts. Part I will provide the theoretical background of this
study. First, the controversy on the distinction or "continuity" between high-functioning
autism (1-IFA) and Asperger's syndrome (AS) will be presented (Chapter 2). Next,
cognitive theories and social-affective perspectives on the knowledge of self and others in
autism will be discussed in the light of their empirical evidence (Chapter 3). In the
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following chapter, theoretical models on the understanding of the self and others in normal
children will be reviewed.
In part II, the purpose is to discuss how significant issues arising from the literature review
have formulated the theoretical aims and the methodological directions of this study
(Chapter 5). Part III will present the analysis of all sets of findings. First, results from
experimental testing (Chapter 6) and interviews on self-understanding (Chapter 7) will be
discussed (Chapter 8). Then, the use of language on mental states of the self and others at
school (Chapter 9) and home (Chapter 10) will be described, and discussed (Chapter 11).
Also, observations based on ethnographic observations will be presented (Chapter 12).
Finally, conclusions and directions for future research will be covered (Chapter 13).
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CHAPTER 2: IDENTIFICATION OF THE DISORDER
Introduction
In the first section of this chapter the aim is to present a detailed clinical description of
typical autism and discuss the main diagnostic issues related with this disorder (this term
is used to describe the pervasive disturbance of autism, including several deficits; the
meaning of the term "deficit" refers only to one abnormal aspect of a disorder), arising
from existing diagnostic classifications. The next section will compare the clinical picture
of high-functioning autism with that of Asperger's syndrome. Finally, there will be a
discussion of the existing controversy about the validity of a differential diagnosis
between high-level autism and Asperger's syndrome, drawing from research findings.
EARLY INFANTILE AUTISM
The "triad of impairment"
Early infantile autism was originally identified as a syndrome by the American child
psychiatrist Leo Kanner in 1943. That year he published an article entitled "Autistic
disturbances of affective contact", which was ground-breaking in the sense that it
described the case histories of eleven children (all under the age of 11) with a peculiar
clinical picture. The main striking features of these individuals were: an "inability to
relate themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life"
(p. 242), an "extreme aloneness ..., not responding to anything that comes to them from
the outside world." (p. 248) and "an anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of
sameness" (p. 245). Also, these children showed delayed echolalia, inappropriate use of
personal pronouns ("personal pronouns were repeated as heard"), very good rote memory
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and stable relationships with objects; yet, most of these children gave the "impression of
serious-mindedness" (p. 247) in their facial expression. Overall, Kanner claimed that all
the above symptoms established "early infantile autism" as a distinct syndrome,
differentiated from childhood schizophrenia.
It was nearly thirty years later that these anecdotal clinical observations comprised the
basis for an epidemiological study of the disorder, with the purpose to investigate the
incidence of autistic features in the population and their relation to mental retardation. A
comprehensive study by Lorna Wing and Judith Gould (1979) in the MRC Social
Psychiatry Unit in London represents a major step in that direction. Out of 914 children
with mental or physical handicap under the age of 15 years who lived in Camberwell, 132
children had been identified on the basis of the following criteria. They showed at least
one of the following behaviours, regardless of level of intelligence and age of onset:
impairment in reciprocal social interaction (especially with peers), impairment in verbal
and non-verbal communication and impairment in imagination accompanied with
repetitive, stereotyped activities. This "triad of impairment" was established as the crux of
autism.
Wing & Gould (1979) distinguished between two groups of children: "socially impaired"
and "sociable severely retarded". The former group represented 21.2 cases of every
10,000 children in the same area, of whom 4.9 had a history of typical autism.
Furthermore, they proposed a classificatory system for the "socially impaired" group.
Social impairment was rated as "social aloofness", "passive interaction" and "active but
odd interaction". A "socially aloof' child would show indifference and aversion to social
contact; s/he would initiate social approaches only with the purpose to satisfy her/his own
needs. Also, s/he would like physical contact, such as cuddling and tickling, but with no
interest in the social aspects of the contact. A "passive" child would not make social
contacts but would not resist if other children asked her/him to engage in their games.
Her/his role in these games was simply to act like a baby or a patient. When the game was
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finished s/he would just wander off. The "active but odd" child would enjoy being with
people, mostly with adults. But s/he would monopolise the topic of the discussion and
would not appreciate the feelings and needs of others. S/he would pester other people,
because of her/his idiosyncratic behaviour. However, these types of behaviour indicated
the predominant style of abnormal social interaction in different children, as well as
different styles of social handicap shown in different situations by the same child (Wing
& Attwood, 1987).
Moreover, an important finding of this study was the positive association between level
of retardation and severity of social impairment (Wing & Gould, 1979). So those children
that seemed to be "socially aloof' and "passive" had severe to mild mental retardation;
whereas the "active but odd" socially impaired children had milder mental handicap. One
might leap to the conclusion that in autism there is a broader neurological damage in the
brain areas responsible for social interaction and intelligence. But a group of mentally
retarded children with social skills appropriate to their mental age ("sociable severely
retarded") was also identified. Finally, this large scale study provided empirical evidence
for the reliability of the distinction between "childhood autism", "childhood psychosis"
and "childhood schizophrenia".
However, Wing & Gould's research has been criticised on methodological grounds,
particularly the selection of its sample. Baron-Cohen (1985) argued that the
generalisibility of the subtypes of social impairment was dubious, since it was drawn
from a sample that represented only the retarded range of autism. Hence, he questioned
the validity of the comparison of the social handicap in autistic people with normal
intelligence with the social impairment in severely retarded autistic persons. Baron-
Cohen's evaluation is fair in the light of recent research on the social handicap in high-
level autism. But, Wing and Gould's typology needs to be evaluated as the pioneer work
in the prevalence and identification of the core abnormalities in autism.
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Diagnostic criteria for autism
There has been a great deal of variation in the conceptualisations of autism over the years,
since the focus of clinicians and researchers has shifted from viewing autism as an
infantile psychosis to a cognitive developmental disorder that is characterised both by
deviance and delay in specific areas of functioning (Rutter & Schopler, 1987). Both the
major systems of classification, lCD-b (World Health Organisation, 1990) and DSM-III-
R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) have tended to concentrate on four sets of
diagnostic criteria. First, "autistic disorder" or "childhood autism" is defined as "a
qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction", that is shown through (a) lack of
awareness of the feelings of others, (b) lack of seeking comfort when distressed, (c) rarely
imitating others, (d) rarely participating in interactive play with others and (e) lack of
ability to make relationships with peers, based on mutual interests, activities and
emotions.
The second set of diagnostic criteria includes abnormalities in verbal and non-verbal
communication and imagination. These deficits are described as a cluster of features, such
as (a) lack of general mode of communication (i.e., facial expression, gesture, mime,
spoken language), (b) abnormal use of non-verbal communication means (i.e., does not
respond with smile and eye-gaze when making social contact, stares at people, becomes
rigid when held), (c) abnormalities in the characteristics of speech (like volume, pitch,
rate and rhythm), (d) impairment in the form and the content of language (i.e., reversal of
pronouns, echolalia, idiosyncratic use of words), (e) failure to initiate and sustain
conversation with others and (f) lack of spontaneous and creative imaginative play, such
as pretend play.
The third set of diagnostic criteria is related to stereotyped activities and interests, shown
in (a) stereotyped body movements, (b) restricted and narrow interests, (c) preoccupations
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with parts of objects, (d) attachment to unusual objects, (e) distress over changes in minor
aspects of the environment and (f) insistence on following rituals in precise detail.
Lastly, the age of onset is mentioned as a secondary criterion for the diagnosis of autism.
But there is no agreement on the exact age range. DSM-III-R (1987) requires that an
onset of the above symptoms during infancy or childhood is specified, whereas according
to lCD-lU (1990), these clinical features need to be present in the first three years of life.
Gillberg (1990) argued that the age factor should be dismissed, since it is not a
behavioural criterion. Also, it is often hard to obtain a full and reliable medical history
from parents before the age of three. In addition, Baron-Cohen & Bolton (1993)
emphasise that it is very difficult to detect whether abnormalities of the child at an early
age are caused by autism or mental retardation. Moreover, functional language and
communication do not always develop until the end of the first three years. Finally, they
point out that there is a small number of autistic children with an initial period of normal
development followed by a regression and decline of their abilities and skills.
It is important to note that "early infantile autism" is defined in DSM-III-R as in DSM-IlI
(1980): as a member of the group "pervasive developmental disorders" (severe, early
developmental disorders with delays and distortions in the development of social skills,
communication and cognition). As Rutter & Schopler (1987) argue, this classification is
useful, since it points to a broad deficit picture in autism, instead of a specific one. Also,
it implies that autism is a disorder present from childhood, unlike adult mental conditions.
However, this grouping is misleading as "the disorder is pervasive but not all-pervasive"
(p. 161). The general level of intelligence maybe high but the ability for social
relationships may be very low (i.e., "high-functioning autism").
Nevertheless, DSM-III-R defined the "autistic disorder" as a range of cardinal behaviours
including severe and mild autism. Thus, autism was substantially broadened and specified
in a concrete and observable way, that would make its diagnosis more operational (Tsai,
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1992). Yet, Tsai also criticised the classification of DSM-III-R as a "lumpers" approach
(p. 16), since it tends to group all different conditions under the same bundle. Clinicians
and researchers may diagnose a mild form of autism and a severe form of autism under
"autistic disorder", making it even more difficult to study small groups that are
heterogeneous in their functioning. Therefore, Tsai suggested "a "splitters" approach" (p.
17) as more appropriate. He contends that in order to learn more about autism and autism-
related disorders we need to differentiate between levels of autism.
The psychogenic theory of autism
This section will only highlight the major proponents of psychogenic explanations for the
causes of autism. The first theory on the etiology of autism was introduced by Leo
Kanner (1943, 1954, 1979). He commented that the parents of all his cases were highly
intellectual, educated people with "a great deal of obsessiveness"; they were strongly
preoccupied with abstract aspects of science, art and literature and their interest for people
was limited. Overall, they were characterised as cold and formal personalities. Thus, he
explained his cases as "pure-culture examples of inborn autistic disturbances of affective
contact." (Kanner, 1943; 250) However, he stated that "the children's aloneness from the
beginning of life makes it difficult to attribute the whole picture exclusively to the type of
the early parental relations with our patients." (p. 250).
Rutter (1983) has pointed out a conflict between Kanner's earlier and later statements on
the etiology of the disorder. Six years after his first article (1949), he suggested that
autistic children's aloneness "... seems to be an act of turning away from such a situation
to seek comfort in solitude" (p. 517). Also in 1951, he explained obsessive behaviours in
these children as follows: "The patients find security in sameness, a security that is very
tenuous because changes do occur constantly and the children are therefore threatened
perpetually and try tensely to ward off this threat to their security." (p. 517, quoted in
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Rutter, 1983). Yet, in 1954, he claimed that "... it should not be forgotten that the
emotional refrigeration which the children experience from such parents cannot but be a
highly pathogenic element in the patient's early personality development." (p. 384).
Therefore, Kanner's first position that autism is an innate deficit shifted to the view that
the extreme social withdrawal of these children may be a constitutional disposition, but
essentially it is a conscious reaction to a hostile family environment.
A psychogenic explanation for autism was also put forward by the child psychoanalyst,
Bruno Bettelheim. In his book "The empty fortress: infantile autism and the birth of self'
(1967), he explained the whole clinical picture of his patients as the outcome of the
mother-child relationship. Therefore, he proposed that these children should be isolated
from the cause of their behaviour: their parents. The treatment would be the initial
isolation of the child in the clinic, where there would be continual effort to re-built the
emotional security that these children lacked, due to an unresponsive mother.
Although the above theoretical accounts were useful in stimulating clinical interest on the
enigmatic nature of autism, they have failed to provide any adequate empirical evidence.
Despite their incisive observations of the children's disordered behaviour, their claims
were founded on interviews with parents and impressionistic information. On these
grounds, the psychogenic assumptions have been dismissed as a valid explanation of
autism. But they have inspired an explosion of genetic studies, intended to explain the
puzzling clinical picture of autism.
Medical research
It is now unanimously accepted that autism is an organically based neuro-developmental
disorder (Rutter and Schopler, 1987). There is a considerable body of evidence for the
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contribution of genetic factors in the cause of autism. Different types of research findings
will be examined.
Twin studies have found that there is an increased possibility of finding autism in the
siblings of autistic children. In a nationwide British twin study, 60% of pairs of identical
(monozygotic) twins had autism whereas 9% of non-identical (dizygotic) cases of twins
showed autism (Folstein & Rutter, 1977a). Also, over 90% of the identical twins showed
abnormalities in the cognitive and social domain, whereas only 10% of the non-identical
twins showed similar signs of autism. Moreover, family studies claim that the proportion
of siblings with some features of autism is about 20% (Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993). It
seems likely that what is inherited is not nuclear autism but language and social
difficulties. Also, siblings did not appear to have a mental handicap, unless they were
autistic. Therefore, both the twin and the family research show that what is passed on to
relatives is an impairment of a broader nature. Interestingly, the chance of broader
abnormalities in relatives is associated with the severity of autism.
Furthermore, two population studies on autistic twins (Folstein & Rutter, 197Th;
Steffenburg et al, 1989) reported that perinatal complications play an important role in the
cause of autism. However, it was found that inborn abnormalities in the foetus had given
rise to obstetric problems, rather than the other way round (as is the case with Down
syndrome) (also, Bolton et a!, 1994).
The view that the biological component is strong in autism is consistently supported by
the high male: female ratio. In typical autism, the excess of boys ranges from 2.0 to 2.9
(Gillberg, 1990). Also, Wing & Gould (1979) argued that the sex ratio is related with the
degree of autism. In their study, the ratio of boys to girls was 2:1 at the lowest levels of
ability but it raised to 15:1 at the highest ability levels.
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In addition, epidemiological studies in Sweden, France, U.S.A. and U.K. have showed
that there is no social class effect in the occurrence of autism (Gillberg, 1990).
Interestingly, there seems to be a bias in the referral of autistic children. Wing (1980)
noted that parents of autistic children from high and middle classes tended to refer their
children to psychiatric services for a diagnosis. This conclusion implies a strong referral
bias rather than a social class effect. Nuclear autism can be found in any culture and
social level (Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993).
Finally, the association between mental handicap and autism in 75%-90% of the autistic
population provides further evidence that there is a strong organic background in the
autistic disorder (Gillberg, 1990). In addition, the prevalence of epilepsy in autistic
children (5% to 14%) (Steffenburg & Gillberg, 1986) and adolescents with typical autism
(26%) (Gillberg & Steffenburg, 1987) provides another clue for supporting that autism is
caused by a neurological fault. Moreover, autism has been found to be related with
chromosomal anomalies, such as fragile X (about 2.5% (Bailey et all, 1993)), tuberous
sclerosis and neurofibromatosis. Metabolic disorders, such as phenylketonuria as well as
viral infections (rubella, cytomegalovirus, herpes encephalitis) have been also associated
with autism (Baron-Cohen & Bolton, 1993). However, Rutter et al (1994) in their review
of research findings on the link between autism and medical conditions concluded that the
degree of this association is strongly determined by the level of intelligence. Thus, it is
more common to find medical conditions in the severely retarded autistic children rather
than the mildly retarded or those with normal IQ.
In summarising the discussion on the evidence for a biological background in autism, the
main point is the considerable genetic heterogeneity in the etiology of autism. Yet, it is
possible that what lies behind all these related abnormalities is a "final common pathway"
(Darby & Clark, 1992). This model proposes that various genetic factors cause
neurological damage in centres of the brain that lead to autism and mental handicap.
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Hence, it remains still uncertain which area of the brain has been insulted and which
mechanisms have been responsible for the dysfunction of these systems.
HIGH-FUNCTIONING AUTISM
Over the past decade, the need to study different subgroups that fall within the category. of
"autistic disorder" has been widely acknowledged (Schopler & Mesibov, 1988, 1992).
The variety and complexity of the autistic impairment have called for a differentiating
approach. The grouping of individuals according to their level of functioning and severity
of the handicap has been highly beneficial for the understanding of the syndrome.
Recently, there has been a growing attention on the minority (one-fifth to one quarter) of
the autistic population that shows a mild form of the core autistic symptoms and is not
associated with mental handicap. Able autistic individuals present a special interest, since
they represent a purely autistic group, without any abnormal behaviours attributed to
mental retardation or other handicaps (Rutter. 1983). However, it is necessary to point out
that high-functioning autism is not defined as a separate member of the category
"pervasive developmental disorders" in DSM-III-R (1987); the diagnostic criteria for the
"autistic disorder" are described with examples for more and less handicapped autistic
persons. Next, the profile of an individual with high-functioning autism will be presented-
a description drawn from DSM-III-R and research findings.
Cognitive level
Kanner's (1943) first account on the disorder described eleven autistic persons, all of
whom had normal intelligence. However, this has not been found to be the case in later
studies. Three quarters of the autistic population are also mentally retarded (Rutter &
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Lockyer, 1967). Initial investigations in autism focused on the mentally impaired majority
of autistic persons. Bartak & Rutter (1976) found that there was a different pattern of
behaviours and skills between autistic children with performance lOs above 70 and below
70. Since then, the cut-off point of Performance 10 above 70 or Full Scale IQ above 60-
65 has been used for research purposes as the main cognitive criterion for the
differentiation of a high-functioning from a low-functioning autistic group (Tsai, 1992).
Therefore, high-functioning autism has been defined on the basis of a normal cognitive
level, as measured by a standardised-test of intelligence. However, the question is whether
a cognitive criterion is sufficient or needs to be complemented by additional criteria of
social and communication skills (Tsai, 1992).
Social relationships
In the area of social interaction, persons with high-functioning autism appear to be
interested in forming relationships with other people, but they do not seem to understand
the social conventions and needs of others for privacy. As they grow older, they feel a
stronger desire to make friends and have human company, but fail to comprehend the
complex social rules of interaction (Wing, 1992). With regard to Wing's classification
("aloof", "passive", "active but odd"), the high-functioning groups would be those with
passive and "active but odd" social behaviour. Moreover, they do not avoid eye contact
but tend to stare at people and talk to them for a long time about their own particular
circumscribed interest. They may approach others persistently so that they can bombard
them with their own favourite topic. When they are involved in an activity they tend to
act repetitively and stereotypically but they do not seem to be so rigid as severely retarded
autistic children in following their patterns. Also, they copy others' actions but out of
context. In play, they engage other children only as "mechanical aids". In adolescence and
adulthood, these high-level autistic persons may achieve independence and employment
in a job with a fixed routine and minimal requirements for social interaction (such as
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librarian, accountant, work with computers, assembly work in factories) (Wing, 1988;
1991). However, they need continuous supervision and counselling in coping with the
multiple demands of social life. Most of these cases with high-functioning autism may
have not been diagnosed in early childhood since they were considered as eccentric and
odd rather than disordered. Quite often their bizarre behaviour was not even observed as
abnormal by their parents. Many of them may attend mainstream schools and receive
special support. However, because of their social naivety they are often bullied by their
peers.
Language and communication
In high-level autism aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication seem to be mildly
impaired. This impairment covers abnormalities both in the production of speech and the
content of talk. They seem to be delayed in acquiring and using grammatical constructs,
such as pronouns, negatives, interrogatives (Shea & Mesibov, 1985). Also, Bartak &
Rutter (1976) found that all the high-functioning autistic children who could speak were
echolalic, and 95% of them showed pronoun reversal. Besides, DSM-III-R (1987)
describes the speech of less handicapped autistic persons as monotonous and stereotyped,
with idiosyncratic use of words and phrases and lack of normal intonation. Also, their
voice sounds mechanical and artificial and they tend to talk about superficial, repetitive
and esoteric issues (Wing, 1992). Bright autistic children appear to change subject quite
often without taking into account the other's feelings or enthusiasm about the
conversation; they also show a lack of interest for imaginary stories (DSM-III-R).
Overall, they are very poor listeners.
Ritualistic and compulsive behaviour
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Similarly to low-level autism, in high-functioning autism there is a high incidence of
stereotyped movements (rotating movements of the hand, arm flapping, shaking of the
arms and arms, whole body movements) (DSM-III-R, 1987; Tsai, 1992). In addition,
there is a strong tendency for pre-occupation with a single subject (i.e., mathematics,
astrology, train timetables, telephone directory) and difficulty to accept a new routine or
change in the environment. However, there is a lot of potential for monitoring these
behaviours because able autistic persons have better communication skills. The main
problems persist but it is easier to explain to them how they could suppress their
obsessions and stereotypies in social situations.
ASPERGER' S SYNDROME
A first account
One year after Kanner's insightful account of "early infantile autism" (1943), an Austrian
clinician published his thesis on "'Autistic Psychopathy' in childhood" (Asperger, 1944,
translated in Frith, 1991). Hans Asperger's paper described a "personality disorder"
characterised by "the shutting-off of relations between self and the outside world." (p.
39). At that time he did not seem to be aware of Kanner's article. However, Asperger later
recognised that his four cases of boys (aged 6-11 years) share more similarities than
differences in their clinical picture with Kanner's eleven patients (Asperger, 1979; Wing,
1992). He emphasised social isolation, impaired non-verbal communication, stereotypical
movements, narrow interests and "originality of thought" as the main features of his
syndrome- he later concluded that his syndrome was a mild form of Kanner's autism
(Asperger, 1979). But he considered autism as a "psychotic process" and his syndrome as
a personality trait (Asperger, 1979). Unlike Kanner, he insisted that "autistic
psychopathy" can occur at all levels of intelligence, from "the highly original genius to
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the most severe contact-disordered, automaton-I ike mentally retarded individual."
(Asperger, 1944, in Frith, 1991; 74). Also, he noted that his syndrome was not recognised
before the third year, whereas Kanner's autism occurs before 30 months. He claimed that
his patients were not indifferent to other people, but aware of their existence; yet, their
approach to others was inappropriate. Perhaps the most interesting observations made by
Asperger are related to highly creative abstract thought and the production of a
sophisticated original language in these persons. For example, an eleven year old boy
said: "I can't do this orally, only headily." (Asperger, 1944, in Frith, 1991; 17); he
probably meant that he found it easier to think about something rather than talk about it.
Asperger felt that these children would follow their own esoteric impulses and interests
regardless of the outside world. Some of them had pursued this interest as a profession
(i.e., mathematics, chemistry, technology). Also, Gillberg (1991) examined six family
stories with Asperger's syndrome and noted that "the most striking feature of Asperger
cases is their odd all-absorbing interests" (p. 140).
Asperger's syndrome and schizoid personality disorder
Asperger (1979) defined his syndrome as a personality disorder, although he appreciated
many similarities with Kanner's infantile autism. Later, Wolff & Barlow (1979) compared
autistic (high-functioning), schizoid and normal adolescents on a variety of psychometric
tests. They found that their sample with "schizoid personality" showed the same clinical
features as those that manifest Asperger's syndrome but they were distinct from the
autistic children. Also, in a follow-up study of 25 boys with schizoid personality or
Asperger's syndrome, the stability of the clinical picture and the validity of using these
two labels interchangeably was further supported (Cull et al, 1984). In contrast, Tantam
(1988b, 1988c, 1991) did not find any strong association between Asperger's syndrome
and schizotypal personality disorder. He reported that it was common for able autistic
persons to develop schizoid features but the occurrence of these problems was not
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significahtly higher than in the control group of non-autistic subjects. However, Wolff
(1991) suggested that "schizoid personality" disorders are likely to be on a continuum
with Asperger's syndrome and autism and overlap with schizophrenia spectrum disorders.
Asperger's syndrome and autism
In this section, the existing controversy in the literature over the relationship between
Asperger's syndrome and autism will be presented. Namely, is Asperger's syndrome
closely related with autism? If so, then which is the group of autistic persons that also
shares the label Asperger's syndrome? If not, then what are the criteria for the distinction
between "autistic psychopathy" and infantile autism?
Asperger's syndrome was first recognised as a nosological entity in the draft of the tenth
edition of the World Health Organisation's International classification of diseases (World
Health Organisation, 1987). It was included under the category of "pervasive
developmental disorders", that are characterised by "the triad", together with restricted,
stereotyped interests and activities. It was stated that "no general delay or retardation in
language or in cognitive development" would distinguish Asperger's syndrome from
autism; yet, it was mentioned that the majority of people with this disorder have normal
intelligence. However, ICD-1O did not make any references to the impairment of verbal
and non-verbal communication that has been reported in research (Asperger, 1944,
translated in Frith, 1991; Tantam, 1988a, 1991; Wing, 1981a). This highlights the need
for diagnosticians to be better informed by researchers and clinicians.
Wing (1981a) examined 34 cases (aged from 5-35 years) that resembled the clinical
features for "autistic psychopathy". Despite her agreement with Asperger (1944, 1979)
that there is a strong familial loading for the occurrence of the syndrome, she disagreed
21
with him that speech develops at normal age in these children, since she noted that
slightly less than half of her sample were delayed in their speech. Besides, she argued that
despite the good use of grammar and the large, rich vocabulary observed by Asperger,
"the content of speech was impoverished and much of it copied inappropriately from
other people or books." (Wing, 1981a; 117). In addition, she made the point that careful
analysis of the thought processes of these persons revealed that they were not original and
creative as Asperger (1944, translated in Frith, 1991) had regarded but rather "confined to
a narrow, pedantic, literal, but logical, chain of reasoning." (p. 118). Also, she noted that
some of the children in her sample showed autistic features in their pre-school years but
later appeared to have Asperger's syndrome. Thus, she argued that Asperger's syndrome
and Kanner's autism can be classified under the same category ('the autistic continuum"),
since they share the core triad of impairment in communication, social interaction and
imagination, accompanied by repetitive activities and circumscribed interests. Their
differences lie only in the degree of severity of the deficit (Wing, 1988).
Two case studies lend further support to Wing's position for "an autistic continuum".
Volkmar, Raul & Cohen (1985) discussed a case study (boy aged 13 years old) that would
be very problematic to be diagnosed as Asperger's syndrome or high-functioning autism.
They concluded that there was not enough evidence for the claim that Asperger's
syndrome and autism are entirely separate disorders. Also, Bowman (1988) presented a
case study of a family with four out of six members exhibiting features of the autistic
continuum. The youngest boy was diagnosed as Asperger's syndrome and his other two
older brothers were autistic; one of them had no speech delay and the other was observed
to be retarded before the age of 30 months. The father was described as a "loner" with odd
language and narrow interests. All of them had normal verbal and performance IQ, but
widely scattered subtest scores: a cognitive profile that is very common in autistic
persons. Clearly, there is a strong genetic effect in this family, that supports the view that
autism and Asperger's syndrome may have a broad common etiology. Thus, the variations
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in the impairment of the triad in this family were explained in terms of the "autistic
continuum".
Szatmarj (1989) reviewed 20 studies with the aim to evaluate whether the evidence for
the distinction between autistic disorder and "autistic spectrum disorders" (ASD) had
internal and external validity. The term "autistic spectrum disorders" included those
disorders with the triad of impairment (such as Asperger's syndrome, autistic tendencies,
atypical autism) but without enough features to qualify for the autistic disorder. He
concluded that "certain clinical differences exist between ASD and autism; that is, the
ASD children tend to have fewer autistic symptoms, greater fluency in language, and later
age of onset." (p. 592). However, Szatmari's review of 17 studies on the comparison of
clinical symptoms between autistic spectrum disorders and autism highlighted many
critical methodological weaknesses in this area of research. These, including the clinic-
based sampling procedure, the lack of justification for the exclusion of autism in the cases
with Asperger's syndrome and the non-matching on IQ, cast serious doubts on the validity
of the claim for the clinical distinction between the two diagnostic categories.
Nevertheless, he identified three subgroups under "autistic spectrum disorders": low-
functioning autism, high-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome. Yet, he noted that
there was enough evidence that the two latter groups share common etiology in contrast
with the first group. But it remains unresolved whether level of severity or developmental
level account for the distinction between Asperger's syndrome and autism (Szatmari,
1989). Thus, research on specific subgroups within the "autistic spectrum" or "autistic
continuum" would be highly necessary.
Szatmari, Bartolucci & Bremner (1989) compared a group of adolescents with AS with a
group of adults with HFA on early history and outcome. They did not find any
substantive qualitative differences between the two samples, although there were clinical
differences related with the "triad of impairment" in their early history and outcome.
These were explained as milder forms of pervasive developmental disorder, rather than as
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symptoms of a distinct syndrome. The question is whether we really need the label
"Asperger's syndrome". But Simblett & Wilson (1993) point out that, although the
diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome remains controversial, it was useful in designing a
management program for the anti-social and violent behaviour of three adults.
A major British study of 46 adults provided good evidence that Asperger's syndrome can
be reliably identified in adulthood as well (Tantam, 1988a, 1988b, 1991). The validity of
the diagnostic criteria was supported by the high frequency of these behaviours in his
sample: 91% showed non-verbal communication handicap, 67% were socially impaired
and 95% had special, narrow and private interests; also, clumsiness was observed in 91%
of them. Hence, there is a consistency in the presence of the core deficits throughout life.
However, Tantam argued for the independence of Asperger's syndrome from high-
functioning autism on the basis of a wide IQ distribution in his group of patients. This
finding has been also supported by Burgoine and Wing (1983) and Gillberg et al (1986).
Therefore, the level of intelligence cannot be accepted uncritically as the significant
criterion for the connection between Asperger's syndrome and autism.
In summary, it is clear that diagnostic guidelines are confusing in the identification of
high-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome. It seems that the "triad" of impairment
is the common clinical picture for both disorders. Moreover, research has shown that the
criterion of absence of language delay in early history is not well established for
distinguishing Asperger's syndrome from high-level autism. In the light of these
considerations, Happe (1994a) has gone further to suggest that theoretical criteria based
on psychological measurements might be more useful. In particular, performance on
theory of mind tasks may be an appropriate way to differentiate between autism and
Asperger's syndrome. However, Wolff (1994) has criticised this approach on the grounds
of tapping only specific skills and drawing inferential results. In this thesis, the position
of regarding high-functioning autism and Asperger's syndrome at the upper end of "the
autistic continuum" has been adopted. However, diagnosis of HFA and AS is only one
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dimension of the identification of the disorder. The next step would be to examine current
psychological theories aimed to explain cognitive and affective processes in able autistic
individuals. In particular, the intention is to present the main theoretical assumptions of
cognitive and social/affective perspectives and the major research findings on the ability
of persons at the upper end of the autistic continuum to have knowledge of their own and
others' mental states.
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CHAPTER 3: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES ON KNOWLEDGE
OF SELF AND OTHERS IN AUTISM
Introduction
The principal aim of this chapter is to discuss the main psychological theories of the
understanding of self and others in autism. The first section will present the theoretical
assumptions and empirical evidence of recent and influential cognitive perspectives; in
these, the main argument is that the lack of theory of mind can explain the social deficits in
autism. The second section will present the conceptual framework and experimental
research of social-affective theories that regard autism as an impairment in the
interpersonal relationships between autistic individuals and others. Finally, the quality of
awareness of self and others will be examined through first-person accounts and
autobiographies of able autistic persons.
COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES
Theoreticaifraniework
Autism as a cognitive disorder
It is widely accepted that autism is a "behaviourally defined syndrome of neurological
impairment" (Gillberg, 1990; 106); however, the special brain lesions remain unknown.
One of the main premises of the cognitive theory is that autism is a cognitive disorder
(Baron-Cohen, 1988, 1993; Frith, 1989a, 1989b; Leslie, 1987, 1991, 1993). Therefore, the
principal theoretical aim of cognitive perspectives is to provide an explanatory hypothesis
that will link a biological mechanism with a behavioural manifestation via a cognitive
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psychological process Frith, 1989a, 1989b). Hence, the study of the thnction of the
autistic mind has been considered the key route for the understanding of this syndrome.
Frith (1993) proposes three causal models for the explanation of various developmental
disorders at three levels: biological, cognitive and behavioural. The suggestion is that, in
the case of autism multiple neurological abnormalities may cause a single cognitive deficit,
leading in turn to multiple behavioural manifestations. Thus, the objective of cognitive
neuropsychology is to identify the underlying cognitive process that gives rise to "surface"
behaviours (Frith, 1992).
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of mind and cognitive science provide the theoretical resources for cognitive
perspectives on the etiology of autism. In 1978, Premack & Woodruff published a paper
with the title "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?". They carried out a series of
experiments with a chimp (Sara); she was shown video recordings of a person facing
problems and was asked to choose a solution. Her responses were surprisingly
appropriate, revealing that she could understand the actor's desires and intentions. So, if
Sara could easily predict human behaviour on the basis of her theory of mind, then this
innate cognitive mechanism of attributing independent mental states to self and other could
be the background for making sense of the social world in humans as well. In a
commentary on this study, the philosopher Dennett (1978) argued that mental states are
"instrumental" for every human being to make sense of the social world; beliefs and desires
are the most significant, because they determine human action. Thus, the study of one's
ability to understand and predict false belief could be a strong test for his/her theory of
mind ability. These ideas have inspired many theoretical hypotheses and a rich body of
empirical investigation in autism, since one of its primary clinical symptoms is the lack of
reciprocal social interaction. Namely, it has been proposed that the social abnormalities in
autistic children may stem from a pathological fault in the acquisition and development of
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the ability to understand and predict one's own and other's social behaviour by inferring
mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1993; Frith, 1989a, 1989b; Leslie, 1993).
Precursors of the theory of mind
The "cognitivist stance" views behaviour as a set of representational schemata of the world
(Olson, .1988). For example, if one believes (represents) an object to be in location x, one's
action will be determined by this belief, rather than the true location of the object. The
characteristic feature of these psychological states is their "intentionality". This property
provides a realistic dimension to representational states. In other words, mental states
entail a "propositional attitude": they express the relation between a proposition and its
holder, i.e., I (subject) think (attitude) that it will rain tomorrow (proposition). That is,
their content is always about something, i.e., I think x, I know y. Moreover, these mental
states are not directly observable and require the use of inference. This logical property of
mental states is their "referential opacity": it is suspended whether they are true or not
(Olson, 1988). Hence, it is possible to represent things that are non-existent or false, i.e.,
in the statement "I believe there is a tree in the yard", it is not clear whether there is a tree
or not.
Leslie (1987, 1988, 1991, 1993) proposed that the cognitive system produces "primary"
and "secondary" representations (or metarepresentations). The former are beliefs about
concepts of the physical world, i.e., there is a tree. The latter are beliefs about own or
other's primary representations, i.e., I pretend there is ghost here (first-order
metarepresentation), I think that you pretend that there is a ghost (second-order
metarepresentation), I believe that you think that he pretends there is a ghost (third-order
metarepresentation) and so on. In Leslie's terms, any metarepresentation has the general
form: Agent (personls) - Informational Relation (intentional state, i.e., pretend, think,
know, imagine) - "Expression" (decoupled representation). "Decoupling" is the mechanism
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of copying a primary representation and suspending its reference to the physical world. In
the above example of first-order metarepresentation, it is not certain whether there is a
ghost or not, since this is only related to my mental state. Leslie formulated his theory
through observations of pretence in young normal children. He assumed that their ability
to pretend (or form metarepresentations) is based on their ability to have primary
representations of the world. When a child pretends that a banana is a telephone, s/he
already knows that bananas are fruit. Otherwise, s/he would not be able to understand and
show pretence. However, autistic children have not been observed to engage in
spontaneous pretend play (Baron-Cohen, 1985). This impairment has been explained by
Leslie as a lack of their capacity for metarepresentation. However, Eisenmajer & Prior
(1991) stressed that a serious problem with Leslie's metarepresentational model is that "it
is an all-or-none affair" (p. 362), that does not allow for degrees of metarepresentational
ability. This point is fair in the light of empirical evidence on some high-ftinctioning autistic
individuals that show the ability to hold first- and second-order representations.
There is a great deal of controversy on the nature of the precursors for a theory of mind in
infants as well as the exact age of onset of a theory of mind. Weliman (1990) proposes
that by the age of three years all children are able to perceive other people's minds and use
this knowledge for understanding their actions. Leslie (1987) suggests that the acquisition
of theory of mind occurs earlier, between 12 and 18 months of age. Baron-Cohen (1991b;
1993 a) claims that this ability emerges in the 9-12 months of age and is associated with the
understanding of goal and attention. In particular, he argues that joint-attention deficits are
the earlier signs of an impaired theory of mind, since they are also based on
metarepresentation.
Baron-Cohen (1989d) tested autistic children on their ability to use protoimperative and
protodeclarative pointing. Compared to normal and Down's syndrome children, autistic
subjects showed almost no use of pointing for making a comment or remark for objects to
others (protodeclarative use). In contrast, they appeared to use their index finger mainly
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for requesting objects from adults (protoimperative use). Thus, autistic children appeared
to share one's attention only as a strategy for satisfying their own needs. Then, Baron-
Cohen (1991b; 1993) argued that the earliest detector of autism could be the lack of
understanding attention in others: that others look at objects selectively, because of their
own interest. This is the first type of representation formulated in the mind: understanding
of the mental state of attention. This argument is useful in explaining clinical observations
of autistic children that take an adult by the hand and guide him to the object they want to
get. In opposition, normal children use eye-gaze as a way to communicate their needs.
But, autistic children do not seem to use eye-gaze for understanding the goal of one's
actions; although they do not always avoid eye-contact with others, they do not seem to
make the appropriate social use of eye-gaze. Thus, the deficit in goal-detection leads to a
general deficit in the ability for "mind-reading" of other mental states (Baron-Cohen,
1991b; 1993).
However, Baron-Cohen's account remains in the cognitive domain. Although, Mundy et al
(1993) acknowledge the critical role of joint-attention behaviours for the development of a
theory of mind, they draw attention to their affective component. Thus, their model
emphasises the integration of affect and cognition in joint-attention. The ability for affect
perception is viewed as closely related with the cognitive ability for representation. Also,
Meltzoff and Gopnik (1993) agree that infants perceive others as persons rather than as
objects (as the affective theories propose) but refute the "affective attunement between
infants and others" (p. 360) as the key mechanism; instead they support imitation as the
fundamental process for the development of a theory of mind.
The "nativist assumption"
The aim of neurocognitive approaches is to built up a theory, based on the investigation of
the internal architecture of the mind, that will explain abnormal and normal behaviours
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(Leslie's "black box" model, 1993). The hypothesis is that abnormalities in brain growth
may produce impairments in cognitive structures, resulting in behavioural deficits.
Metarepresentation (or theory of mind) is considered as an in-built module of the cognitive
engine that generates conceptual development (Leslie, 1988, 1991); it is a computational
mechanism that changes with maturation. Leslie (1988) claims that normal children at the
age of 18 months are "biologically prewired" to acquire the ability for pretend play, a
primitive form of metarepresentation. Later, at about 3-4 years, they are able to make
attributions about intentional states of their own and others' minds. However, autistic
children are not equipped with this cognitive apparatus. As a consequence, they can not
make sense of social interaction and are not aware and conscious of their own mental
reality (Baron-Cohen, 1989c). Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993) present Leslie's view with an
analogy: autistic children " might be seen as more analogous to astronomers who try to
develop theories of the stars without telescopes" (p. 359). Proponents of the cognitive
perspectives claim that education can only compensate for an ability that nature has
impaired (Frith, 1993).
The "primacy assumption"
The relevant argument is that the deficit in theory of mind is the most appropriate tool for
predicting the "triad of impairment" in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1985; Frith, 1989a, 1989b,
1989c). Thus, the damage in metarepresentation is considered as the single cognitive
domain responsible for the abnormalities in communication, imagination and social
interaction in autism. However, Happe (1994a, 1994b) rightly points out that the theory of
mind account cannot explain non-triad features of autism, such as restricted repertoire of
interests, obsessive desire for sameness, islets of ability, excellent rote memory and pre-
occupation with parts of objects. She goes !l.irther to suggest that Frith's "central
coherence theory" is more successftil on this task. Frith (1989a) suggested that autism
could be explained as a result of a disturbance in the information-processing ability for
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formulating meaning in context out of diverse information. The hypothesis is that autistic
children will perform very well on tasks that require attention to local aspects but very
poorly on tasks that require knowledge of the global meaning. Happe (I 994a, I 994b)
embraces Frith's theory, since it may explain why "the talented minority" of autistic
children (those that pass advanced theory of mind tests) has persisting problems in real life
social encounters. Two-way social interaction is a global situation and as such, it is even
more difficult for an autistic person to control and respond to the whole, if s/he is able to
process only parts of it.
Another rival neuropsychological theory on the primacy of the metarepresentational deficit
in the autistic syndrome is "the executive function hypothesis" (Bishop, 1993; Ozonoff et
al 1991a, 1991b). This assumption postulates autism as the outcome of a biological fault in
the frontal lobe and the limbic system of the brain, where "the ability to maintain an
appropriate problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal" (Bishop, 1993; 284) is
located. Executive function is the basis for behaviours, such as organised search, flexibility
of thought and action, impulse control. The evidence for this presumption will be
discussed in relation with the empirical evidence on theory of mind in autistic individuals.
The "specificity assumption"
It has been noted that one of the strengths of the cognitive account is that it allows for a
mixed pattern of abilities and deficits in autism (Frith, 1989a; Baron-Cohen, 1993). The
main premise is that areas of functioning that call on mentalising skills and "mindreading"
will be heavily damaged. Thus, the "metarepresentational conjecture" (Leslie, 1991)
predicts that some social skills will be intact in autistic children: those that do not require
metarepresentation. Namely, face recognition, mirror self-recognition, gender recognition,
visual perspective-taking, person permanence, relationship recognition, animate-inanimate
distinction will be unimpaired, whereas imitation of symbolic gestures, emotion
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recognition and conceptual role-taking will be impaired (Baron-Cohen, 1988, 1991b,
199 Ic). On the whole, it is proposed that the lack of theory of mind in autism presents a
mixed pattern of deviance and delay in areas of functioning (Baron-Cohen, 1991c, 1992a).
This is illustrated through strong experimental evidence showing a small number of autistic
children passing second-order theory of mind tasks. However, they do not appear to
follow the same developmental pattern in the developmental acquisition of mental states
(i.e., perception, desire, imagination, belief).
Knowledge of self and others in autism
The cognitive model puts forward the argument that awareness of the self and others will
be impaired in autism (Frith, 1989a, 1989b, 1993). This claim rests on the assumption that
the autistic person's mind cannot impute its own and others' internal states. Self-
consciousness is regarded as the product of having a mental self. To illustrate this point,
Frith (1989b; 47) paraphrases Descartes' dictum "I think therefore I am" in the following
way, "I know that I think, therefore there is myself'. However, she claims that without any
doubt autistic children do have mental states, such as perceptions, desires, wishes, beliefs,
memories, knowledge; but they are not conscious of them, due to the innate lack of theory
of mind. In effect, they are "mind-blind" as opposed to others that can "mind-read"
(Happe, 1994a). Hence, the autistic person can only make sense of the physical and
observable world; s/he can not access any mental dimensions of reality in her/himself. In
Frith's terms (1989b), the autistic individual would have a "non-reflective" (p.47) sense of
self that might include a concept of self as a bodily object and not as a mental subject, as a
result of a deficit in the ability to be aware of mental representations about the self.
Moreover, understanding of the self and the other are considered as closely related. Thus,
knowledge of others will not go beyond the attribution of physiological states, which do
not require mental skills for their conception. Therefore, autism represents a disorder with
a primitive concept of the self and others.
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Critique of cognitive approaches
Here, my objective is to evaluate the a-priori theoretical assumptions of the cognitive
theories that were presented in the preceding sections. Of course, the theory of mind
hypothesis constitutes a major advance, because it established specific mechanisms that
link cognition, and - social behaviour (Rutter & Bailey, 1993). It moved from the
behavioural level to the cognitive level in research into autism; thus, it threw light on the
underlying cognitive mechanisms of the clinical features of autism. Moreover, the
cognitive account has been essentially a developmental one; it postulated a series of skills
that built up one's theory of mind; it did not claim that "mind-reading" is a novel ability. It
attempted to explain early autistic indicators through cognitive deficits at the young age of
9 months. On the whole, it represents an ambitious endeavour, that has stimulated a great
deal of theoretical discussion and empirical work at an international level. The task of
evaluating the cognitive approach has been impeded by its enthusiastic welcome in the
research and professional community, mainly because it offers a new and ground-breaking
theory, demonstrating that autism is a cognitive disorder and not a psychogenic syndrome.
Nevertheless, the fact that the theory of mind hypothesis has been primarily focused on the
role and the contribution of cognitive processes in the autistic behaviour constitutes ones
of its critical theoretical limitations. Certainly, the emphasis on innate mentalising abilities
is an insightful avenue but it is not sufficient for a more comprehensive understanding of
autism, as it is experienced in real-life social situations. The assumption of the primacy of
the theory of mind ability as the basis for social interaction could be criticised for its
narrow and mechanistic implications. The cognitivist stance views all social contact as a
merely computational act, free of contextual influence. It regards human nature as a
product of a cognitive engine that constructs and appraises its contents (i.e., mental states)
and behaviour. However, the mind is not developed in a vacuum but in the complex social
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domain. Individuals manipulate their behaviour with respect to the social-emotional cues
they receive from their human surroundings. Thus, it would be interesting to explore how
the autistic mind performs in different contexts; to look for variations in the ways autistic
persons use or do not use a theory of mind. It seems that there is a need to go beyond the
metarepresentational self and examine social interactions.
In normal children the development of a theory of mind occurs through the transactional
experience between caregivers and children (Bruner & Feldman, 1993). Such an approach
acknowledges the significance of interpersonal relationships in shaping one's theory of
mind. Various assumptions have been put forward on the key processes that may hinder
the formation of social experience in autism. A failure to recognise and appreciate
emotional expressions in other people has been postulated as the primary deficit in autism
(Hobson, 1993 a). Another alternative hypothesis is that the inability of autistic persons to
encode and organise the narrative structures of society as they are scaffolded by others
prevents them from developing a conventional theory of mind (Bruner & Feldman, 1993).
However, these assumptions have not been tested in natural settings. Finally, the strength
of the cognitive theory will be measured in terms of its methodological decisions and
empirical findings. These will be considered in the following section of this chapter.
Empirical research
Here, the overall aim is to consider the empirical evidence of cognitive perspectives on the
understanding of mental states of self and others in autism. However, the intention is to
select and present the most prominent and diverse research paradigms that have served as
the basis for the assumption that individuals with autism show a cognitive deficit in their
social understanding with implications for their own knowledge of themselves. The
emphasis on selection of research paradigms is important, because this chapter is nQt
seeking to present a total coverage of the extensive research on autism. Moreover, the
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focus will be on studies that have used persons with high-functioning autism and
Asperger's syndrome as their target groups.
Although research conducted by the proponents of cognitive theories is, on the whole,
primarily experimental, there is some interesting work carried out in naturalistic settings.
First, I will present findings on the performance of autistic persons on a series of
experimental tasks, tapping the theory of mind ability. Here, the main paradigm is the
comparison of the target group with control groups (mentally handicapped and normal),
carefully matched on verbal mental age, so that any effects from mental retardation on the
autistic subjects are reduced. However, there has been a fascinating explosion of research
with data that are contradictory to those obtained by the initial experimental investigations.
Next, I will discuss how naturalistic work on the cognitive deficit in autism, albeit
extending the traditional experimental approach, nevertheless remains within the same
theoretical framework.
Experimental evidence
Attribution offalse belief
At the outset, understanding of false belief was regarded as the baseline for establishing a
theory of mind or the lack of it in normal and clinical populations. In 1983, Wimmer &
Perner tested normal children at the age of 3-4 on their ability to impute another's false
belief. Their test was adopted by Simon Baron-Cohen, Alan Leslie & Uta Frith (1985),
who were the first psychologists to test the same ability in autistic children (n= 20),
compared with a group with Down's syndrome and a group of normal children. The target
group had higher mean verbal (5 years and 5 months) and non-verbal (9 years and 3
months) mental age than the control groups; also, these autistic subjects were high-
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functioning, with an average performance IQ of 82 (only one subject had IQ lower than
70)
The "marble task" involves two dolls: Sally and Anne. Sally has a basket and Anne has a
box. Sally puts a marble into her basket and leaves. While she is away, Anne takes the
marble from Sally's basket and places it into her box. Then Sally comes back and wants to
play with her marble. The critical question is: "Where will Sally look for her marble?" (the
_Belief question). Children were also asked comprehension questions: the Naming question
("Which doll is Sally and which is Anne?"), the Reality question ("Where is the marble
really?") and the Memory question ("Where was the marble in the beginning?").
Interestingly, the only significant group differences were found in the Belief Question:
80% of autistic children failed the test, in contrast with 85% of normal and 86% of Down's
syndrome children who responded correctly about Sally's false belief. The finding that the
autistic subjects who passed the test did not have higher MA than those who failed
showed that successful attribution of false belief was not related with verbal ability. Thus,
this failure in imputing another's false belief was supported as a demonstration of a specific
cognitive deficit in the theory of mind in able autistic children.
deGelder (1987) criticised heavily Baron-Cohen et al's study. Firstly, she argued that the
autistic group did not pass the test, because it was "embedded in a pretence situation" (p.
287). Autistic children were asked to pretend that the dolls were people with beliefs, and it
has been demonstrated that they have difficulty in pretend play. Therefore, it was expected
that they would find it hard it to be successful on that task. Instead, deGelder insisted that
it would be necessary to study autistic children in natural interactions that require the use
of the ability experimentally tested. Secondly, she pointed out that this task was
"embedded in language" (p. 287), since autistic children were asked to give verbal
responses. Given the empirical evidence for pragmatic deficits in autism, it is not certain
that autistic children could understand the meaning of the critical question. Thus, the
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SallyAnneu
 task may evidence a language deficit rather than a cognitive deficit. Thirdly,
she suggested that if autistic children did not have a theory of mind they would not have
been able to participate in an experimental situation, as they need to be able to understand
the experimenter's beliefs and intentions. She concluded that autistic children do have a
theory of mind, but it is less complex than that of normal children. Finally, deGelder
proposed a componential view in the study of autism: this syndrome needs to be
considered as a case of a partial biological breakdown in the integration of the biological
function of social interaction with the development of linguistic/conversational skills and
the conceptual ability of having a theory of mind.
Leslie & Frith (1987) replied to deGelder in the following way. Firstly, they referred to the
replication of a similar experiment with real people confirming the theory-of-mind-deficit
prediction (Leslie & Frith, 1988). Secondly, autistic children appeared to have rather
selective language problems only with the belief question and not with the memory and
reality questions. So, if there was a language disability, it was not generalised, but affected
only statements on mental states and not true states of affairs. Thirdly, Leslie & Frith
(1987) emphasised thatit is not certain which areas of social interaction and conversation
involve metarepresentational skills and which do not. Therefore, these autistic children
may have not employed this cognitive ability for taking part in an experiment.
deGelder's argument (1987) was important in the sense that it highlighted factors
associated with the task that may explain autistic children's performance on the task. As
Freeman et al (1991) have demonstrated appropriate changes in the task may have a direct
effect on normal children's success rate. They modified the "Sally-Anne" task to a hide-
and-seek game (the marble was replaced with a doll with whom Sally was playing hide-
and-seek), so that the task would have greater "human sense" (Donaldson, 1978) for the
children. They tested one group of 3-year-old (n= 40) normal children and another of 4
1/2 year-olds (n= 40) on three tests of false-belief attribution: the standard Sally-Anne test,
the hide-and-seek test and the Debbie's pet test. The results were interesting, because they
38
showed that the hide-and-seek game was easier (85% success rate) than the standard test
(48% success rate). In a second experiment, the children were required to act out the
actor's plan. Children were asked to take up the story and act out the actor's mental plan
(measure of practical intelligence). This resulted in more successful responses (94%),
whereas in the standard modified task the success rate was smaller (64%). However, there
has not been any research on whether similar task modifications would also affect autistic
children's performance on the same test.
In 1986, Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith tested false-belief attribution through a different
paradigm. Autistic, mentally handicapped and normal 4-year old children were shown
pictures representing three different types of events: physical, social-behavioural and
intentional. They were asked to make a story by putting each set of pictures in the right
order and give a verbal report of it. For example, one intentional story was: a girl is
holding her teddy bear and looks at a flower. She leaves her teddy bear behind, picks the
flower and smells it. At this point, a boy comes and takes the teddy bear away. The girl
turns back and believes (or expects) that her teddy bear is there. The hypothesis was that
the autistic group would have a specifically impaired performance on those stories that
involved understanding of the protagonist's mental state. Also, their language would be
poor in mental terms. These assumptions were confirmed. All autistic children were
successful in finding the correct picture-sequence in events with physical and social-
behavioural causes, but 80% of them failed in the false-belief stories. Moreover, their
descriptions were not rich in mental-state verbs relative to those of controls. Boucher
(1989) criticised this study on the ground that the sample might not be representative,
since it was also examined in the 1985 study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith. However,
Ozonoff et al (1991a) found exactly the opposite results: high-functioning autistic
adolescents were able to pass the intentional condition in the same task, but not the
mechanical and behavioural (they failed only on one of these stories) conditions. Also,
Oswald & 011endick (1989) did not find any differences between a low-functioning autistic
group and mentally retarded controls. It could be concluded, then, that the utility of this
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task as a measure of knowledge of false belief is still questioned. A critique of the
theoretical model used was given on pp.33-34 and on pp.59-60 there is further discussion
of the empirical evidence derived from them.
The few autistic children that passed the "marble" test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith,
1985) were further tested on their ability to understand second-order belief attribution
(i.e., "I think he believes that ...") (Baron-Cohen, 1989b). It was hypothesised that the
capacity for an advanced .theory of mind would be also impaired in this successful
minority. In the autistic group, the minimum chronological age was 11 years and
verballnon-verbal age higher than 7 years.
The "Ice-Cream man" task, adapted from Perner & Wimmer's study (1985) with normal 5-
10 year olds, was also presented with puppets, but the story was more complicated than in
the "Sally-Anne" task. John and Mary are in the park. John wants to buy ice-cream but has
left his money at home. The ice-cream man tells him that he will be there all afternoon. So
John goes home to get his money and will be back in the afternoon. But the ice-cream man
changes his mind and tells Mary that he will go to the church in order to sell more ice-
cream there. On his way, he meets John and tells him that he will drive to church. Mary
goes to John's home and his mother tells her that John has gone to buy some ice-cream.
The Belief question was: "Where does Mary think John has gone to buy an ice-cream?".
Also children were asked to justify their responses.
The prediction was confirmed. All autistic children failed this task, as opposed to 90% of
normal and 60% of Down's syndrome children who passed it. Moreover, autistic children
were found to use either first-order (instead of second-order) attributions or attributions to
physical states in their justification responses. This finding supported the hypothesis that
most of the autistic children are not able to make first-order attributions and those that are
able, do not proceed to a more advanced level of a theory of mind. Therefore, autism was
seen as a case of a specific developmental delay in theory of mind.
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However, Burack (1992) argued that the above findings indicate a developmental deviance
rather than delay in the acquisition of a theory of mind. Baron-Cohen (1992a) proposed a
mixed model of deviance and delay in autism. His preceding study (1989b) supported a
delay in the acquisition of theory of mind. Later, when he studied experimentally the ability
for recall of a range of mental states in autistic children, he found a deviant pattern in the
sequence of acquisition of a range of mental states (Baron-Cohen, 1991c). Autistic
children appeared to have more difficulties with imagination and pretence than perception
(in contrast with normal and mentally handicapped who found these mental states the
easiest ones), which was the easiest for them followed by desire. Yet, belief was equally
difficult for all groups.
Boucher (1989) developed an insightftil criticism of the "Ice-Cream Man" task. By
drawing attention to "the safety of interpreting failure to use a skill as evidence that the
skill is lacking" (p. 191), she suggested that autistic children may fail to appreciate the
need to use this knowledge of others' mental states in particular situations. She recalled a
similar argument proposed in respect of pretend play: that autistic children lack the ability
to pretend in their play (Baron-Cohen, 1985). However, able autistic children showed
pretend play under "elicited" play situations, whereas under "spontaneous" conditions they
did not (Lewis & Boucher, 1988). Boucher made the point that a more careful research
design and a hypothesis that is not deficit-oriented may throw light on the "true"
behaviours in autism. Moreover, she stressed the fact that autistic children were assessed
on a vocabulary test (the British Picture Vocabulary Scale), whereas the theory of mind
tasks assess grammatical competence. Although their vocabulary was superior to that of
controls, this did not imply that their comprehension of syntax was also superior.
However, Leslie & Frith (1988) did not find any relationship between language ability and
performance on theory of mind tests; this might be due to the use of an inappropriate
language test. Also, Boucher speculated that motivational factors may determine autistic
children's performance on theory of mind tasks. Baron-Cohen (1989a) replied to Boucher,
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by posing the critical question: "Why are they not motivated to use a theory of mind?". If
it is an intentional act on behalf of autistic children then, he argues, it would require a
massive effort from them.
Leslie & Frith (1988) utilised a more refined methodological strategy in another study of
false belief and knowledge attribution in autistic children. In this project, autistic children
were compared with children with specific language impairment; so any effects from
language delay in the performance of autistic subjects would be eliminated. Again, the
target group had a higher mean MA (7 years and 2 months) than the control group (6
years and 9 months).
In the knowledge task, experimenter 1 hid a red counter under a yellow box. Both
experimenter 2 and the child saw her doing that. Then, experimenter 2 was asked to leave
the room; experimenter 1 produced another similar counter which the child hid in another
place. The "knowledge" question was: "Does experimenter 2 know that there is a counter
(the second) under here?" and the prediction question was: "When experimenter 2 comes
back in, where will she look for a counter?". Eight (44%) out of 18 autistic children
passed the above task. The authors did not use a control group for this test.
In the false belief task, instead of puppets as in the initial study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie &
Frith (1985), real people acted out a scenario. Experimenter 1 hid a coin in a basket in
front of experimenter 2 and the child. Experimenter 2 left the room, and then experimenter
1 removed the coin from the basket and hid it in a red purse, making sure that the child
was attending. The "knowing" question was: "Does experimenter 2 know that the coin is in
here?", the prediction question was: "When experimenter 2 comes back, where will she
look for the coin?" and the "think" question was: "Where does experimenter 2 think the
coin is?". Significant group differences emerged: only 27% of autistic children made the
correct predictions of the experimenter's false belief, as opposed to 92% of the control
children. Interestingly, there was no correlation between mental age and performance in
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the target group on both tests. Therefore, autistic children found it easier to understand
knowledge than belief (44% and 27% of the autistic children were successful respectively);
yet, both mental states were difficult for them.
The autistic child's understanding of false belief and knowledge was tested in a different
paradigm by Perner, Frith, Leslie and Leekam (1989). Again, autistic children (mean
verbal mental age= 6.2) were compared with children with specific language impairment
(SLI) (mean verbal mental age= 6.9) on the "deceptive-appearance" or "Smarties box"
test. Each child was presented with a box of Smarties and was asked to say what the
contents of the tube would be. All children gave the same response: "Smarties". Then the
box was opened and children were shown that it contained a pencil. The critical question
was: "S/He hasn't seen the box. When she comes in, I'll show her/him this box just like this
and ask: [Name] what's in here?", "What will [Name] say?". Only 4 (17.5%) out of 23
autistic children gave the correct response, whereas all but one SLI children passed the
test. The pass rate was similar to that of the seminal study on false belief by Baron-Cohen
et al (1985). As in Leslie & Frith's study (1988), performance on false belief and
knowledge were closely associated. However in the present study, more autistic children
failed to attribute knowledge to themselves and others, compared to those in Leslie &
Frith (1988), due to "procedural differences" between the two studies (Perner et a!, 1989).
Eisenmajer & Prior (1991) were the first to study the link between having a theory of mind
and its cognitive-behavioural consequences, such as pragmatic competence, understanding
of sociallmoral rules and interpersonal relations. Their main assumption was that the
performance of autistic children in theory of mind tests may result from a
cognitive/linguistic delay which is not an autism-specific deficit. In other words, their aim
was to examine how the possession of theory of mind is related with language
competence. They investigated theory of mind in a sample of Australian high-functioning
autistic children with mean MA (7 years and 9 months) higher than that (5 years 5 months)
in Baron-Cohen et al's (1985) as well as that (7 years 2 months) in Leslie & Frith's (1988)
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British studies. First-order belief attribution was measured in two tasks. First, they
presented the "Sally-Ann&' task in its original form as it was employed in Baron-Cohen et
al's study (1985); in the second trial, they introduced the word "first" in the critical
question: "Where will Sally look for her marble first?". This procedural change had an
interesting effect on the results: 50% of the children who failed the first trial passed when
the question was changed to include the word "first". Overall, the percentage of "passers"
(69%) was higher than the previous studies. All subjects who passed had verbal mental age
above 5 years and chronological age of 8 years. Although verbal .MA appeared to be a
significant discriminating factor of autistic children on theory of mind tests, it was not
sufficient since some children with high verbal MA did fail on those tasks.
At this point it is worth noting a valid argument supported by Siegal & Beattie (1991) and
embraced by Leslie (1994). They claim that children may not be aware of the
experimenter's intention and switch their response to an incorrect one. For example,
children may interpret the critical question: "Where will Sally look for the marble?" as
"Where will Sally have to look for the marble?" rather than "Where will Sally look for the
marble first?", which. is more revealing of the experimenter's questioning. Thus,
experimenters should be more careftil on the conversational rules of the task and provide
conversationally supportive task questions (as in the above study) that may improve
autistic children's performance on these tasks. It is crucial that the participants who are
tested share the same purpose of the task questions with the experimenter. The general
suggestion is that failure on false-belief tasks could be explained in terms of children's
conversational environment (at home and school) and their previous experience with
adults' usage of language (Siegal & Peterson, 1994). It might be interesting to explore
whether high-ftmnctioning autistic children who succeed on theory mind tasks are taking
part in rich conversations on mental states in their natural settings.
A linguistic modification on the test questions was used by Lewis & Osborne (1990) in a
study of belief attribution to self and other in normal 3-year old children. Their hypothesis
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was that the syntactic form of the question accords a higher chance that children will
understand the experimenter's intentions. They tested a large sample of pre-schoolers (n=
131) on the "Smarties task" under three conditions. In the first trial, the belief question
was asked in the standard way; in the other trials, a different time-specification was
introduced: "What did you think was in the box?" (standard question), "What did you
think was in the box, when the top was still on it?" ("when" question), "What did you
think was in the box, before I took the top off?" ("before" question). It was found that 3-
year-olds were able to make false belief attributions, when the time was specified in the
question. Their responses to the standard question were less successful than to the other
two conditions. They had greater difficulty with the "when" question than the "before"
question. Also, all children tended to predict equally correctly their own and other's
beliefs. This study emphasises the importance of the "children's interpretations of the
discourses in which experimenters attempt to assess their knowledge and skill." (p. 1519).
The view that task-related factors may effect autistic children's performance has been also
tested by Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan (1994). A group of high-functioning autistic
adolescents was tested on a second-order theory of mind task with simple information
processing demands (i.e., the length and complexity of the story). Two short stories on
deception were read to the children. Surprisingly, there were no significant differences
between the autistic group and the mentally retarded control group in the number of
correct responses as well as appropriate use of mental explanations. Therefore, it was
argued that "the difficulty for both groups with the standard second-order task lies in its
information processing demands, rather than subjects' conceptual difficulties in handling
recursively embedded mental states." (p. 583).
Bowler (1992) also found a more successful performance on first and second order belief
attribution tasks of 15 individuals with Asperger's syndrome. As in Eisenmajer & Prior
(1991), this sample had significantly higher age (26.6) and general intelligence (1Q 87)
than the autistic group in Baron-Cohen et al's study (1985). There were no significant
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group differences in the first-order belief attribution test ("the marble story") between the
target group and a comparison group of schizophrenic patients (in order to test differences
in theory of mind in two groups with social impairment) and normal subjects. Interestingly,
the percentage of successful persons with Asperger's syndrome (93%) was exactly the
same with that of normal subjects and higher than that of the schizophrenic group (73%).
Further, the ability for second-order belief attribution was tested twice. In the first study,
the test used was the "Ice-Cream Man" scenario, identical to that in Baron-Cohen
(1989b). Contrary to Baron-Cohen's findings (1989b), no significant group differences
were found. Besides, all subjects were asked to give justifications of the protagonists'
belief and behaviour. Individuals with Asperger's syndrome and schizophrenia did not
differ from controls in their use of mental-state language. However, the majority of
justifications in all groups was of one type: not referring to the actor's mental state.
A further study of second-order belief attribution tested the hypothesis that the failure of
subjects' responses to use mental-state language in the above task could not be explained
in terms of representational deficits, but was due to "features of the story that focus
subjects' minds on non-mental explanations for people's behaviour" (Bowler, 1992; 884).
So, another test ("The Overcoat Story") that followed a pattern similar to the "Ice-Cream
Man" story was devised. But this scenario had two important characteristics: the content
was more adult and the event leading to a false-belief was a random, non-intentional act,
instead of a deliberate mental one. The percentage of "passers" with Asperger's syndrome
(73%) was the same as in the first study of second-order belief attribution. However, less
normal subjects and schizophrenic patients were successful compared to their own
performance in the first study and that of the Asperger's group. Interestingly, the use of
mental-state language in all groups tended to be greater than in the first study.
Bowler's study poses a serious challenge for the universality assumption of the cognitive
theory: the argument that theory of mind is not found at any level of autism. His sample of
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adults with Asperger's syndrome was successful in showing advanced theory of mind.
Moreover, his findings undermine the primacy assumption: whether the theory of mind
deficit can predict the triadu of autistic features. Further, he makes the challenging
question: does the successful performance on a theory of mind test protect autistic
children from their social impairment? Clearly, it does not. Thus, it seems that the theory
of mind hypothesis is not sufficient as an explanatory framework for the central social
abnormalities in autism.
Moreover, Bowler (1992) raised another substantial point: the failure in performance on a
theory of mind task does not necessarily imply that this ability is absent in the repertoire of
autistic persons. It could be interpreted as a failure to generalise and apply skills that make
them incompetent in their social behaviour. He argued that there is a problem in all the
deficit-oriented research on theory of mind in autism. It has failed to reject the null
hypothesis (that this ability is present), but this does not mean that the ability is absent.
Therefore, a failure to generalise and apply skills may explain why most autistic children
are incompetent in their social behaviour. In this study, persons with Asperger's syndrome
appeared to show an intact theory of mind social impairment. He proposed that it is
likely that individuals with Asperger's syndrome are able to develop compensatory
cognitive strategies and use "slow" and "cumbersome" routes in theory of mind tasks that
make them appear odd in social interactions. A similar possible cognitive interpretation of
the results is what Hermelin & O'Connor (1985) termed as the "logico-affective state":
high-functioning autistic persons use logical processes in problems that are in the
emotional and affective domain. However, Frith (1991) suggested that the success of
Asperger's syndrome individuals in solving complex belief attribution tests may explain
their better social adaptation. Yet, she proposed that their success on theory of mind tests
may come from a strategy that is not "theory-based". Developing this point, it could be
argued that these studies that focus on performance outcomes do not highlight the process
and the route that these children employ for solving or failing similar tests.
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Happe (1994c) attempted to investigate this critical issue as well as explore Bowler's
(1992) question. That is, why able autistic individuals pass advanced theory of mind tasks,
but face problems in their everyday social interaction. For this purpose, she devised a set
of stories with a more naturalistic content than other theory of mind tasks, responding to
the need for contextually embedded and realistic tests. These stories described dialogues
with different motivations behind utterances, such as, "pretence", "white lie", "joke",
"irony", "double bluff', "persuasion". The autistic adults who took part in that study were
grouped according to their performance on traditional theory of mind tasks. There were
three groups: those who failed all theory of mind tasks, those who passed first-order
theory of mind and those who passed second-order theory of mind tests. All subjects were
asked to give a response to the questions: "Was it true, what X said?" and "Why did X say
that?". Interestingly, autistic persons were consistent between their performance on the
stories and the theory of mind tasks: those who passed the second-order theory of mind
tasks scored higher than the other two groups of autistic subjects and gave more mental
explanations in their justifications. Also, stories on lying, joking and persuasion were more
difficult than stories about appearance/reality and forgetting. Moreover, the adults who
passed second-order theory of mind tasks (mean verbal 1Q 95) were not different in their
scores from the two comparison groups: normal adults and persons with mental handicap.
However, a significant difference emerged in the use of mental explanations; although, the
successful autistic group used the same amount of mental state terms as the control
groups, they were observed to give fewer correct mental state answers and made more
errors in attributing mental states than the normal controls. Thus, the difference was found
in the appropriate use of mental state references. These results replicated Bowler's
assumption that able autistic persons may find it hard to apply social knowledge in
everyday life (implying that the theory of mind deficit is not primary). Happe (1994c)
suggested that the lack of "central coherence" as it has been proposed by Frith (1 989a)
may fit these findings: these able autistic adults are able to understand mental states but fail
to use them in a context, due to an innate deficit in processing information as a whole.
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The relationship between success on theory of mind tasks and social adaptation in real life
was explored by Frith, Happe & Siddons (1994). They studied a group of 24 autistic
adolescents (mean verbal IQ= 51.63) on two tasks of first-order false belief attribution;
also, the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales were completed for each child by his/her
teacher/caregiver. The items of this instrument were classified into those that require
"mentalising" skills and those who do not. Three subgroups of autistic individuals were
observed: those who fail theory of mind tasks and in everyday life, those who pass the
tasks but show no theory of mind ability in real life and those who are able to understand
mental states both in the experiment and in real life. These results were confirmed by
Fombonne et a! (1994) who applied the same methodology on 17 French high-functioning
autistic individuals. Thus, the claim that there is "talented minority" in autism gains further
support. However, it could be argued that these measures were purely psychometric and
indirect: they were not derived from observations of social behaviour of able autistic
children in natural settings (i.e., home and school) but based on others' judgements about
these skills. It seems that the next direction for research should be to study the behaviour
of able autistic persons in their social interactions in everyday life.
However, an Australian study by Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) did not find any relationship
between performance on a series of theory of mind tests and social skills (the Social
Behaviour Rating Scale by Dawson & Fernald (1987) was completed by teachers). They
agreed with Ozonoff et al (1991b) that "it may be necessary to test theory of mind in a
more ecologically valid setting, if it is truly to represent the individual's ability to utilise
understanding of the beliefs of others during real-world social interactions." (p. 261). This
seems an insightful argument.
Nevertheless, a strong association between conceptual role-taking measured on tests in the
laboratory and social behaviour (teachers' ratings on the Social Behaviour Rating Scale)
was supported by Dawson & Fernald (1987). However, Prior et al (1990) found no
relationship between theory of mind performance and social skills (measured by parents'
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ratings on the scale referred above). There seems to be a contradiction between parents'
and teachers' evaluations of the social skills of autistic children. This problem arises as a
result of collecting information on autistic children's social awareness through
indirectlpsychometric techniques. Another study by Oswald & 011endick (1989) measured
autistic children's role-taking ability with a combination of techniques: task performance,
structured observations between children and adults, parents' and teachers' ratings. They
found a close relationship between direct measures of social competence and adults'
reports.
The "primacy" assumption of the theory of mind deficit (that the deficit in theory of mind
is primary) was also investigated by Ozonoff et al (1991a). In particular, emotion
perception, theory of mind and executive function were measured in high-functioning
autistic adolescents (mean frill scale 1Q 89), matched on CA and verbal IQ with non-
autistic children with dyslexia, learning difficulties, mild mental retardation and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder. First- and second-order theory of mind were assessed in five
different tests: picture-sequence, appearance-reality task, mental-physical distinction task,
brain-function task, Smarties task and the "Ice-Cream Man" task.
This study replicated findings of earlier studies: the autistic group was found to perform
significantly less well than the controls on the tests of emotion perception, theory of mind
and executive function. However, the theory of mind deficit was not found to be universal
in the whole autistic group, as opposed to the executive function deficit. The autistic
group appeared to find the tasks on the executive function the hardest (96% failed),
whereas the emotion perception tests were the easiest (65% failed). Second-order theory
of mind tasks were more difficult (87% failed) than first-order theory of mind (52% failed)
for the autistic subjects. Therefore, Ozonoff et al (1991a) argued that the primacy
assumption needs revision, since the prefrontal hypothesis provides a more successful
account; they also suggested that another neurological impairment in the prefrontal cortex
may causes both the executive function deficit and the theory of mind deficit.
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However, the autistic subjects of the previous study were divided in those with HFA and
those with AS and comparisons on the above tests were carried out (Ozonoff et al,
1991b). It was found that the HFA and the AS groups were deficient on the executive
function test, whereas the AS group had a better performance on the theory of mind tests
than the HFA group. On the basis of these findings, they argued for the primacy of the
executive function deficit and the distinction between 1-IFA and AS.
However, the main issue on whether the ability of an advanced theory of mind is lacking
from all autistic individuals remains still unresolved. Apart from task factors that may
influence autistic children's performance, another issue has been also suggested as a
possible explanation for the discrepancies in the percentages of autistic persons that pass
advanced theory of mind tests: verbal ability. Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) set out to
investigate whether autistic individuals with low (mean verbal age 5.8) and high (mean
verbal age= 9.3) verbal ability would have the same performance on five tasks of belief
attribution. Also, they examined the development of theory of mind, by selecting tasks that
ranged from simple to advanced belief imputations. They found that verbal ability was a
significant discriminating factor for success on the tasks: the autistic group with high
verbal mental ability scored higher than the comparison group with low verbal mental age.
However, they observed that the number of successful autistic persons was decreasing, as
the difficulty of the tasks was increasing. In particular, the second-order theory of mind
task was passed by 30% of the sample; this rate is consistent with Ozonoff et al (199 Ia)
and Bowler (1992), but in discrepancy from Baron-Cohen's (1989b) study. The main
explanation for that may be the higher verbal and non-verbal ability of the autistic group in
Baron-Cohen's study. Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) also found that all autistic subjects
who passed the tests gave mental explanations in their justifications. However, this may be
due to a less stringent criterion on these responses: implicit and explicit references to
mental states were included.
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Experimental testing of self-awareness in autistic children
Autistic children's knowledge of their own mental states has been tested experimentally by
Baron-Cohen (1989c). The prediction was that autistic children would not be able to take
into account their own mental states, as a consequence of "a dysfunction of the neural
structures necessary for a theory of mind in general" (p. 581). This deficit-oriented
hypothesis was tested on the basis of the assumption that self-awareness is a precursor of
the appearance-reality distinction (the ability to distinguish what something appears to be
as opposed to what it really is). The theoretical background of this experimental
investigation was the interrelationship between understanding false-belief attribution,
representational change and the appearance-reality distinction in normal 3-5 year olds
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988). The fundamental cognitive capacity for all these acquisitions
is metarepresentation (the construction of representations of one's own and others'
representations).
Autistic children were compared with mentally retarded and normal subjects on four
different tasks, in which four object properties (colour, size, material, identity) were
manipulated (Baron-Cohen, 1989c). These tasks were slightly adapted from relevant
developmental research with normal groups (Flavell et al, 1983; Gopnik & Astington,
1988). For example in the identity task, the child was shown a stone looking like an egg
and was asked: "What is this?". After replying that it was an egg, the child was given the
object to handle and discover that it was really a stone. Then, the probe question: "What is
it made of?" was asked. At that time, the appearance question: "What does it look like?"
was asked, followed by the reality question: "What is it really?". The tasks on the other
properties had an analogous structure.
According to the results in all tests, 11 out of 17 autistic subjects failed to give the correct
responses, as opposed to 13 out of 16 mentally retarded and 15 out of 19 normal children
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that were successful. Thus, autistic children tended to make phenomenist errors, focusing
and reporting only the appearance of the objects. For example, in the above task they
appeared to say that it looked like an egg and it was really an egg. Furthermore, autistic
children had greater difficulty performing on the tasks on size, material and identity. In
contrast, the same number of autistic and mentally retarded children (n= 11) passed the
colour task. Therefore, these findings supported the hypothesis that autistic persons would
be unable to disentangle their own perception of an object and their own knowledge about
it. In cognitive terms, "the perceptual information overrides other representations of an
object" (Baron-Cohen, 1989c; 595). It was concluded that they did not seem to be in
contact with their own mental states. However, their performance might be better, if they
were asked more probe questions (Baron-Cohen, 1989c). Another explanation emphasised
that the ability for introspection is only one of the component skills required by these
tasks, like "the ability to recognise the occurrence of a 'trick', and then communicate this
recognition." (p. 595). Besides, it is important to clarify that not all internal states are
beyond their awareness in autistic persons. This inability pertains only to those mental
states that depend on metarepresentation.
Nevertheless, the evidence outlined above can be criticised, with respect to the type of the
objects and the degree offamiliarity to the autistic children. It could be argued that, if
each child was presented with a picture of himself, then the possibility of showing
understanding of the appearance and the reality of these objects might be greater. For
example in the colour task, a photo of the child could be placed behind an orange filter and
then the child would be asked to say what the colour of his physical characteristics looked
like and what it really was. This modification of the task is based on the idea that the
responses of autistic children on tests of their awareness might be correct, if the objects
were representing directly themselves. Also, in the test of the appearance-reality
distinction on the size of the objects, the autistic child could be shown a photo of himself
and a family member. Then, a magnifying glass held over his figure in the photo would
make him appear bigger than the other figure. The child would be asked to say who looked
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bigger and who was really bigger. It has been reported that autistic children are able to
recognise facial characteristics of people (Hobson et al, 1988). So they would not have
problems with this sort of material. In that case, it is possible that they could express easily
their own mental states. A similar procedure could be applied for the test of material and
identity of objects. Another criticism could be that experimental evidence is necessary but
not sufficient evidence for a deficit in self-awareness in autism, because of its artificial
nature and the lack of qualitative information on the issue. It might be more illuminating to
obtain direct and qualitative information on mental states from autistic persons by asking
them direct questions on their own mental states.
Development of the understanding of mental states
Baron-Cohen (1991c) studied the ability to recall a variety of mental states- belief,
pretence, perception, desire and imagination- in the same group of autistic individuals. He
examined autistic children's awareness of their own mental states in 15 subjects (with
mental age over 5 years) matched with mentally retarded and 3 to 4 year old normal
children. Each mental state was tested once on tasks that followed the same pattern: the
child was presented with an original state that was experimentally manipulated and
produced a changed state. The critical demand was to report the original state. However,
the test question was modified, so that it would be more specific in lime (this modification
was originally used by Lewis & Osborne, 1990). For example, in the belief and pretend
tasks the questions had this form: "When I first asked you, before we opened the carton,
what did you think was inside?" or "When I first asked you, before we poured anything
out, what did you pretend to drink?".
It was striking that autistic children showed a different developmental sequence in the
understanding of these mental states from the normal and mentally retarded groups. In
particular, recall of their own perceptions was the easiest for them; pretence was more
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difficult than imagination; belief was the most difficult, as for the other two control
groups. On the contrary, the control groups found the task on desire slightly more difficult
than those on perception, imagination and pretence. Therefore, there is some evidence that
persons with autism understand belief six years later than normal children and they follow
a different pattern in understanding mental states.
Baron-Cohen (1991c) explained these findings as consistent with the cognitive model.
First, autistic children were expected not to.be  able to understand the "representational
mind". Second, the metarepresentational deficit predicts that the understanding of mental
states that are "driven by thought", like pretence and imagination, will be impaired,
whereas perception and desire will be intact. Third, the degree of mental-state
comprehension is related with the "truth-suspension" criterion. It is hypothesised that in
autism there is a dysfunction in the mechanism that allows "truth suspension". Therefore,
autistic children are predicted to have difficulties in grasping mental states, such as
imagination, pretence and belief, in which truth is suspended.
Understanding of emotions
Baron-Cohen (1991d) examined the ability to understand three causes of emotions:
situations, desires and beliefs. Desire and false belief are regarded as fundamental in folk
psychology (Dennett, 1978). Autistic children were compared with mentally retarded and
normal children on their ability to describe the feeling state (happy or sad) of a protagonist
in a story and explain the cause of these emotions. Significant group differences were only
found on the belief task: autistic children showed less understanding of beliefs as causes of
emotion than situations and desires. These findings confirmed the specificity assumption of
the cognitive account: autistic children appeared to have intact awareness of desire, but
impaired understanding of belief. Therefore, they would have difficulty in grasping
emotions caused by beliefs, such as boredom, embarrassment, surprise, curiosity. In
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contrast, they were able to be aware of their own and others' desires, since these mental
states do not require metarepresentation; they do not involve "intentions" but "drives" to
certain objects (Baron-Cohen, 1991 d).
Understanding of deception
On the one hand, clinical observations have reported that deceptive behaviour is rarely
shown by autistic persons. On the other hand, psychologists have conducted experimental
research with contradictory findings. This discrepancy is significant, taking into account
the underlying assumption that there is a strong relationship between understanding false
belief and the ability to understand lies and deception.
Russell et al (1991) presented autistic children with two boxes with windows facing them.
Each child was shown which box contained chocolate; then, he was told that someone else
wants to get this chocolate as well, but does not know where it really is. The critical
question was: "Where will you show (name) that the chocolate is?". Autistic children failed
to use their knowledge for deceiving the other person. This performance was explained in
terms of "the salience hypothesis": that autistic persons tend to consider as more salient
their physical knowledge about objects rather than their mental knowledge, due to an
impairment in their executive functioning ability. In other words, the lack of deception in
the tasks could be attributed to the inability of autistic subjects to disengage from the
objects. The same claim has been also made for the failure on false-belief tasks.
In a different paradigm, Sodian & Frith (1992) found that children with low and high-
functioning autism were successful on a sabotage task but failed on a deception task. In
the sabotage task, autistic subjects were successful in hindering a competitor from getting
a sweet by locking the box where it was hidden, while they left the box open for a
cooperative person; the critical question was: "Do you want to lock the box or do you
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want to leave it open?". Thus, they were able to apply deception with physical
manipulation (locking the box). However, they failed on the deception task that required a
belief manipulation; the critical question was: "Do you want to say the box is locked or do
you want to say it is open?".
Baron-Cohen (1992b) questioned the validity of the above findings, as they were based on
linguistically complex test questions. Also, he suggested that autistic children might not
have been motivated to respond correctly on a. task that was not studied in a natural
context. Thus, he carried out a different investigation of deception in a group of autistic
children, compared with mentally handicapped and normal subjects. His method involved a
naturalistic situation with minimal linguistic requirements: the penny-hiding game.
However, his findings were consistent with those by Sodian & Filth (1992). Thirteen out
of fifteen autistic children were only able to keep the penny hidden from the guesser
("object occlusion") but they disclosed cues from the guesser about where the penny might
be ("information occlusion"). In other words, they did not seem to understand that seeing
leads to knowing.
Another study on the relationship between second-order belief attribution and
understanding of lies and jokes in a group of high-functioning subjects showed that 50%
of them passed the second-order theory of mind test and made correct social judgements
about lies and jokes in the task story (Leekam & Prior, 1994). These findings replicate
those of Bowler (1992), Happe (1994c) and Ozonoffet al (1991b) that there seems to be a
"talented minority" that, despite an early history of childhood autism, has a successful
performance on "mentalising" tests. Leekam & Prior (1994) interviewed the parents of
their autistic sample on "lying" and 'joking" behaviours by the children. No incidents of
lying were reported for almost all children who passed the second-order belief attribution
tasks. Also, there was no evidence for intentional jokes and irony. Instead, parents
described their autistic children's jokes as repetitions of simple jokes. Therefore, it would
be useful to explore whether high-functioning autistic persons do not use their knowledge
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of understanding mental states in their everyday social interactions or they apply
compensatory strategies for this deficit (Sodian & Frith, 1993).
Naturalistic evidence
Research on the theory of mind in autistic children has been enriched by a different
methodological approach: the study of knowledge of one's and other's mental states in
spontaneous talk as well as the development of contigent discourse ability and cohesion in
spontaneous interactions with others.
Autistic children (mean CA= 3.5 yrs) were found to use correct cohesive strategies
(linguistic tools that create connections within and between utterances in a conversation:
pragmatic skills) less frequently than normal children in their discourse with an
experimenter in a semi-structured situation (Baltaxe & D'Angiola, 1992). However, the
autistic group made more errors than both the normal and the specifically language-
impaired group in the use of cohesive ties in discourse.
Furthermore, high-functioning autistic children showed no developmental changes in their
discourse abilities, although their language became more sophisticated in structural aspects
(i.e., grammar, syntax) over the period of 1 year in their conversations with their mothers
(Tager-Flusberg & Anderson, 1991). In contrast with a group of children with Down
syndrome (matched on age and language level), the autistic subjects did not seem to use
ways to maintain the conversational topic (by adding new information, challenging,
expanding or introducing new topics), despite their advanced language ability to contribute
in a conversation. Thus, the content of their discourse did not appear to change in parallel
with the form of their language.
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Moreover, Tager-Flusberg (1992) carried out an empirical investigation of the use of
utterances that referred to mental states by six high-functioning autistic children, compared
with six children with Down syndrome during home visits over a period of 1-2 years. Both
groups were matched on CA (mean= 5.4), language level, family/educational background
and socio-economic status, but not on level of intelligence. The main hypothesis was that
autistic children would have a language poor in lexical mental terms compared to controls,
due to the metarepresentational deficit. Verbal interactions between mother and child were
observed for 40-70 minutes bimonthly and recorded. Mothers could choose the
toys/activities/games that would suit best their children's needs. Four internal states were
coded: perception, desire, emotion and cognition. Also, all utterances were coded
according to whether they referred to self or other.
Interestingly, autistic and Down's syndrome children differed significantly only in the
cognitive domain. It was confirmed that autistic children were "noticeably deficient" in
their ability to talk about cognitive mental states. Another important finding was that all
children talked more about their own perceptions, desires and cognitions than those of
others. Only emotion terms were used equally for themselves and others.
Therefore, the data of this small-scale observational study are in agreement with the
experimental evidence on the delayed/deviant development of understanding mental states
in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1991a, 1991c). In particular, there is further support for an
uneven developmental pattern: perceptions, desires and emotions are unimpaired early on,
whereas cognitions seem to be impaired from the start. One possible explanation could be
that autistic children do not have pragmatic skills: they may not know the social use of
these terms. This argument could be also put forward for explaining the findings by
Bowler (1992) and Happe (1994c).
Overall, Tager-Flusberg's study has a limited observational scope. It could be suggested
that recordings of the conversations of able autistic individuals in different social settings
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(i.e., home, school) with a variety of others (i.e., father, sibling, teacher, peer) would
provide deeper and broader knowledge about their theory of mind, as reflected in language
about mental states. Nevertheless, the strength of the methodological strategy applied by
Tager-Flusberg lies in its empirical basis: a social situation that minimises experimental
effects and encourages naturalistic interaction. But, it has to be noted that, despite its
contextual focus, the interpretation of the results by Tager-Flusberg remains primarily
cognitive. The following study illustrates clearly the point that we wish to make.
Brown and Dunn (1991) studied the spontaneous talk of six second-born normal children
with their mothers and older siblings during the whole of their third year. They found that
there were reciprocal changes in mothers' and children's talk about feelings, desires and
thoughts of others. Also, both mothers and children were "delayed" in the use of
references to cognitive states as compared with their references to desires and feeling
states. Here, the main argument is that the role of social interaction in the developing
cognitive ability of normal children to understand their own and other people's
psychological states is substantial. Dunn (1994) has argued that "the ability to 'understand
other minds' is not a capability that, once achieved, will be evident across contexts; rather,
it will be subtly and not-so-subtly affected by what the child is trying to do in the social
encounter, and how the child interprets what the other is trying to do." (p. 307).
Curiously, though, there is a very limited amount of research with normal children on this
issue. In the area of autism, too, the paucity of research on whether autistic children apply
(or fail to do so) their social understanding in different contexts is notable. This line of
inquiry may illuminate the contradictory research findings on the able autistic children's
performance on theory of mind tasks.
Critique of the empirical research
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Because both the theoretical and practical implications of cognitive theories are substantial
and important, it is necessary to consider the evidence carefully and critically. Without any
doubt, the whole body of experimental evidence is based on carefully designed
experiments and sound methodological strategies. The original tests on false belief
attribution, such as the "Sally-Anne" and the "Ice-Cream" tests have introduced useful
paradigms for exploring the cognitive ability for a theory of mind. There has been an
explosion of studies with refined experimental methods. Persons with autism have also
been exposed to a variety of materials with a scenario that is supposed to represent
naturalistic circumstances. A range of task modifications have been critical in the
improvement of autistic person's performance. Currently, it is a matter of agreement that
there is a minority of individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger's syndrome who
perform successfully on advanced theory of mind tests. Thus, the assumption for the
universality of a single metarepresentational deficit across all levels of autism has been
seriously undermined. Alternative cognitive deficits have been proposed as more
appropriate candidates for explaining autism in the "talented minority": weak central
coherence and executive function.
However, it is this amount and quality of work that illuminates theoretical weaknesses of
the cognitive model. Therefore, the question that poses a challenge for cognitive
psychologists, who support a cognitive impairment as the sole fundamental cause of the
syndrome, comes from their own experimental findings: why do high-functioning autistic
persons with theory of mind still have persisting problems in real life situations? Thus, their
conclusions do not have a full explanatory power, since they cannot justi the social
abnormalities of the bright autistic persons that pass theory of mind tasks. Therefore, in
my view, an urgent need, which emerges from the existing experimental studies, is for a
new direction in the study of the social behaviour in autism: real-world social settings. The
major focus of the empirical research on the performance of autistic individuals in an
artificial situation indicates its most important limitation. It fails to take into account the
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context of social interaction, in which the use of the theory of mind ability will take place
and develop. This is the key area for a comprehensive understanding of the autistic mind.
SOCIAL-AFFECTIVE PERSPECTIVES
In this part I will present another set of psychological theories on the etiology of autism.
My purpose is to evaluate the main assumptions of social-affective arguments as measured
against the cognitive hypotheses. I begin with the theoretical premises on social perception
and the understanding of self and other in normal and abnormal development. Then, I will
consider the main directions of empirical research on autistic children, that provide support
for these explanatory models.
Theoretical background
The "relatedness triangle"
A rigorous alternative theory for explaining autism at the psychological level has been
proposed by Peter Hobson (1989, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1994). Its theoretical origins draw
from Kanner's (1943) first description of the syndrome as "a pure culture example of
inborn autistic disturbance of affective contact" (p. 250). Hence, Hobson's account
emphasises the affective aspects of autistic behaviour, as the key routes for understanding
the disorder. Also, philosophical ideas by Wittengestein, Strawson and 1-lamlyn are used as
the theoretical grounds for developing a social-affective theory of autism.
The first premise of this theory is that social behaviour is determined by the innate
propensity for "personal relatedness", which is anchored on perception of others'
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psychological orientations through their bodily movements (Hobson, 1993a). Infants are
"hard-wired" with the capacity to perceive the affective expressions of people and respond
to them in appropriate ways from the middle of their first year of life; they do not simply
respond to the behaviour of others, but they are also emotionally engaged. Thus,
"perception is relational" (Hobson, 1993a; 187). The concept of "relatedness" has been
chosen as the cornerstone of this theory, because it is perceptually based, it has cognitive
dimensions and entails motivational and emotional qualities (Hobson, 1993a). Therefore,
the role of others in social development is strongly acknowledged.
The notion of the "relatedness triangle" reflects the triangulation between infant, other and
referent. It means that infants are able to perceive their own attitude towards a referent, as
well as somebody else's different evaluative attitude towards the same referent (Hobson,
1994). This ability starts to develop through face-to-face interactions between the infant
and the caregiver in the early months of life. Examples of this type of relatedness and
understanding are requesting actions, initiating games, communicating refusal, making
greetings. It is argued that the interpersonal dimension of the infant's engagement with the
world will provide the essential background for the growth of social perception in
childhood (Hobson, 1993a). Namely, self-reflection, creative symbolisation and language
depend fundamentally on the "relatedness triangle".
Understanding of attitudes
The second premise of Hobson's perspective is that understanding of minds is essentially
understanding of persons with minds (Hobson, 1990b, 1993a, 1994). In his own words,
"the existence of beliefs presupposes the existence of persons" (Hobson, 1993a; 111). He
defines a "person" as a thing that has a body and a mind. He postulates that from the
beginning of life newborn babies relate to people and experience their emotional
expressions. Thus, by the age of nine months infants begin to apprehend others as persons
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with beliefs, intentions and feelings through their affective inter-subjective relations. They
can represent others' mental states, because they can directly perceive their attitudes in
their bodily movements.
Apart from the ability for interpersonal engagement, self-reflective awareness is considered
as another precursor for the development of a theory of mind. The argument is that of the
analogy. Once the infant is involved in social interaction, s/he begins to introspect and
ascribe mental attitudes to her/him self, then, s/he starts to infer others' mental states
(Hobson, 1990a, 1993 a). This account is similar to that of George Herbert Mead (1934)
on role-taking: the child can reflect others' attitudes within her/himself, if s/he has
appropriate attitudes towards others.
The focus on the development of self is one of the major differences between the cognitive
approaches and the affective theories. The "computational metaphor" regards
"metarepresentation" as an innate module of the cognitive apparatus in the child (Leslie,
1994). However, in Hobson's terms the "decoupling" or distancing of thoughts from
objects will not occur 'out of context, but in the affective engagement of the infant with the
caregiver that will facilitate awareness of the self (Hobson, 1994). This claim is drawn
from Vygotsky's (1978) thesis that "An interpersonal process is transformed into an
intrapersonal one" (p. 78). Hence, Hobson's position places emphasis on the social-
developmental paths for the acquisition of a theory of mind. In this process, self-
knowledge is a critical prerequisite for the grasp of mental states of others (Hobson,
1990a). Thus, the innate dimension in the affective theory does not go beyond the
biological ability for interpersonal relatedness. In normal development, the inborn capacity
for engagement in emotional relationships with others will lead to the understanding of the
psychological states of others (Hobson, I 990b).
Autism as an affective disorder
64
In the case of autism, the argument is that there is a lack of the inborn ability for affective
relationships with others, due to a deficient perceptual equipment grounded on
neurological fault. In short, "autism is best viewed as an interpersonal impairment"
(Hobson, 1992; 164). Hobson's claim regards autism as a condition resulting from the lack
or slow development of the innate ability to relate and experience other people as persons.
Therefore, the knowledge of self and others as persons with psychological attitudes will be
seriously impaired. Moreover, Hobson's theory has the ambitious aim to explain the "triad
of impairment": creative imaginative play, symbolic language and comprehension of verbal
and non-verbal communication will be deficient.
The main thesis is that autistic persons behave in an abnormal way, as a result of their
inability to direct their attention to others around them and share emotional experiences
with them. Although they are not visually impaired, they are not motivated or equipped
with the natural tendency to engage in relationships with caregivers; as a consequence,
their concept of themselves and others as persons with bodies and minds is restrained.
They are not able to make the important distinction between things ("I-It" relations) and
people ("I-Thou" relations); so they appear to treat people as objects, without any
emotional value. Thus, they can not have a concept of belief, since they do not have a
concept of persons holding beliefs. As Hobson, in agreement with Neisser (1988), states
"they have an impairment in the development of the interpersonal self' (1990a; 173). This
lack of personhood leads to a lack of understanding attitudes or mental states of the self
and others.
An integrative model
Peter Mundy and Marian Sigman (1989) propose an alternative model that combines
affective and cognitive factors. In particular, they agree with Hobson on the critical role of
affective mechanisms in the development of autism. But they do not consider the
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disturbance in early emotional perceptions and exchanges to be the primary deficit that
gives rise to the cognitive metarepresentational deficit. Instead, their theoretical position
emphasises the interaction between impaired early affective responses to social stimuli
with developmental delays in the cognitive system of the child. Another aspect of their
model differentiated from Hobson's hypothesis is the focus on a deficit in the expression of
emotion (i.e., self-regulation of arousal) rather than the perception of emotion in autistic
persons.
Critique of social-affective perspectives
One of the strengths of Hobson's argument is its emphasis on interpersonal relationships
for the development of social perception. The basic assumption is that the understanding
of mental states is a process that occurs in the social domain. The emotionally-laden
contacts between infants and caregivers are considered as fundamental for cognitive
growth. This approach comprises a valuable contribution in the understanding of the
syndrome, illuminating another area of autistic behaviour. The social-affective aspects of
autistic behaviour have been neglected and overlooked by the cognitive schools of
thought. In essence, the main difference between Hobson's theory and the cognitive
hypotheses lies in the primary role they attribute to psychological processes: affective or
cognitive. I consider that a balanced view is more appropriate in the investigation of the
complex autistic disorder; both cognitive and affective processes may be disturbed in the
individual with autism. Human interaction is a complex phenomenon that requires
cognitive and affective skills. In fact, Hobson (1993a, 1993b) regards his perspective as
complementary rather than antithetical to cognitive explanations of the autistic syndrome.
Also, Baron-Cohen (1988) elaborated the prospect of a synthesis of cognitive and
affective accounts for the acquisition of social knowledge in autism.
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Nevertheless, both Hobson's explanation and the cognitive accounts share a common
feature: the deficit-oriented perspective. Although they draw attention to different
psychological processes as primary causes of autism, both aim to prove that a single deficit
creates a core disturbance in autistic persons' social interaction. Despite the focus on social
relationships, the affective approach remains in the same theoretical tradition as the
cognitive theories: postulating an impairment in the autistic individual as the only cause of
abnormality. Curiously, the effect of the autistic child's disturbance, either cognitive or
affective, on the behaviour of others has not been conceptualised as another possible line
of understanding autism. It seems possible that a shift of theoretical focus on the
relationships of autistic persons with their social environment could be a fruitful avenue for
the investigation of this complex disorder.
Another important aspect of Hobson's affective theory is the central role of awareness of
self and other for the development of a theory of mind. A sense of the self as a person with
psychological attitudes is essential in forming social relations with people and predicting
their behaviour. Knowledge of the self and the other are closely linked, both arising from
the perceptually anchored affective interaction between infants and caregivers. Hence, the
initial ability of perceiving others as persons with bodies and minds, distinct from self and
objects is the basis for developing social perception. In contrast, the cognitive account
views this ability as a consequence of the metarepresentational skill. But humans do not
simply function as cognitive subjects in social encounters; they do not only pay attention to
others' mental states. They also perceive others' emotions, as reflected through their bodily
expressions. Emotion perception is the ground for self-reflection and social understanding.
Hobson's emphasis on self-development as a precursor of a theory of mind is a significant
contribution in the study of autism.
Another strong factor in the social-affective theory is its sound theoretical basis. Its
conceptual "loans" from philosophy are elegantly interwoven with psychological theories
on normal development (i.e., the notion of "persons" and the key role of perception in
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cognitive development). Hobson (1990a, 1993a) unfolds his argument with confidence in
its philosophical underpinnings. Thus, he succeeds in building a heuristically useful
theoretical framework. Nevertheless, his perspective needs to be evaluated in terms of its
empirical evidence. This is the centre of the discussion in the following section.
Empirical evidence
In this section, my objective is to present the body of empirical research that has been
carried out to investigate the social-affective domain of autistic person's behaviour. First, I
will present the major findings of experimental research on emotion perception in autism.
Next, I will consider studies on affective sharing, joint-attention, social attachments and
interactions with caregivers that also deal with the assumption of a social-affective deficit
in autism.
Emotion perception
Hobson's early studies on emotion-perception are important advances in the research on
affective processes in autism, because of their refined methodological paradigm using a
cross-modal technique: the study of emotion recognition through different modes (visual,
auditory, gestural), so that the possibility of using a perceptual matching strategy is
eliminated.
Hobson (1986a, 1986b) in his first study on emotion recognition applied an interesting
matching strategy: he compared the same group of autistic children (mean chronological
age= 14.7; mean verbal mental age= 7.1) with one group of mentally retarded subjects
matched on performance IQ, a second group of normal children matched on verbal mental
age and a third group of normal children matched on non-verbal mental age. In the
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principal task, the children were asked to match basic emotions (sadness, happiness, fear
and anger) expressed by a person in a videotape with gestures, vocalisations and context.
In the first condition, the child was presented with two tape-recorded vocalisations for
each emotion. In the second condition, the experimenter acted out two examples of each
emotion, wearing a cardboard mask to conceal facial expression cues. In the third
situation, two large drawings representing situations likely to elicit each of the four
emotions were shown. A control task with "things", instead of emotions, was also used.
Autistic children failed to choose the appropriate drawings of facial expressions of
emotion to match with videotaped gestures, vocalisations and contexts, as compared with
normal children with the same non-verbal mental age. Similar results were obtained when
the autistic group was tested again on the same tests about one year later (1-lobson,
1986b). Interestingly, there were no group differences between the autistic group and the
group of normal children matched on verbal MA. Yet, Hobson argued for an affective
deficit on the basis of autistic children's performance on these experimental tasks.
However, he questioned the validity of his claim; he admitted that these facial expressions
could be regarded as artificial, since "they were not only stylised in form and content, but
were also presented singly and out of context." (Hobson, 1986a; 338).
In a later study, Hobson, Ouston & Lee (1988) repeated the same paradigm with two
methodological refinements: they used a control non-emotion task (objects/events
recognition) that was the same with the emotions task in terms of form and level of
difficulty; also, they used as control groups, mentally handicapped children matched on
verbal mental age and verbal IQ, and normal children. Again, there was a significant group
difference on the recognition of emotions, rather than the recognition of objects. Thus, the
hypothesis for an autism-specific impairment in the recognition of affect was confirmed.
Ozonoffet a! (1990) conducted a study, paying special attention to the selection of control
groups and the equal level of difficulty in the "emotions" and the control tasks. In their
69
first study, they examined emotion perception in a group of autistic children (mean
chronological age= 6.40, mean verbal age= 3 years or greater) matched on verbal mental
age with a control group of normal children. In their second study, the same target group
was matched with a different control group of normal children on non-verbal mental age.
In both studies, emotion perception was measured with four techniques, each with an
affective and a non-affective component (within-subjects design): (1) identity/emotion
task, which involved sorting a set of cards on the basis of identity and emotion (happiness
and sadness), (2) crossmodal processing task. which included matching colour
photographs of emotions (happiness, sadness and anger) with sounds; in the non-
emotional task, photographs of objects had to be matched with sounds, (3) matching task,
which required children to match pictures of objects, faces, emotional expressions and
situations with a photograph. Also, parents of the children were asked to complete a
questionnaire on the emotion-related vocabulary used by their children. Interestingly, in
the first study there were no group differences between autistic and normal children
matched on verbal mental age. Thus, the hypothesis for an affective deficit in autistic
persons was not supported. However, there were group differences on the
identity/emotior. sorting and matching tasks, when autistic children were compared with
normal children of the same non-verbal mental age. Therefore, there was not sufficient
evidence for the primacy of the emotion perception deficit in autism.
Another important study threw doubt on the specificity of the affective impairment in
autism. Hobson, Ouston & Lee (1989) applied a slightly different methodology in the
study of emotion perception: participants were asked to give spontaneous verbal
judgements of the photographs and the sounds expressing emotions, instead of a forced-
choice technique, used in the above studies. A group of autistic adolescents was matched
on verbal mental age with a group of mentally handicapped subjects and a group of normal
children. Emotion perception was tested through photographs and audio tapes. Also, a
control task with non-emotion materials (objects) was included. The prediction that
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autistic children's performance would be worse than the controls' on the emotion tasks
rather than the objects tasks was confirmed.
However, Prior et al (1990) carried out an experimental investigation of emotion
perception with an Australian group of autistic children (mean verbal mental age: 7.2) that
also failed to replicate the hypothesis for a deficit in autistic children's recognition of
emotions. They used "the emotions task" by Hobson (1986a): each child was shown a set
of pictures, with faces expressing happiness, sadness, fear, anger and a neutral expression.
Also, emotion recognition was tested through three modes: sounds, gestures and contexts.
Prior et at (1990) did not find any group differences on the emotion recognition task: 11
out of 20 autistic children and 10 out of 20 controls passed. This success rate was higher
than that in Hobson's study, although the average mental age in both studies was the same.
A study on empathy in high-functioning autistic persons provided empirical evidence for
the claim that autism may be a "logico-affective" impairment (Hermelin & O'Connor,
1985). Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari & Mundy (1992) selected "empathy" as an appropriate
affective state, as it combines the use of cognitive and affective skills. They adopted
Feshbach's model on empathy, as the feeling state that requires three components: "a
cognitive ability to discriminate among affective states of others; a second, more advanced
cognitive ability to assume the perspective and role of another person; and an emotional
response." (Yirmiya et al, 1992; 151). High-functioning autistic children, matched on full-
scale IQ with normal children, watched a set of ten videotaped segments about children
displaying happiness, anger, pride, sadness and fear; they were asked to provide an
account of how the person they had just watched would feel as well as their own feelings
to the story. In agreement with previous research findings, the autistic group failed to
perform as well as the normal group on the empathy task. They did not appear to be able
to label the feelings of the protagonists in the video stories and take the role and
perspective of others.
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Another study adds an extra dimension to these observations. Capps, Yirmiya & Sigman
(1992) studied understanding of emotions in a group of high-functioning adolescents
through verbal report and recognition of affect in pictures. A list of simple (such as
happiness, sadness) and complex (such as pride and embarrassment) feelings was read
aloud to each child and they were asked to describe when they had experienced them. The
autistic children's responses were compared with those of normal children only, since the
average full scale IQ of the target group was 101.9. Autistic children appeared to make
greater cognitive effort to talk about their emotions. Also, they had greatest difficulty with
reporting an incident of "embarrassment"; 40% of them reported embarrassing experiences
that were external and uncontrollable and they made less explicit and frequent references
to an audience than the normal group. This finding was explained as a consequence of a
lack of a theory of mind, as well as a deficit in affective sharing and joint attention skills. In
particular, Capps et at (1992) suggested that "the sense of a critical audience pervades
autistic person's experiences such that they are compelled to avoid, rather than solicit, the
appraisal of others." (p. 1178). In contrast, autistic children did not differ from the
controls on talking about simple emotions and pride. Pride requires "personal
responsibility", whereas embarrassment requires a social audience. Finally, there were no
significant group differences on the ability to label affects in photographs. However, in
another study by Kasari et al (1993) autistic children showed the same "mastery"
behaviour (smiling after completing the task) as mentally retarded children, but did not
show evidence for "pride": they avoided contact with the adult who praised their work.
This indicates that praise was aversive to them; or they were not interested in it.
Kasari et al (1993) did not argue that persons with autism do not experience emotions,
such as pride, but rather that they seem to face difficulties with socially-mediated
emotions.
Joint-attention
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Apart from emotion perception, joint-attention skills have been also considered as another
line of empirical investigation of social-affective disturbances in autism. The majority of
the research on joint-attention in autistic children has been conducted by a team of
psychologists at UCLA. Marian Sigman, Peter Mundy, and their colleagues (1986) video-
recorded young autistic children with average age four and a half years old with matched
mentally retarded and normal children in 12-minute play situations with their caregivers in
the labratory. They found that the autistic group did not appear to share attention and
make eye contact with both familiar and unfamiliar adults. Thus, they supported the
hypothesis for an autism specific deficit in joint-attention skills.
Moreover, Mundy, Sigman & Kasari (1990) studied the relationship between joint-
attention and language development in autistic children. They examined a group of autistic
children with mean age of four years (mean mental age = 19 months) matched with two
groups of mentally retarded children on language and mental age respectively, over a
period of one year. In this paradigm, non-verbal communication skills were observed in a
25-minute session between the experimenter and the child. Each child sat at a table, facing
the experimenter, who presented a set of toys, that were within the reach of the child.
Also, the experimenter engaged the child in physical social games (such as tickling) and in
turn-taking activities (such as, rolling a car back and forth, taking turns in using a comb).
Verbal interactions were kept to a minimum. The child's non-verbal behaviour was rated in
three categories: (1) "social behaviour", which described the ability of the child to make
physical contact with the experimenter and engage in turn-taking with him, (2) "joint
attention", which referred to directing attention to an object and (3) "requesting", which
involved attempts to ask for help in obtaining objects. Lastly, expressive and receptive
language skills were measured through psychometric scales.
The hypothesis for a deficit in the non-verbal joint-attention skills in the autistic group was
confirmed, thus replicating results from an earlier study (Mundy et al, 1986). Moreover,
this impairment seemed to be specific in the target group only; hence, it could not be
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attributed to factors, such as language ability and mental age. Also, it was found to be
stable over the period of 13 months. In addition, this study provided evidence for a strong
association between gestural joint attention and language abilities. Thus, this work
suggests that autistic children's disturbance in the acquisition of joint-attention skills (such
as, pointing and showing) may constrain their subsequent language development.
Expression and sharing of affect
Kasari, Sigman, Mundy & Yirmiya (1990) looked at affective expression and sharing in
autistic children in relation with their joint-attention and requesting behaviour. It was
hypothesised that joint-attention, rather than requesting behaviours, would elicit greater
sharing of positive affect with adults. Also, the aim was to investigate whether autistic
children were different in the type of affect they displayed in joint-attention situations from
mentally handicapped children. The procedure was identical to that in Mundy et al's study
(1990) reported above. The coding variables were: "attention" to the adult and the toys,
"facial affect expressions" (positive, negative and neutral/interest expressions) and
"communicative context", which included requesting and joint-attention behaviours.
The results revealed significant group differences in the expression of positive affect
according to the communicative context. In particular, autistic children were found to
share less positive affect with the experimenter in their joint-attention behaviours, rather
than their requesting acts. On the contrary, there were no group differences in the display
of positive affect in the context of requesting objects. Therefore, there may be a strong
developmental link between joint-attention deficits and expression/sharing of positive
affect in autistic children.
Further to this study, Sigman et al (1992) investigated autistic children's responses to the
negative emotions expressed by familiar and unfamiliar adults. In one situation, parents
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would show distress on hitting accidentally a finger with a hammer; in another situation,
both the experimenter and the parent would show fear, when a robot was moving to them;
in a third situation, the parent would pretend that s/he is in discomfort, feeling ill, and
would lay in a couch. Strikingly, autistic children did not pay much attention to the adults
in all situations, in contrast to mentally retarded and normal control groups who were very
attentive to adults. Autistic children seemed to be more interested in playing with their
toys, rather than noticing the adults. These findings were interpreted as a lack of the ability
for emotion comprehension. Yet, it has been found that -autistic children are not
emotionally detached, as Kanner (1943) first described. They do show positive affect, and
they form social attachments with caregivers (Sigman & Mundy, 1989). However, there
seems to be an impairment in their cognitive/affective underpinnings to make sense of the
emotional cues from others. Sigman et al (1992) suggested that if these children do not
have a theory of mind (recognising that other people have emotions), then they are not
motivated to look at people's faces. But this raises the question: how is it possible that
autistic children are able to display appropriate affect in some social situations but they are
unable to recognise emotional expressions in other people.
Overall, the evidence shows that autistic children are inattentive to others' negative
emotions. But, what are their reactions to expressions of positive affect? This question
was explored by Kasari et al (1993) in a study on pride and mastery in autistic children,
with average age three and a half years. Each child was given by the experimenter a
developmentally appropriate puzzle to complete. When the child had finished, the
experimenter waited five seconds and made a neutral comment and gave a second puzzle
to the child. After the completion of the second puzzle, both the experimenter and the
parent praised the child. Preschool autistic children were compared with mentally retarded
and normal children, on their overall emotional responses on pride and mastery in each
stage of the session. The prediction of no group differences upon completion of the puzzle
was confirmed. Similarly to control groups, autistic children showed pleasure when they
had completed the task. Thus, they displayed a positive feeling, showing mastery
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motivation. However, the autistic group did not seem to seek the adult's attention to their
task. The lack of this behaviour has been explained as inability of the self to experience a
socially mediated emotion such as pride and reflect on it in normal ways. This does not
mean that autistic children do not feel pride, but rather that the nature and the situations of
this emotion (independent of social audience) may be different in them. Moreover, autistic
children avoided contact with the adult who praised them; perhaps, praise was not only
uninteresting for them but also aversive. Finally, Kasari et al (1993) make the interesting
point that the affective deficit in autism may extend only to emotions and situations that
make demands on social-interactive skills.
Social attachments and interactions
Sigman & Mundy (1989) studied the social attachments of preschool autistic children with
their caregivers (in all but one autistic cases, caregivers were parents) in the laboratory. In
this procedure, the child was left to play alone with some toys in the room, where the
parent and the experimenter were present. Then, the caregiver would leave the room for
two minutes and he would come back in the room, sit in the chair and allow the child to do
whatever s/he liked. Next, a stranger would approach the child for two minutes, making
physical contact before returning to her seat. Subsequently, the stranger would leave the
room for two minutes and would enter the room in the same way that the caregiver did.
There were no critical differences in the social behaviour towards the caregivers between
the autistic and the control groups. The only difference was evident in the behaviour
towards the stranger. In contrast to the normal group and the mentally handicapped
groups who looked at their caregivers' faces for reassurance when they saw the stranger,
the autistic group did not retreat nor did they look at the stranger's or the caregiver's face.
This finding was explained as an indication of lack of skills in the autistic children in using
other people's facial expression to derive information about their mental states.
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Sigman & Mundy (1989) carried out a second controlled study with a slightly different
methodology and a different sample of autistic children; the chronological and mental age
of the autistic group were the same as in the above study. They included a second
separation and reunion session and omitted the stranger episode. Curiously, they found
that autistic children showed more distress when separated from their caregivers for the
second time, than mentally retarded children. Thus, autistic children do form social
attachments but their deficit seems to be in the area of social comprehension, which could
be due to lack of affective awareness and responsiveness.
In another study by Kasari, Sigman, Mundy & Yirmiya (1988), autistic children's
interactions with their caregivers were observed from a different perspective. The aim was
to look into the ways that adults responded to the autistic children's deficient social
behaviour. Thus, the focus was on the influence of the autistic child on the caregiver,
rather than the other way round. In particular, caregivers (in most cases, mothers) of
preschool autistic, mentally-retarded and normal children were observed in free-play
episodes with a doll, a puzzle, a social game and putting all the toys away. These 12-
minute sessions were videotaped and caregivers' behaviour was rated for the following
categories: (1) "attention regulation", which referred to the ways the caregivers attempted
to elicit the child's attention to objects or events without the use of physical contact, (2)
"behaviour regulation", which involved requesting a specific action of the child or
control/management of the child and (3) "responsiveness", that is, verbal and non-verbal
actions used to maintain the child's engagement with an activity. These behaviours were
studied in relation to the child's non-verbal communication language skills, assessed
through different psychometric scales.
Interestingly, there were few group differences in the interactive behaviours of the
caregivers across the three groups. However, significant differences emerged within the
autistic group. Specifically, there was a significant association between caregivers'
regulatory behaviour/responsiveness and the autistic child's joint-attention and language
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skills. In particular, there was a difference in parents' responses to more communicatively
able children; parents showed more mutual play, less behaviour regulation and more
positive feedback to the autistic children with less joint-attention deficit; this pattern was
not found in the comparison groups. A possible interpretation of the results reported by
Kasari et al is that the relationship between the autistic child's characteristics and
caregivers' behaviour to them is important. Although the direction of this influence awaits
further investigation, this evidence is valuable in the understanding of the abnormal autistic
repertoire; it highlights the critical role of others' responses in shaping autistic children's
behaviour.
Another study that throws further light on the effect of autistic children's behaviour on the
behaviour of others was conducted by Dawson et al (1990). These investigators examined
social behaviour, affect and eye gaze in a group of preschool autistic children, matched on
receptive language age with a group of normal children. They videotaped the interactions
between children and their mothers during three situations: a 10-minute free play session,
which involved low communicative demands, a "put-toys-away" session, where mothers
asked the children to help them to tidy up the toys and a 10-minute "snack" session, where
mothers were sitting face-to-face with their children and provided them a snack.
Interestingly, there were no group differences in the frequency and the duration of
children's gaze at their mothers' face, as well as emotional expression. However, there was
a critical qualitative difference between the two groups: autistic children did not seem to
combine emotion and eye contact in an act with communicative intent. Also, most of the
autistic children did not smile in response to their mothers' smiles. This abnormality was
interpreted as a result of overstimulation of the autistic children by the complexity of the
social situation; it may be that the emotional expressions and the language are
overstimulating, so that children with autism tend to withdraw from the situation.
It has to be also noted, that there was a significant difference in the affective changes
between mothers of the autistic and the normal children. In particular, mothers of the
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autistic children were less likely to display smiles and respond to their children's smiles,
than mothers of the normal children. This is an important finding, since it implies that "the
autistic child is affected not only by an inability to easily assimilate and respond to social
stimulation but also by the negative impact that his or her behaviour may have on the
social environment" (Dawson et al, 1990; 345). Sadly, a serious limitation for the
specificity of the abnormalities that were found in the autistic group is that the majority of
the autistic participants were also mentally retarded.
Critique of the empirical evidence
Although the research reviewed in the preceding section is not by any means exhaustive, it
presents the main directions of empirical work on affective deficits in autism. In summary,
the major findings suggest that the empirical evidence on the primacy and the specificity of
emotion perception as the underlying impairment in autism is not convincing. First, there is
conflicting evidence on whether autistic children have a deficit in recognising emotions on
tasks. It seems that task-related factors and methodological issues such as the matching
strategy, can throw doubt on the findings. Therefore, the nature of the tests needs to be
refined and the criteria for the comparison groups to be more fully identified. In contrast, a
specific deficit in joint-attention skills seems to be universal in autism and to explain
language and emotion development.
However, in my view, research both on "emotion-perception" and "joint-attention" has a
common underlying objective: to look for an affective deficit in the autistic child. Despite
the emphasis on the importance of affective relationships between autistic individuals and
their social environment, the relevant studies do not examine the lack or the presence of an
affective skill in the context of social interaction. Hence, they examine affective behaviour
through an individualistic perspective, which determines their methodological choices and
interpretations of their results. However, in one study by Kasari et al (1988) there was
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critical evidence on the affect of the autistic children's abnormal behaviour on the
behaviour of caregivers towards them. Curiously, researchers have neglected to investigate
how autistic children's deficits may affect and be affected by others' responses to them.
The paucity of research with a "social-interactionist" approach could be explained as a
consequence of a specific methodology. On the whole, research on autism from social-
affective perspectives has been almost exclusively experimental and quasi-naturalistic.
Obsetivational studies of affective exchanges between parents and autistic children have
been largely carried out in the laboratory. Thus, it seems that systematic naturalistic data
might shed further light on the nature and course of social perception in autism.
FIRST-PERSON ACCOUNTS ON AUTISM
In the previous sections of this chapter, I have discussed awareness of the self and others in
autism, as it has been conceptualised by current psychological theories. At this stage, I will
present another strand in the literature. First-person accounts on the experience of autism
provide an insightful perspective on the syndrome, rather than test an explanatory hypothesis.
They offer valuable qualitative information on how able people with autism think and feel
about themselves and the social world. There are a few very bright persons with autism who
have published an account of their lifelong experience of being autistic and their journey in the
discovery of themselves and others around them (Grandin & Scariano, 1986; Miedzianik,
1986; Williams, 1992).
Cesaroni & Garber (1991) applied a qualitative strategy to study the experience of autism
through the accounts of a 25-year old man (Jim) and a 13-year old boy (Albert) and his
parents. As their main techniques, they used participant observation, formal and informal
interviewing, correspondence and collection of poems, art work and essays. Content analysis
80
of their data revealed five areas of functioning as the most significant: sensory processing,
memory, stereotypical behaviours, social interaction and empathy.
In particular, both autistic individuals described auditory, visual and tactile stimuli as intense
and as coming from multiple sources; they reported that they very often feel overloaded by
information. Both Albert and Jim stressed the degree of trust they need to have with another
person to allow him/her to touch them. Moreover, they had extraordinarily detailed memory
for past events. Regarding their stereotypies, they were able to bring them under conscious
control. Interestingly, they showed increasing self awareness with respect to their social
behaviour together with the need to develop interpersonal relationships with friends.
"I look like Frankestein, that's what people tell me. My voice sounds strange, I'm
telling you people say I look like Frankestein, I know he might look like me."
(Cesaroni & Garber, 1991; 310)
This quote illustrates how Albert's self-perception has been heavily influenced by how he
perceives others as perceiving him. Curiously, there is no reference to behavioural
characteristics; he is only concerned with his image, rather than with his psychological self.
Jim also described his continuous victimisation by people, because "he lacked the ability to
judge the depth or sincerity of friendship" (Cesaroni & Garber, 1991; 310). However, in both
cases there are signs of introspective ability, although it is noted that both made great effort to
achieve this level of reflection. Moreover, both emphasised the difficulty in becoming involved
with other people and showing empathy. However, they explained this problem as a result of
lack of expressive and receptive communication skills, rather than a lack of empathy itself. As
Jim states:
"It is therefore much easier to empathise with someone whose ways of experiencing
the world are similar to one's own than to understand someone whose perceptions are
very different." (Cesaroni & Garber, 1991; 311)
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Another study by Huriburt, Happe & Frith (1994) offers an additional dimension to the study
of a reflective self in persons with Asperger's syndrome. These researchers hypothesised that
the ability for introspection would be impaired even in bright autistic individuals. The
contribution of this study lies in the methodology applied. Namely, they adopted the
"descriptive experience sampling method" that has been used with a sample of normal subjects
compared with a group of patients with anxiety, depression, eating disorders and
schizophrenia. This technique involves the subject wearing a device that produces a beep at
random intervals, which he can hear through an earphone; when he hears the beep, the
individual needs to stop and write down details of his experience at that moment. Three adults
with Asperger's syndrome were systematically interviewed by the research team on the same
day as the collection of samples. Each person produced between twelve and sixteen samples.
All three adults had passed first-order theory of mind tests, and two had passed second-order
theory of mind tasks. Thus, this method combined the privacy of the autistic person when
sampling his experience and the establishment of a relationship with the researchers for
analysing these samples.
The striking finding was that the sole aspect of the reported inner experiences of the three
adults consisted of visual images. Their thoughts were described in the form of images only;
processing of mental events appeared to be carried out mainly by visual thinking. Thus, there
was an absence of other categories that were found in the samples of forty normal individuals:
verbal inner experience, unsymbolized thinking and feelings. Moreover, they found a
relationship between successful performance on theory of minds tasks and the ability to report
inner experience. The two adults who passed the advanced theory of mind task easily
understood the introspection technique, whereas the adult who failed on that, was the least
able to report his inner experience. Therefore, their hypothesis for a paucity of an
introspective psychological self in high-functioning autistic persons was supported.
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Another piece of information on self-awareness comes from a large-scale study on identifjing
autistic persons with near-normal intelligence. Dawson (1983) interviewed extensively parents
of 93 high-functioning individuals on their behaviour and functioning. With respect to self-
awareness, in 35 out of 93 cases there was a sense of being different from other people, but
without feelings of worry; whereas only 11 out of 93 young persons were reported to feel
different and worry about that. These results are important, because of the large size of the
sample; however, these data are based on indirect knowledge of the autistic person's self-
awareness, i.e., parental observations and inferences.
A detailed presentation of the life history of a 31-year old man with Asperger's syndrome
established further the tendency of able autistic persons to become aware of their difference
from others in the period of adolescence (Bemporad, 1979). However, it has to be noted that,
despite awareness of the loneliness, there was "an appalling poverty of inner life" (p. 191),
that is, daydreams and fantasies.
Fransesca Happe (1991) made some useful comments on autobiographical writings of three
adults with Asperger's syndrome. She analysed the content and style of two autobiographies
(Temple Grandin's (1986) and David Miedzianik's (1986)) and letters of an adult man through
theoretical models for communication and social understanding in autism. Regarding
knowledge of the self and others, a common feature of this material was that all individuals
showed limited insight into their own feelings and thought processes. The evidence suggests
that, although these bright individuals were able to reflect on their own and others' behaviour,
still they lacked a deep awareness of mental states. Social naivety together with strong desire
to make friendships appeared to be the main concerns of the two male writers.
However, there is an important methodological problem with this textual material: the lack of
control group (Happe, 1991). That is, these accounts have not been systematically compared
with those of normal children for the study of content and stylistic aspects, such as description
of psychological states, the choice of subject matter, how frequently the topic changes, the
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keeping with conventional literary rules. It could be possible, then, to find deviance or delay in
communication	 theory of mind in Asperger's syndrome.
Finally, I wish to draw attention to an important methodological issue. Although first-person
accounts, case histories and autobiographies provide a substantial body of information on the
understanding of self and other in autism, the paucity of systematic, controlled and qualitative
studies of children and adults with high-functioning autism has to be noted. Hence, it might be
illuminating to explore how a group of able autistic children or adults think about themselves
in comparison with a group of children/adults with mental handicap.
Conclusion
In summary, both the cognitive and the social-affective perspectives support a deficit in the
ability of knowledge of the self and others. It seems that only a minority of bright autistic
individuals is successful on theory of mind tasks; but research has shown that they do not
report a rich mental life and their problems in social interactions are persistent. However, the
understanding of the self and the other has not been studied directly in a controlled study, that
will compare first-person accounts of able autistic persons on their own conceptions of
themselves with those of persons with mental handicap. Another important issue is the lack of
naturalistic studies that will evaluate the performance of the "talented minority" of autistic
individuals on experiments with evidence on their "mentalising" skills in everyday life. In my
view, this is one promising avenue in the study of autism. Research on understanding of the
self and others in normal development may provide useful methods for investigating these
unexplored issues. The following chapter will touch on these areas.
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CHAPTER 4: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES ON KNOWLEDGE
OF SELF AND OTHERS IN NORMAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
The broad aim in this chapter is not to present a comprehensive review of psychological
theories of the self Instead, the discussion is primarily intended to select and present
specific empirical investigations on knowledge of the self and other in normal populations
that will resolve the methodological problems that have been addressed in the preceding
sections of the thesis: the lack of systematic qualititative information on the self as it is
viewed by individuals themselves and the paucity of techniques that look into the ways
that the self is constructed through social experience between children and adults.
In the first section, I will present a contemporary social-cognitive model, formulated by
Damon & Hart (1982, 1988). It has been selected as appropriate for conceptual purposes
of this study for the following reasons:
1. As a social-cognitive model on the self, it focuses on cognitions rather than affective
attitudes about the self: how the individual perceives him/her self, rather than a
person's positive/negative evaluation of his/her personality. This emphasis is in line
with the cognitive perspectives on autism (see Chapter 3) that consider as
fundamental the ability for a conceptual understanding of the mental aspects of self
2. Also, it identifies specific developmental conceptual changes in the understanding of
the self at different ages.
3. Moreover, it is committed to the assumption that the knowledge about the self is
shaped both by the features of the environment and by features of the cognizing
subject. This dimension is in agreement with the theoretical aim of this thesis: to
explore social understanding as a cognitive ability applied in social interactions.
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4. Lastly, its empirical technique (the self-understanding interview) has been used with
clinical populations; thus, it may provide useful insights in the study of persons with
high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome. Methodological limitations of this
model will be also highlighted.
In the second section of this chapter, I will deal with naturalistic perspectives which
examine how the construction of knowledge of self and others is achieved through
everyday social interaction. First, their theoretical background in symbolic interactionism
and contemporary developmental psychology will be explained. Next, empirical research
on the representation of self through discourse will be reported. Finally, there will be a
critical evaluation of this strand in the literature. Here, the purpose is to identify
methodological strategies that will assist the research design of this study (the need to
examine the understanding of mental states of self and others as it revealed through natural
discourse in social contexts).
Damon & Hart's development'il model of self-understanding
A primary assumption of Damon & Hart's (1982, 1988) perspective is the dual nature of
the self. William James' (1890) classical distinction between the "I" and the "Me" in one's
self provides one of its theoretical bases. In particular, Damon & Hart (1988) adopted
James' definition of the "I" as the "self-as-knower": the part of the self that initiates,
organises and interprets experience. Awareness of the "I" is achieved through four types of
subjective experience: agency ("how I became this person"), distinctness ("how I am
different from others"), continuity ("how do I change or remain the same over time?") and
reflection. A sense of an autonomous self derives from its ability to process and structure
experiences ("agency"). Individuality of the self emerges from distinctness from others;
James wrote "Other men's experiences, no matter how much I may know them, never bear
this vivid, this peculiar brand." (James, 1890; 71). Stability of the self comes from
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continuity; in James's words "... each of us spontaneously considers that by 'I' he means
something always the same." (p. 63). Lastly, self-consciousness derives from reflection
("awareness of one's own awareness"), the ability to know oneself. Damon & Hart (1988)
note that the strength of James' account lies in "the systematic integration of these four
components into a single psychological theory of the self-as-subject." (p. 6).
Damon & Hart (1988) also drew upon James' conceptualisation of the other aspect of the
self; the "Me", as "the sum total of all a person can call his." (James, 1890; 44). Namely,
"the self-as-known" includes material features (i.e., body, possessions), social
characteristics (i.e., relations, roles, personality) and "spiritual" characteristics (i.e.,
consciousness, thoughts, psychological mechanisms). In Damon & Hart's model, the "Me"
includes four "self-schemes": physical, active, social and psychological. James also
proposed that each individual organises these primary "constituents" in a hierarchy with
"the bodily me at the bottom, the spiritual me at the top, and the extra-corporeal material
selves and the various social selves between." (James, 1890; 57). Although James
suggested that persons would vary in the ways they formulate these aspects of themselves,
he did not imply a developmental dimension in his self-concept (Damon & Hart, 1982,
1988). Thus, he did not hypothesise variations in the hierarchical organisations of the three
constituents over time.
Further, James (1890) suggested that psychological investigation should focus on the
"Me", as the most concrete and objective aspect of self. Inquiry into the experiential "I"
should be left to philosophers. However, Damon & Hart (1982, 1988) purported to
explore both the self-as-subject and the self-as-object. They drew on George Herbert
Mead's (1934) proposal for a study of one's knowledge of the "I" through the "Me"; thus,
their emphasis is on a conceptual approach to the self. For this purpose, Damon & Hart
adopted the term "self-understanding" instead of "self-concept", as it reflects more
appropriately their intellectual focus.
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A relevant fundamental assumption in Damon & Hart's (1988) theoretical approach is that
"self-understanding" is a cognitive construct. It is defined as "one's cognitive
representation of self, self-interest, and personal identity." (p. 14). It is distinguished from
"self-esteem", the affective evaluation of the self, that has been measured quantitatively.
Damon & Hart's model concentrates on the study of the cognitive constructs that persons
hold for themselves, the conceptual framework of their self-concept. Thus, it aims to
provide a qualitative analysis of the meanings of self across individuals. This shift of
interest from "affective" to "cognitive" aspects of self has been dictated by the failure of
empirical research on self-concept to establish relationships between self-esteem and
variables on adaptation to life, as noted in an extensive and detailed review of a large
number of studies on the self-concept (Wylie, 1979). Another conclusion in the same
review was that the majority of studies measure self-esteem rather than self-concept.
Damon & Hart (1988) make the additional comment on the same literature that there is "a
lack of attention in such scales to the changing conceptual bases of self for the growing
child." (p.18).
Aiother important dimension of Damon & Hart's approach on self-understanding is its
developmental orientation. The assumption is that knowledge of the self as a whole
undergoes critical age-related cognitive changes. The emergence and formulation of self
has been conceptualised as a maturational process. In particular, self-knowledge in
childhood and adolescence is suggested to evolve in four periods: (a) infancy/early
childhood, (b) middle/late childhood, (c) early adolescence, and (d) late adolescence. At
each age, the development of self occurs in two parallel dimensions: the "I" and the "Me"
(Figure 4.1 in the next page). The "I" has three distinct features: continuity, distinctness
and agency. The "Me" has four aspects: physical, active, social and psychological self. At
each stage the "I" and the "Me" develop in mutual influence. This notion of developmental
change, regarded as "a conceptual reorganisation" is opposed to the traditional view of
change in terms of a shift or empirical tendency. Hence, Damon & Hart (1982, 1988)
argue that each individual is able to describe all aspects of "Me" and qualities of "I" from
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early life; what changes is the focus of the self-understanding over time, rather than the
content of self-knowledge. In essence, transformations apply to the knowledge of each
self-scheme and process of the self following a qualitative developmental sequence from
"categorical identifications", "comparative assessments", "inter-personal implications" to
"systematic beliefs and plans". Thus, each of these hierarchical levels signifies a different
level of self-understanding.
Damon & Hart (1988) examined the empirical validation of their assumptions through
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. They administered the "self-understanding clinical
interview" to 82 boys and girls (aged from 6 to 16) on three occasions over a period of
three years. Content analysis of their subjects' statements about themselves on the items of
the interview revealed that the four aspects of the self-as-object were evident across all
age levels. These findings were explained in terms of their methodology: they used a
probing clinical interview, so that a fuller account of self-perceptions could be obtained.
Interestingly, these results contradict those from previous studies that young children are
only able to conceive themselves in terms of their physical characteristics and favourite
activities. Their evidence suggests that an early concept of a psychological self exists even
in early childhood. Thus, there is a need for more "sensitive" techniques that will capture
these levels of self-knowledge.
Damon & Hart's (1988) hypothesis that knowledge of the self-as-object develops in a
orderly sequence of levels, defined by the front face of their model (Figure 1) was also
confirmed by the evidence from their longitudinal studies. However, little stability and
regularity was found in the aspects of themselves on which individuals focused. Only the
"psychological" self-scheme was found to be increasingly used across the three testing
occasions. But this was attributed to the nature of the testing: the interview technique
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repeated three times with the same individuals may have affected their tendency to become
reflective and to focus on themselves.
Data from the above cross-sectional and longitudinal studies also support the relationship
between age and developmental change in the three dimensions of the "I" of the self. In
particular, children's understanding of "continuity" and "distinctness" is transformed from
early childhood to late adolescence. There is a transition in the perception of stability of
the self from categorical identifications (body, possessions, behaviour), cognitive and
active capabilities, to the recognition of self by the social network and a sense of
continuity between the past and the present self. Similarly, distinctness is first defined in
relation to the physical self, next, the self is compared with others on behavioural and
cognitive criteria, followed by a sense of self as a unique whole of physical and
psychological characteristics; in adolescence, the self is perceived as distinct from others in
terms of one's own philosophy and life plans. The third dimension of the self-as-subject
(agency) develops from an understanding of the self as non-volitional and controlled from
external biological, social or supernatural forces. In middle childhood, there is a dramatic
shift to an awareness of the self as a subject with control over his/her formation; later, the
self is perceived as part of a wider social matrix; in the adolescent period, the self control
is considered to derive from personal values and philosophies.
An issue connected with the validation of this model of self-understanding is its usefulness
in the study of abnormal populations. Damon & Hart (1988) used their self-understanding
interview as a method for exploring mental health problems in a group of anorexic girls.
They assumed that the sense of "agency" and "distinctness" might have a central role in the
disturbance. Their general argument was that there is a close association between
problems of self-understanding and mental health difficulties: pathological conditions
generate a distorted self-understanding, which in turn exacerbate mental health problems.
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Nevertheless, their findings supported their assumptions for "agency" but not for
"distinctness". In contrast to normal teenagers, anorexic girls were found to have a sense
of lack of control over their condition; they seemed to perceive themselves as passive to
external forces, not being responsible for their condition. However, their sense of
distinctness was conceptualised at the same developmental level as in the normal group.
In another study (Damon & Hart, 1988), self-understanding was examined in a group of
adolescent boys with conduct disorder. Preliminary findings showed that there was
developmental delay in the way these individuals perceived themselves. They seemed to
make immature judgements on themselves, based on categorical aspects of the "me". Thus,
their sense of "me" was less connected with the social context (family, friends, society).
Also, their sense of "agency" seemed to be distorted. It was also important that they did
not seem to have a concept of themselves in the future and a sense of personal continuity;
these contribute to the formation of personal identity. Damon & Hart (1988) suggested
that these characteristics of self-understanding in boys with conduct disorder may explain
the behaviour of these individuals. They did not claim that these aspects are the primary
cause of their condition but they may influence their actions.
Critique of Damon & Hart's model
Damon & Hart's position represents a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to the
knowledge of the self. It is successful in operationalising the integration of the "I" and the
"Me", and the self-understanding interview encompasses aspects of the subjective and the
objective self. Thus, a holistic view of the self is obtained. Another strength of this model
is the emphasis on the knowledge of the self rather than its affective evaluation. However,
this specific focus could be regarded as a weakness as well, because it undermines the
comprehensiveness of this model (self-evaluation is measured only with one question). Of
course, the centrality of conception of the self is a major step in the empirical investigation
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of the self; but it is strongly associated with positive or negative appraisal of the self. Thus,
Damon & Hart adopt a similar set of preconceptions to the theorists they criticise. It might
be more illuminating to formulate a clinical interview that would tap both conceptual and
evaluative dimensions of the self (in a balanced proportion of questions on the interview),
so that a global sense of the individual towards him/her self would be obtained.
However, Damon & Hart's argument that all aspects of the self are present from early
childhood is a significant contribution in developmental thinking on the self-concept; the
critical age-related change is on the conceptual modes of understanding the self. Empirical
evidence suggests that there is a qualitative shift in the ways that persons think about
different aspects of themselves, such as physical, active, social and psychological
characteristics. This position is radically different to the traditional developmental view
that self-understanding is characterised by a move from a conception of the physical self;
to the active, to the social and later to the psychological self.
Nevertheless, Damon & Hart's model presents a static view of the selfi it describes the
spontaneous self. Although, it is put forward as a .social-cognitive perspective that
acknowledges the role of social interaction in the construction of self; it fails to
operationalise this assumption. It does not highlight the processes involved in the
formation of this self-knowledge. Given that the clinical interview technique entails
methodological limitations, since it relies heavily on the individual's memory and language
abilities as well as on the relationship with the interviewer for the disclosure of private
aspects of one's personality, its reliability as a method for gaining access to one's
knowledge of him/her self is under dispute. Thus, the self-understanding interview, albeit
focused on mental attitudes towards the self; is not a sufficient method for exploring the
social mechanisms associated with the formation and maintenance of cognitions about the
self. This limitation is crucial and must be recognised in a thorough study of the
development of the self-system. Interestingly, there has been a considerable amount of
evidence that children have abilities that are not evident in interviews and experimental
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situations (Dunn, 1992). Therefore, it.would be interesting to look at social-cognitive
approaches, directed towards a naturalistic enquiry into knowledge about the self. This
will be the theme of the following section of this chapter.
Najuralistic perspectives
A pertinent supposition of naturalistic approaches is that the genesis and maintenance of
self is heavily dependent on social processes. Interpersonal experience is considered
fundamental for the emergence and development of self. Social relationships are regarded
as the cornerstone for the cognitive construction of knowledge about the self and the
other. The theoretical basis of this presumption is symbolic interactionism with its
emphasis on language as a medium for socialisation into a cultural system (Mead, 1934).
Any type of socially embedded discourse provides the powerful tool for self reflection and
construction of identity. Children's cognitive abilities to think and talk about themselves
are affected by the emotional context of the interaction, their self-interest and the salience
of the topic of the conversation (Dunn, 1988, 1991a, 1991b).
At an empirical level, social-cognitive models have focused on discourse, on the co-
narrated self that is shaped through everyday social interaction. The observation of
language in naturalistic and laboratory settings between children and their mothers in a
variety of tasks has been their major methodological strategy. The fundamental assumption
is that language is "a window into self' (Miller et al, 1992; 46). Language represents the
self and the social contributions to the construction and alteration of ideas about the self.
Language research on the self has taken two directions. First, it has employed the
measurement of lexical terms referring to the self or others in the spontaneous talk of
children with their mothers at home (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Shatz et al, 1983). Part
of this literature has been presented in chapter 3, as the main type of naturalistic evidence
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for cognitive perspectives on the development of social understanding in autism (Tager-
Flusberg, 1992). Another substantive corpus of studies has shifted the focus of analysis
from the utterance-level to the discourse-level, as more appropriate for looking at the
social construction of understanding of self and others. The following studies illustrate this
theoretical and methodological turn.
Miller et al (1992) carried out a study on the unarratedu self through observations of co-
narrated personal experiences occurring in the spontaneous talk of children with others in
the family context. The purpose of their study was to examine empirically the social
character of self-construction through examination of interactive rather than monologic
discourse. They videotaped 12 children with average age two and a half years and 12
children with average age five years in their conversations with family members and friends
at home; for each child ten naturally occurring stories of personal experience were
collected. These young children came from diverse cultural backgrounds. It was found that
both young and older children portrayed themselves through interpersonal experiences;
this tendency was increased by 85% at the age of 5. Thus, their stories increasingly
described the self in relation to the other, situated within a social context. However, young
children referred more to themselves in relation to family members, whereas older children
extended their references to peers and others (i.e., teacher, doctor). Also, the majority of
children described themselves in relation to others in terms of an activity (joint activity,
social comparison). This finding is consistent with the evidence from interviews on the self
that supports an activity orientation in the categorisations of the self in early childhood. In
the above study, children compared themselves with others along three dimensions:
actions, emotions and possessions.
Another line of empirical investigation into the social processes on the development of the
self-concept in young children is the study of attributions about the self. Wylie (1987)
analysed the attributions made by three mothers in their talk to their children during 2 1/2
hour sessions for each case in an apartment within the laboratory. The average age of the
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children was 2 years and 10 months. Maternal attribution was defined as "any statement
made by a mother in the hearing of her child which makes some comment expressing
and/or implying some behavioural and/or inner characteristic(s) of the child, whether
current or more enduring." (p. 79). It was found that mothers tended to refer more
frequently to their children's cognitions (perceiving, knowing, understanding,
remembering), powers/abilities to make acceptable, appropriate choices and competencies
(building, table setting, climbing). Also, the most common type of lexical terms that
mothers used referred to children's desires/needs/emotions; the next most common
categories were "cognitions", "name address" and "abilities/competencies". Moreover,
most of maternal attributions to the children were implicit rather than explicit and few
were directed towards the total child rather than aspects of his/her behaviour.
Mothers' natural discourse has been the focus in another study by Radke-Yarrow et al
(1990). Eighteen middle class mothers with their toddlers (average age: 30.5) compared
with seventeen mothers with depression and their infants were observed on two occasions,
each time for 2 1/2 hours in a research apartment. There was a high frequency of labelling
of the child's behaviour by mothers. This indicates the importance of mother-child
conversations as a source of information about the self. Surprisingly, there were no
significant differences between the severity of a mother's depression and the frequency of
implicit/explicit attributions to the child. Interestingly, the implicit comments of mothers in
both groups were most frequently directed towards children's ongoing activities and
cognitions, rather than feelings and social qualities. In both groups, most of mothers'
comments for their children were positive in evaluative tone; also, mothers made more
explicit rather than implicit attributions to their children. Yarrow et al (1990) acknowledge
the risk of overgeneralising these findings, because they were produced under semi-
naturalistic circumstances; real-life social interaction is embedded in different contexts that
influence the quality and the content of discourse.
96
Regarding children's comments about themselves, it was found that there was a significant
positive relationship between the number of self-references made by the children and (a)
implicit and explicit attributions of mothers in both groups, (b) the variety in mothers'
attributions, and (c) the quality of dialogue. Interestingly, there were no differences
between the children of depressed and normal mothers in their frequency and variety of
self-references. Like their mothers, children tended to refer more often to their immediate
activities and less to their social and emotional qualities. Unlike them, they described their
own physiological feeling states more than their mothers did. It is interesting that mothers
made more frequent references to their children's cognitions and competencies rather than
to social-emotional domains; they seemed to affect social-affective development through
non-verbal behaviour, such as the moods they expressed and the feelings they created to
their children. The most evident difference between the two groups of mothers was in the
evaluative nature of their comments. Depressed mothers tended to make more negative
comments about their children. Their affective tone was different from mothers without
depression.
Research on the linguistic representations of the self in atypical populations has been also
fruitful. Beeghly, Bretherton and Mervis (1986) found that mothers of prelinguistic
children with Down syndrome employed proportionately fewer internal state utterances
than did mothers of children in the comparison group (matched on mean length of
utterance, mental and chronological age). Also, they did not refer to their children's
cognitive states as frequently as mothers in the control group. The above results have
significance when they are considered together with those of Cichetti et al (1990), who
found that children with Down syndrome were delayed in their ability to talk about actions
and internal states of self. Beeghly et al (1986) also found that mothers of children with
Down syndrome used significantly more internal state words referring to their children's
physiological states (i.e., "You're not very alert today") than mothers of the control
children. A possible explanation would be that children with Down syndrome have arousal
difficulties.
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Critique of social-developmental perspecth'es
On the whole, naturalistic perspectives have provided a valuable insight in the study of
development of the knowledge about the self and others. Their theoretical framework
takes into account developmental assumptions and cognitive hypotheses on the ability for
a conception of the self. But the research design and methodology in these empirical
studies are dictated by the argument that understanding of the self is a social process
mediated through language. This has special interest, as the dearth of research on the
investigation of the role of socialising agents, whose labelling of the child's behaviour
becomes a significant source of self-descriptions, has been noted in the literature (Harter,
1983).
Although contemporary developmental approaches in social cognition recognise the
importance of social interaction in the construction of self understanding, they do not
provide empirical methodological strategies that could examine systematically this issue.
The observation of spontaneous talk between children and their caregivers represents a
direct and meaningful way of looking at the ways that others influence children's concepts
about themselves. Further, these observations could be analysed together with transcripts
of clinical interviews on the self for a fuller understanding of the underlying mechanisms of
self development. Therefore, a combination of methodologies (interview and language
observation) could offer a more insightful perspective in the descriptive self and its
formation. However, the data from naturalistic perspectives come from only from toddlers
and preschool children. Thus, there is a need for additional information on the social
construction of self in middle and late childhood in normal and atypical children.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The goal of this chapter will be to describe the aims of this study, as well as explain its
research design and methodology in broad terms. First, the purpose will be to bring
together questions arising from the literature review highlighting those issues that the
present work has set out to investigate. Next, it will outline and justify methodological
decisions that have been taken for answering these research questions. The final part will
focus on the selection of participants, in terms of their clinical picture and psychometric
characteristics.
Research aims
The main theoretical issues arising from the discussion in the preceding chapters seem to
point to the same direction: the need to carry out research on the understanding of self and
others in autism in real-world social settings. This expansion of the theoretical and
empirical basis of current investigations may provide useful insights into current
assumptions under dispute. Further work is needed on the ways that "the talented
minority" of the autistic continuum uses or fails to use theory of mind competence in social
relationships. In addition, given that an increasing body of experimental evidence against
the hypothesis for a theory of mind deficit in autism shows the critical influence of task
factors on autistic persons' performance, the next step could be to compare experimental
findings with naturalistic information. Also, the study of social behaviour in real life might
be fruitful in the debate on the "cognitive" or "affective" deficit in autism. Although, both
the cognitive and social-affective approaches depend on carefully designed experiments,
the social domain of autistic behaviour has been surprisingly overlooked. An important
reason for this neglect is the attraction of the hypothesis for a single cognitive/affective
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handicap that will explain the complexity of autism. As a result, there is plenty of research
on both sides. However, what remains unexplored is how autistic individuals cope with
real-life social circumstances that require the application of mental understanding of
themselves and others. Moreover, qualitative information on the self comes mainly from
accounts of exceptionally bright autistic persons; there has not been any controlled study
on descriptions of the self by able autistic individuals (with an appropriate comparison
group). Finally, the naturalistic data on how high-functioning autistic children talk about
their own and others' mental states with their mothers at home have been analysed only as
utterances used by the autistic children, without paying attention to the parents' input in
these conversational exchanges.
These unexplored issues have formulated the following primary aims of this study.
1. A qualitative investigation of self-understanding
On the whole, the principal theoretical aim has been to explore the notion of awareness of
the self and others in individuals with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome. The
first general aim was to gain a qualitative understanding of how persons with mild autistic
disability think about their own self. I thought it important to collect direct information on
the attributes that they ascribe to themselves; also, to examine which aspects of their
personality they are aware of and choose to describe. At present, there is a great deal of
controversy on whether able autistic persons can have knowledge of their own internal
psychological states, as has been supported through a series of experimental tests (see
Chapter 3). However, it remains unknown how they perceive themselves as human beings.
Therefore, an important goal has been to gather direct and descriptive information on
knowledge of the self from able autistic individuals, rather than measure the use of this
ability on an experimental test.
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2. The study of the effect of context on the understanding of self and others
A further significant line of this research has been to study whether cognitive development
of awareness of the internal states of the self and others affects and is affected by social
processes in able autistic individuals. This objective goes beyond the current state of affairs
in the field: the focus solely on the cognitive achievements or limitations of the autistic
mind. My theoretical interest has been to look at the ways that this cognitive ability or the
lack of it are related with social relationships in the life of an autistic person.
Consequently, this study has been concerned with extending existing research knowledge
on able autistic persons' awareness of themselves and others (derived from experimental
situations) by looking further at naturalistic contexts. The aim, therefore, was to combine
information on behaviour in different settings. Since relevant research in autism has been
primarily carried out in artificial situations, it would be interesting to examine whether the
study of autistic children's real-life relationships provides conflicting evidence on the same
issue. Research on normal pre-school children's ability for social understanding has
demonstrated that children's intimate relationships with others (i.e., mothers, siblings,
peers) are closely related with their ability to understand their own and others' inner states
(Dunn, 1993, 1994). Thus, interactions within the family and the classroom may play an
important part in the development of these cognitive skills. An examination of different
contexts in which autistic children talk about their own and others' internal states and the
feedback they receive from familiar others may illuminate the processes that facilitate or
inhibit their own use of social knowledge.
3. An evaluation of dlfferent methodological approaches to the study of knowledge of
self and others in autism
This project has set out to explore the ability to understand the self and others through a
variety of methods in the same group of autistic individuals. This objective is consistent
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with the theoretical assumption that the performance of a cognitive ability is a complicated
phenomenon, related both to social and to cognitive processes. This framework of ideas
has guided the choice of different methodological strategies, so that a comprehensive
systematic understanding of the issue will be achieved. In essence, the underlying principle
of this study has been to explore the "ecological validity" of dominant experimental
research: to examine whether findings from experimental tasks are replicated or
discredited by naturalistic techniques.
To recapitulate, the specific research questions are:
1. Do persons with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome pass or fail a traditional
experimental test on the ability for a theory of mind?
2. Which aspects of themselves do the same individuals describe in a semi-structured
interview?
3. How do these persons talk about their own and others' internal states in the naturalistic
contexts of school and home?
4. Is there evidence that familiar others (i.e., teachers, parents) at home and in school
encourage or inhibit able autistic children's talk about their own and others' mental
states?
5. Do these individuals with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome show mental
understanding of others in their behaviour in real life situations?
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Methodology
The intention here is to outline the methodology adopted for each stage of the study. Also,
this presentation seeks to demonstrate that the research design has been closely linked with
the preceding research questions. However, in this section the discussion is confined to
mapping out the broad methodological directions. More detailed description of the
techniques used to investigate each research question will be provided in the following
chapters.
The core characteristic of our methodology has been its mixed nature. The concept of
'methodological triangulation" (Cohen & Manion, 1994) is descriptive of the general
research design of this study. It is defined as the combination of different methods on the
same object of inquiry. The need for a mixed methodology has been dictated by the
essence of our principal aim: to acquire a global undersanthng ol knoweàge o t'ie se"iI
and others in high-level autism drawing on people's performance in different contexts. Up
to now, research in the same area has mainly utilised a single strategy, namely hypothesis
testing; it has neglected to explore the interaction between individuals with autism and
their environment. Thus, the theoretical background of the present study, permeated by
the aim to embrace cognitive and social perspectives, has led to the application of methods
that will illuminate existing knowledge of awareness of the self and others in mild autism.
Moreover, this project represents a combination of research strategies that have been
applied to the same target group: children with high-functioning autism/Asperger's
syndrome.
In essence, my methodology is characterised by a move from structured to semi-structured
and naturalistic techniques. The assumption here is that such a comprehensive strategy
may throw light on the subject at issue. Therefore, the need to obtain information from
several different contexts necessitated the inclusion of a variety of settings. My aim has to
been to investigate whether differences in the nature of the situation (formal and structured
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versus spontaneous and naturalistic) would have an impact on the ways that able autistic
children talk about their own and others' mental states.
Another aspect of my methodology has been its qualitative dimension. My aim has been to
go beyond current approaches focused on proving whether a cognitive ability is absent or
lacking, so that a deeper analysis of self-understanding can be achieved by looking at the
content of this ability (how able autistic individuals think and talk about themselves and
others). For this purpose, language has been selected as the main unit of systematic
observation. There is general consensus in the literature that language analysis can
successfully inform theoretical interest on the development of understanding of the self and
others (Dunn, 1992). The study of the spontaneous narrated self has been used as a fruitful
method for the investigation of the development of self in normal populations (see Chapter
4). Given that the participants of this study do not have language retardation, the study of
their talk provides a useful tool for gaining access into their mental world. However, it
needs to be acknowledged that some high-functioning autistic persons have the ability to
get involved in conversations (interviews with researchers) and tasks (retelling stories)
about mental states, but they seem to describe rather than narrate their experiences
(Bruner & Feldman, 1993); this communicative problem has been explained as a result of a
weak or absent impulse to rework life experiences through transactional processes
(caregiver-child interactions) from the early years.
However, one of the limitations of analysing language as a rich source of information for
the contents of the "mind" and "awareness" is that it concentrates only on what is
expressed verbally. For this purpose, the study of natural verbal behaviour was extended
to include spontaneous behaviours and dialogues, occurring either during the period of
recorded sessions (for language analysis) or in less structured sessions with teachers. This
technique of opportunistic event sampling based on observations of interactions, could be
used as a complementary source of looking at the person's abilities as a whole, thereby
throwing further light on the findings from the other sets of data.
104
Specifically, the techniques applied for exploring each of the research questions are the
following:
An experimental methodology has been used to test whether persons with FIFA/AS
show the ability for first- and second-order theory of mind. The measurement of
attributing another's false belief has been chosen, as this is the traditional technique
for the study of theory of mind in all levels of autism (see chapter 3). It is a
structured test situation that provides an "all-or-none" reply to the question whether
these children are able to demonstrate the ability to understand somebody else's
mental state in the context of a carefully designed experiment.
II. For looking at the aspects of themselves that persons with HFA/AS describe, a semi-
structured interview has been employed. Since my aim is to obtain descriptions of the
self from the autistic group, a set of questions tapping different aspects of knowledge
of the self has been administered. These free-response questions provide a semi-
structured framework for all talk related to the self between the researcher and the
autistic individual. Also, the interview situation provides a secure setting for
confidential, private information to be gathered.
III. Concerning the talk about mental states of the self and others in naturalistic contexts,
a semi-structured but systematic technique has been chosen as appropriate: the
observation of spontaneous verbal interactions of the autistic group in two different
social contexts (home and school). The intention, at this stage, was to examine the
ways that able autistic persons express understanding of themselves and others in a
formal (classroom) and informal (home) environment. It may be useful to look at the
effects of structure and human factors (the adult taking part in the conversation) on
language about mental states that autistic children use for referring to themselves and
others. The focus, here, is on the able autistic child and the contribution of the adult
(teacher or parent) in the spontaneous conversation on psychological states of the
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self and others. Hence, both questions 3 and 4 have been explored through
recordings of spontaneous talk between autistic children and their teachers and
parents. With these techniques, information on the self and others is collected
through a procedure that minimises effects from the researcher's presence.
IV. Finally, in order to overcome the limitations of systematic language data collection as
well as to enrich the other information obtained, an additional method has been used:
the use of ethnographic observation. This technique aimed to capture any type of
incidents showing mental understanding of the self and others, arising out of the
structured recorded periods at school.
Description ofparticipants
The target group
Our theoretical interest in persons with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome was
inspired by research findings on this subgroup. Although, they seem to perform
successfully on first- and second-order theory of mind tests, they still show autistic
deficiencies in their social life. Also, their advanced verbal ability provides an interesting
way of investigating their knowledge of themselves and others; since they are able to talk,
it might be fruitful to gain access to their social understanding as expressed in a variety of
contexts. Therefore, this "talented minority" (Happe, I 994a, I 994b) presents a challenging
case for understanding the complexity of autism.
Our first step in selecting the participants of this study was to clari& the diagnostic criteria
for the target group. This task became difficult in the face of the amount of controversy
(discussed in Chapter 2) on whether Asperger's syndrome and high-functioning autism
represent the same form of autistic abnormality. On the one hand, high-level autism is
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defined in DSM-III-R (1987) in terms of a mild qualitative impairment in Wing's triad
(social interaction, communication, imagination) together with restricted, stereotyped
patterns of behaviour and interests. Also, the cut-off point of 70 in a standardised
intelligence scale has been used by researchers as the differentiating criterion between mild
and severe autism. On the other hand, Asperger's syndrome was first defined in lCD- 10
(1992) as similar to autism in terms of the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social
interaction and repetitive behavioural patterns. But, the lack of delay in general language
and cognitive development has been identified as the single diagnostic criterion
differentiating typical autism from Asperger's syndrome. However, there is some debate on
the validity of lack of language delay in early history. Recent studies have made a
diagnosis of AS only on the basis of normal language functioning at the time of the study
rather than past history (Ozonoff et al, 1991 a; Manjiviona & Prior, 1995).
A further issue that needs to be addressed is the developmental dimension of research
design in this study. The age of the target group (adolescents) imposes some limitations on
the interpretation of findings from the application of techniques. It has to be acknowledged
that all data are regarded as a reflection of' an original disability as well as efforts at
compensation, resulting from education and learning.
Seven pupils from a special school for autistic children/adolescents were selected for this
study on the grounds that they had been identified by educational psychologists as having
"autism", "autistic tendencies", "Asperger's syndrome" and "communication problems". In
general, the criteria for mild autism could be applied to their behaviour. All of them met
the criteria for autistic disorder defined in DSM-III-R (1987), including at least eight
symptoms from the three categories of abnormalities: impairment in reciprocal social
interaction, verbal/non-verbal communication and restricted repertoire of
activities/interests (see Appendix 1). Also, they had an extensively documented history of
classic autism. Subjects' current social ability was not assessed separately but it was
assumed with the diagnosis, as it was not the focus of the study. Moreover, a
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measurement of their performance IQ was taken. However, only two children (the
youngest in the group) showed more autistic symptoms (one met eleven criteria and the
other met thirteen criteria of DSM-IH-R) than the other five children and could have been
diagnosed as low-functioning. But, one of the two children with low-functioning autism
had the highest performance IQ (114.5) in the whole group. Thus, five individuals could
be diagnosed as high-functioning. Regarding the ICD-1O criteria for Asperger's syndrome,
four children had a history of language delay. However, two children (described above)
showed impaired use of language (echolalia) at the time of the study. Hence, five children
could be also diagnosed as having Asperger's syndrome. Because five children had
received a diagnosis of the same level of autistic handicap and cognitive functioning, they
were placed in the same classroom, together with the other two children that showed
echolalia. The main reason for this was that they did not have severe language delay.
Although the focus of this study is on individuals at the °upper end of the autistic
continuum", two children with more typical autism have been also included in the target
group. This decision was based on the following reason: as a large amount of our data
would be collected in the classroom during group sessions, it was practical to include
these two children in our observations. All children came from different areas of an
English County in the northern part of the country. The social status of their families
ranged from working to middle class.
The decision to study a target group of this size (n= 7) was related to my research
questions and methodological principles. Since the aim is to examine the application of
knowledge of self and others by using multiple techniques, it was considered more
appropriate to pay attention to the quality of the data rather than the number of
participants. In addition, it would have been impractical for one researcher to collect and
analyse the same type of information for a larger number of children within the allocated
time for fieldwork.
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The comparison groups
The inclusion of a comparison group has been largely used as a methodological strategy in
psychological research in autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Baron-Cohen,
1989b; Tager-Flusberg, 1992). In most cases, the control group consists of individuals
with mental retardation, so that any effects from mild retardation in the performance of the
autistic group can be eliminated. Thus, it was necessary to select a group of children with
moderate learning difficulties (MILD) for our research purposes.
The children in the comparison group had been identified as having "moderate learning
difficulties" and were all (except one) attending the same special school in the northern
part of England. In contrast with the autistic children, they all came from different classes
within the same school. The two groups of children were compared on chronological age
(CA) and verbal mental age (VMA). Verbal ability was assessed with the Short Form of
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintillie, 1982).
Non-verbal ability was measured with Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (1956). The
gender distribution in the comparison group (male:female ratio= 5:3) was almost the same
as in the autistic group (5:2). Details of the participants are summarised below.
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XNVMA 8.78
SD	 2.98
HFAJAS
(n= 7)
XCA	 11.95
SD	 3.54
XVMA	 7.88
SD	 2.76
MLD
(n= 8)
12.43
3.31
7.2
2.11
6.50
1.33
t = 1.96, p = 0.10
t=0.47,p=0.99
t = 0.68, p = 0.57
T-test
Table 5.1 Descriptive Characteristics of the Two Groups of Children.
A group of adults with AS (male:female ratio= 5:1) was also included as a comparison
group, so that it could be possible to examine whether the findings from the experimental
testing and the semi-structured interviews would be different by age. These individuals
were selected from a residential College catering especially for autistic persons and all had
received a diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome. They met the criteria of lCD- 10 for this
disorder: they showed abnormalities in "the triad" and had normal intelligence and no
language abnormalities at the time of the study (see Appendix 1). Verbal, non-verbal and
general intelligence (VSIQ, PSIQ and FSIQ respectively) in the adult AS group was
measured with the WAIS-R (1955). Only one adult had a history of language retardation
and ulill scale IQ of 60.5. The other five subjects had general intelligence above 70. Further
details of this group are given in Table 5.2 below.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Characteristics of the Adults with Asperger's Syndrome ('ii = 6,).
CA	 VIQ	 PIQ	 FSIQ
Mean	 24.32
	
90.33	 90.67	 91.17
Standard deviation	 5.11
	
17.73	 25.45	 37.91
Range	 18-33.1
	
70-118	 60.5-130	 51-140
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL TESTING ON THEORY OF MIND
Introduction
This chapter intends to describe the first stage of data collection in this study: experimental
testing. The first section will provide detailed justifications for the methodological design
and procedure that have been applied for exploring the following research question: Do
children with HFA/AS differ in performance on first- and second-order theory of mind
tests compared to children with MLD and adults with AS? In particular, the selection of
tests, procedures and materials will be presented. Then, results will be reported and
explained in the light of current experimental evidence in the field.
Methodology
In this phase of the study, the main aim was to seek experimental evidence on the ability
for a theory of mind in a group of children with high-functioning autism/Asperger's
syndrome. However, we decided to focus only on "false belief attribution". This decision
was based on four reasons.
1. The theoretical assumption supported by cognitive psychologists that "belief' is a
fundamental internal state for the interpretation of human behaviour; thus, testing
"false belief' would be a strict test for the theory of mind hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et
al, 1985).
2. The performance of high-functioning autistic children on tests of false belief
attribution has been used as the main evidence for assumptions about their ability for
self-reflection: since they fail to take into account another's false belief they may not
be able to be aware of their own beliefs as well. Hence, the focus on "false belief
attribution" would be more relevant than performance on tests of attributing other
mental states to the central theme in this thesis: the investigation of understanding of
112
the self and others in able autistic persons in a variety of contexts. The information
obtained through experimental testing will be compared with evidence of their
spontaneous talk on mental states (of themselves and others) in naturalistic settings.
3. Our focus on "false belief' would make it possible for a comparison between our
findings and existing evidence derived from the same procedures.
4. It seems that understanding of false belief presents problems for "the talented
minority" of autistic individuals (Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995).
At this stage of the study, my hypotheses are the following:
Children with HFA/AS are expected to be as successful on a first-order theory of
mind test as children with MILD. This prediction is based on two reasons. First, I
used a modified version of the traditional task, that has been found to improve
autistic children's performance (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Prior et al, 1990). Also,
verbal mental ability (greater than 6 years) has been shown to be a necessary but not
sufficient criterion for success on first-order belief attribution (Prior et at, 1990;
Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995). Since the verbal mental age of our target group is over
6 years, it is expected that they would not fail this task. Moreover, the adult group
with AS is predicted to pass the same task, because other studies using subjects with
AS in the same range of chronological age and level of intelligence as our
participants have shown that they pass first-order theory of mind tasks (Bowler,
1992; Happe, 1994c).
2. Children with HFAJAS will be less likely to pass the second-order false belief-
attribution task than children with MILD. The main reason for this is related to the
verbal ability of the group. It has been found that a chronological age of no less than
11 years and a minimum verbal mental age of 9 years is necessary for passing the
advanced test of theory of mind (Ozonoffet al, 1991; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995).
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Since, the children with HFA/AS had an average age of 11.95 and verbal age of 7.88,
it is predicted that very few of them will be successful on this task.
3. Adults with AS will be more likely to pass the second-order theory of mind test than
children with FIFAIAS. This expectation is grounded on empirical evidence, showing
that adults with similar chronological and verbal mental age are successful on this
task (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1994c).
Procedure
Both tasks were administered individually to all participants in a quiet room in their
school/college. First, each subject was tested on the first-order theory of mind test, to
investigate first-order belief attribution. Those who passed this task were further tested at
another time on second-order belief attribution. All sessions were tape-recorded and
subjects' responses to each question were transcribed.
First-order belief attn bution
A modified version of the traditional "Sally-Anne" test was used, which included the word
'first" in the test question, introduced by Prior et at (1990). The test employed two dolls,
a basket, a box and a marble. The experimenter and the subject were sitting around a table
facing each other. Each participant was presented with two dolls, Sally and Anne.
Explanations were given: "This is Sally. This is Anne. Sally has a basket. Anne has a box.".
Two naming questions were asked for checking whether the subject could identify which
doll was Sally and which was Anne:
"Which is Anne?" and "Which is Sally?".
Next, the experimenter moved the doll Sally in a way that she put a marble in her basket
and then went away. Then, the experimenter moved the doll Anne in a way that took the
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marble from Sally's basket and hid it into her box. At this point, two prompt questions
were asked:
(1) "Where did Anne hide the marble?" and (2) "Did Sally see that?".
After a while, Sally came back and looked for her marble. At this point, the experimenter
asked the test question:
"Where will Sally look for her marblefirst?".
The subject could either say or point to the location where s/he thought that Sally would
look for her marble. Also, s/he .was asked to justify her/his response (just?jicalion
question). Lastly, two control questions were asked: the reality question:
"Where is the marble really?", and the memory question:
"Where was the marble in the beginning?".
The test was repeated (trial 2) in the same session, this time reversing the locations.
Second-order belief attn bution
The traditional test for second-order belief attribution developed by Baron-Cohen (1 989a)
was used in this study (Bowler's tasks (1992) have not been chosen, as they were designed
and administered to an adult group of Asperger's syndrome). In this story the subject is
asked to predict one person's false belief about another's false belief. Each subject was
presented with a toy village (two houses, a church, a fence, an ice-cream van and four
dolls) and was asked to name all the toys. Then the experimenter said the following story
twice; the second time (trial 2) the locations were reversed. Explanations and questions are
given in the box below.
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This is John. This is Mary. They live in this village.
Naming Question: Which is John/Mary?
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice-cream man. John would like to buy an ice-
cream but he has left his money at home. He is very sad. "Don't worry" says the ice-cream
man, "you can go home and get your money and buy some ice-cream later. I'll be here in
the park all afternoon .". "Oh, good" says John, "I'll be back in the afternoon to buy an
ice-cream."
Prompt question (1): Where did the ice-cream man say to John that he would be all
afternoon?
So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the ice-cream man says "I am going to
drive my van to the church to see if I can sell my ice-cream outside there."
Prompt Question (2): Where did the ice-cream man say he was going?
Prompt Question (3): Did John hear that?
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes John's house. John
sees him and says "Where are you going?" The ice-cream man says "I'm going to sell ice-
cream outside the church.". So off he drives to the church.
Pronzpt Question (4): Where did the ice-cream man tell John he was going?
Prompt Question (5): Does Mary know that the ice-cream man has talked to John?
Now Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then she goes to John's house. She knocks
on the door and says "Is John in?". "No", says his mother, "he's gone to buy an ice-cream."
Belief Question: Where does Mary think John has gone to buy his ice-cream?
Justification: Why?
Reality Question: Where did John really go to buy his ice-cream?
Memory Question: Where was the ice-cream man in the beginning?
From Baron-Cohen (1989b)
	 -
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Results
A strict scoring criterion was applied in both tests. The child would pass the test if s/he
pointed to or gave correct responses to the test as well as the control questions (the reality
and the memory questions). For example, a subject would pass the first-order belief
attribution test if s/he pointed to/said the previous location (Sally's basket), the real
location (Anne's box) and the initial location (Sally's basket), thereby predicting correctly
the protagonist's false belief. If the subject pointed to/said the current location of the
marble (Anne's box), then s/he would fail the test.
First-order belief attn bution
All groups passed the naming questions. Interestingly, group differences on the belief
question were strikingly small: six out of seven children with high-functioning
autism/Asperger's syndrome passed the test on both trials and seven out of eight children
in the MILD group also passed the critical question (Table 6.1, below). All children in the
HFAJAS group who passed the belief question had also given correct responses on both
control questions; curiously, the only autistic child who failed the test question was correct
on the control questions. The same pattern of performance was observed in the MILD
group: all children, including the one who failed the test, gave correct replies to the
control questions. In the group of adults with Asperger's syndrome, all passed the belief
and the control questions. Therefore, no significant differences were found between the
target group and the comparison groups.
117
Table 6.1 Group Performance on the First-Order Belief Attribution Task
Children	 Children	 Adults	 Fisher's exact
with HFAJAS MLD	 with AS	 probability
(n= 7)	 (n= 8)	 (n = 6)	 test
Passed
	
6	 7	 p = 0.53, n.s.
Passed
	
6	 6	 p = 0.53, n.s.
However, responses to the justification question ("Why Sally will look for her marble in
her basket?") appeared to be interesting. A detailed description of the justification data for
each group is included in appendix 2. In the HFA group, three out of six subjects who
passed the test, used correct mental explanations (such as "know" and "think") to justi
the doll's action. Yet, replies of the remaining three children who also passed the test
referred to physical states (behavioural actions, i.e., "she put it in there", "she left it last").
The child who failed the test gave an irre'evant reason for the protagonIst"s action,
showing that he did not understand the belief question. Responses of the adults with AS
were exactly the same as those of the target group: three subjects referred to mental states
and three described physical states.
Similar results were obtained from the comparison group of children. Out of seven
children with MLD who passed, only two described mental states in their justifications and
the other six used the same physical state (i.e., "she put it in there"). Surprisingly, the only
child with MILD who failed the task gave a mental explanation.
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XCA
SD
XVMA
SD
HFA/AS
(n 6)
12.35
3.71
8.53
2.37
MILD
(n= 7)
12.72
3.47
7.64
1.84
t= 0.88, p= 0.43, n.s.
t= 0.37, p 0.9, n.s.
T-test
Second-order belief attribution
The task of second-order belief attribution was given only to those individuals who had
been successful on the first-order belief attribution test. There were small changes in the
size, the chronological and verbal mental age of the target group and the group of children
with MILD. Details are given in Table 6.2 below. The group of adults was exactly the same
as in the other test, as all had succeeded on that task.
Table 6.2 Descriptive Characteristics of Children with HFA/AS and Children with MLD
on the Second-Order Belief A ttribiition Task.
All subjects who passed the test answered correctly on the belief and the control
questions. There were no significant differences between the target and the comparison
groups (Table 6.3 below). Two out of three children with HFA/AS who failed the test,
gave incorrect responses on the reality question and correct replies on the memory
question on both trials, whereas the other child who also failed, replied correctly on the
control questions on both trials. A similar pattern was observed in the MILD group: three
out of the four children who failed the test, replied correctly on the control questions. In
the group of adults with AS, out of the two who failed, only one of them replied correctly
on the control questions. These findings show that the belief question was especially
difficult for them.
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Table 6.3 Group Performance on the Second-Order Belief Attribution Task.
Children	 Children	 Adults	 Fisher's exact
with HFAJAS with MILD	 th AS	 probability
(n= 6)
	
(n= 7)	 (n = 6)	 test
Passed
	 3	 3	 p=o.40
(HFAJAS Children
and MILD Children)
Passed
	 3	 4	 p=o.43
(HFAJAS Children
and AS Adults)
A non-stringent criterion was applied for correct justifications: explicit implicit
references to mental states were scored as correct. For example, the statement: "Because
he thought the van was gonna stay in there" makes a clear description of a mental state;
but, in the statement: "Because that's where the ice-cream man said he would be all day" a
mental state (knowledge) is implied. Interestingly, all children with HFA who passed used
appropriate mental explanations (first-order theory of mind) in their responses to the
justification question. The same pattern was observed in three out of four adults with AS
who passed the test: they made appropriate references to internal states (first-order theory
of mind). Also, one adult who failed the test used an inappropriate mental explanation. In
the MILD group, two out of three children who passed the test, gave mental explanations
(first-order theory of mind) for explaining their reply; the other person who passed the test
described a physical state.
Discussion
First-order belief attn bution
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The findings from the experimental testing do not provide evidence for the hypothesis that
high-functioning autistic children fail to employ a first-order theory of mind. Moreover,
the fact that all children in the target group who passed the test gave correct responses on
the control questions as well allows us to conclude that their knowledge about the
protagonist's false belief was genuine and not the result of guessing. Yet, that was not the
case for the only child who failed: although he answered the control questions correctly,
he failed the belief question. It is clear, then, that the question on the other's mental state
was difficult for him, as opposed to the control questions that are both focused on facts
(i.e., "where is the marble really?", "where was the marble in the beginning?").
The high success rate of the target group can be explained in terms of their verbal mental
age. The "passing" group of children with HFAJAS in my study had a higher mental age
(7.88) than the "failing" group of autistic children (5.5) in Baron Ct al's study (1985),
which used the "Sally-Anne" test without the word "first" in the belief question and found
that only 20% of the group passed the task. Our results are consistent with those by Prior
et al (1990) and Eisenmajer & Prior (1991) who used the same version of the task; also,
our target group had similar chronological and verbal age as the groups of high-
functioning subjects in both studies. Therefore, task factors as well as verbal ability (over 6
years) of the autistic individuals appear to improve their performance on the first-order
theory of mind task. However, the current view suggests that verbal ability is not sufficient
for success on the task. Our findings seem to support this position: out of two children
with HFA/AS with verbal mental age below 6 years, one child (verbal age = 5.4) passed the
test and he also gave a mental explanation. The only child who failed had the lowest verbal
ability in the group (4.0). Regarding the results from the adults with Asperger's syndrome,
they are consistent with those in Bowler's study (1992). That was expected as the subjects
with AS in both studies had similar chronological age and verbal IQ.
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Another interesting aspect of my findings is related to the responses on the justification
question. This question is useful in revealing the process of thinking around the belief
question. It was found that not all children (and adults) with 1-IFAJAS who passed the test
referred to the protagonist's mental state for explaining her action. Children with HFA/AS
and adults with AS who were successful explained their prediction for the doll's behaviour
in terms of observed facts (e.g., "Because she put it in there", "The fact that she left it
last", "Because that was the first place she had it", " 'Cause that's where it was."). This
picture becomes even more confusing, since some children in the MLD group used the
same type of reply (common reply: "'Cause she put it there before"). This implies that the
lack of appropriate mental state language in some autistic individuals who are able to
attribute beliefs to another person is not autism-specific. However, this finding may be
explained in two different ways: either that these persons are using mentalising skills but
they do not articulate them in an appropriate way, or that they rely on different cognitive
strategies that are not based on theory of mind. These intriguing results may be illuminated
through the study of the use of these abilities in natural social contexts by the same autistic
individuals. Then it might be possible to provide an "ecologically valid explanation".
Second-order belief attribution
My hypothesis that some children with HFA/AS would pass on the second-order belief
attribution test was supported. In contrast with Baron-Cohen's (1989b) evidence (none of
the ten high-functioning autistic children he tested passed the test), three (out of six
children tested) were successful in this study. This is interesting, as in both studies the
target groups had similar chronological and verbal mental ages. The rates of pass and
failure in our target group can be partially explained as a result of a verbal mental age over
9 years (Ozonoff et al, 199 Ia; Sparrevohn & Howie, 1995). Yet, one child with lower
verbal mental age (7.2) passed the task. All the other children with I-IFAJAS who failed
had verbal mental age lower than 9 years. Thus, it seems that there is an indication that
verbal ability improves task performance but this is not conclusive. It appears that the
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ability to understand the instructions and the nature of the task (dependant on verbal
ability) are not strongly related with the ability for second-order belief attribution (an
advanced conceptual skill).
The success rate in the group of adults with AS is consistent with Ozonoff et al's study
(1991a) and Bowler's (1992) study. It could be explained in terms of general level of
intelligence. The full scale IQ (95.18) of the adults with AS in our group who passed the
test was close to the fUll IQ of the subjects with AS who were also successful in the above
studies (89.52 and 86.8, respectively); the full scale IQ of the adults with AS who failed in
our testing was 81.75.
My results are also consistent with those by Sparrevohn & Howie (1995) who found that
all children with HFA who passed the test gave correct mental explanations, without
specifying if they were first- or second-order theory of mind responses. Also, the use of
mental justifications from adults with AS who were successful is in agreement with Bowler
(1992). However, successful performance on this task seems to be more associated with
first- than second-order explanations. All the children with HFA/AS and nearly all the
children with MLD and adults with AS who passed the test used a first-order theory of
mind strategy in their justifications. Could this mean that they do not have an advanced
theory of mind? But it is notable that the use of mental states was appropriate in the above
cases. Nevertheless, the focus here is on the expression of the thinking process, not the
underlying cognitive ability. Thus, it is not certain whether the language ability truly
represents conceptual ability. This shows the limitations of the experimental technique and
highlights the need to explore application of theory of mind in real-world settings.
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CHAPTER 7: INTERVIEWS ON SELF-UNDERSTANDING
Introduction
The focus of this chapter will be on the second stage of fieldwork of this study:
administration of a semi-structured interview. In the first section, the main research aims
will be outlined in connection with the methodology for their empirical investigation. The
principal research question was: Do children with HFAJAS show different understanding
of themselves compared with children with MLD and adults with AS? Next, the procedure
for the data collection, as well as the specific instrument that has been used, will be
described. Then, results will be analysed and presented; finally, a discussion of the findings
will be developed.
Research aims
In this phase of the study the primary aim was to obtain qualitative evidence on knowledge
of the self in the same single group of children with high-functioning autism/Asperger's
syndrome that had been tested for their cognitive ability to attribute mental states to
another person. The underlying assumption in the testing procedure was that children's
performance on tasks of attributing mental states to another person would be associated
with their cognitive ability to be aware of their own mental states. However, the nature of
experimental measurement did not throw further light on the contents of their ability to
have knowledge of themselves as persons. In particular, it might be interesting to explore
the ways that the same group of children with high-level autism conceptualise themselves
and which aspects of their own personality they report in a semi-structured situation.
Thus, the intention here was to acquire information on knowledge of the self that would be
descriptive and qualitative. Therefore, the major concern was to choose an approach that
would tap on cognitions about the self, that could then be evaluated in connection with
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assumptions about the ability to attribute mental states to the self: based on laboratory
tasks.
The different nature of the research aims at this stage required the selection of a different
methodology. For the purposes described above, the technique of the clinical interview
was chosen as most appropriate. It is a tool that has been extensively applied in
developmental studies that tap social-cognitive dimensions of self-understanding
(Broughton, 1980; Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Montemayor & Eisen, 1977; Selman,
1980). The interview offers mainly the opportunity of gaining access to the spontaneous
self, as it emerges in a semi-structured situation. The individual is given the freedom to
express his/her own concepts/views about him/her self with respect to a set of questions.
However, the lack of instruments for measuring knowledge rather than evaluation of the
self (self-esteem) in normal children is notable (see Chapter 4). To my current knowledge,
there has been no published study to date that has examined systematically descriptions of
the self derived by individuals with high-functioning autism/Asperger's syndrome. Hence,
the area of their self-understanding remains unexplored.
At this stage of the study the research aims were the following:
1.	 To determine whether the quality and the level of self-understanding in autism is
related to the presence or lack of a complex developmental disability by comparing
children with high-level autism/Asperger's syndrome and children with moderate
learning difficulties.
2	 To investigate developmental differences in the quality and the level of self-
understanding by comparing children with HFA/AS and adults with AS.
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3.	 To examine the relationship between performance on theory of mind tasks and
understanding of the self within a single autistic group of children with HFA/AS
compared with adults with AS and children with MLD.
Methodology
The interview was selected as an appropriate technique for two main theoretical purposes.
First, as a qualitative method it would provide a deeper insight in self-understanding, that
would go beyond the limitations of the experimental testing. Individuals would be asked to
describe themselves in a free-response mode, without the constraints of test questions.
However, it has to be noted that the use of an interview was not based on the aim to
contradict, but rather to complement experimental findings. Both techniques concentrate
on cognitive abilities: the false-belief attribution tasks measure the cognitive ability to use
knowledge of another's mental states; the interview reveals the cognitions
(views/thoughts) about the self. Therefore, the experimental testing and the interview have
been employed as suitable for answering different questions. In this thesis, the combined
application of two (or multiple) techniques is considered as more fruitftil than the use of a
single research strategy for the study of understanding of self and others in autistic
individuals.
The clinical interview
Although a variety of interview techniques have focused on young children's conceptions
about the self (Broughton, 1980; Johnson & Wellman, 1982; Selman, 1980), they
concentrate only on general aspects of self-understanding. These studies used open-ended
questions, such as "What is the self?", "What is the brain?" or presented children with
story-dilemmas, tapping self-reflection. But these questions are broad and do not examine
the two basic aspects of a person: the "I" (i.e., sense of the self being different from others,
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stable over time) and the "me" (i.e., physical characteristics, activities, social abilities,
psychological experience). This lack of a comprehensive instrument determined the use of
the self-understanding interview by Damon and Hart (1988).
This clinical tool is based on a multidimensional model of self-understanding (described in
Chapter 4). It consists of seven core items; four of them focus on aspects of the self-as-
object (the "I") and three items explore dimensions of the self-as-subject (the "Me") (see
Appendix 3). The first four questions are defined as "self-definition", "self-evaluation",
"self in past and future" and "self-interest". Responses on each item are examined in terms
of the child's description of four self-schemes (physical, active, social and psychological)
and use of four levels of self-understanding. The "physical" scheme refers to physical and
material attributes of the self; such as size, age, nationality, gender, body, voice, name,
possessions, clothes, health and physical environment. The "active" self includes typical
activities that are allowed, forbidden or demanded from the self (e.g., "I play Nintendo.",
"I'll fight the place."). The "social" self reflects membership of family relations, friendships
and social groups (e.g., "I have a family.", "I am proud of my friends."). The
"psychological" self comprises of feelings, moods and thoughts about cognitive/social
abilities of the self (e.g., "I like going on a ride.", "I get on with people quite well.").
In addition, Damon & Hart propose a conceptual hierarchy of four developmental levels of
increasing complexity in self-understanding (see Figure 4.1 in page 88). In early childhood,
the self is understood in terms of "categorical identifications" (level 1); characteristics of
the self are important in and of themselves without any underlying significance (e.g., "Why
do you say that this is important for you?", "Because I just do."). In middle childhood, the
self is described through explicit or implicit "comparative assessments" with others (level
2) (e.g., "Why is it important for you to work at school?", "Because I work better than
others in the class."). In early adolescence, the self is construed on the basis of its
capabilities to form and sustain interpersonal relationships (level 3) (e.g., "Why does that
make you feel proud?", "Because other kids want to play with me."). In late adolescence,
127
the self is organised according to personal moral and belief systems, life plans and goals
(level 4) (e.g., "Why is that good for you?", "Because I think it's good to help the
handicapped kids.").
A further dimension of the self-understanding interview focuses on the cognitions for the
self-as-subject, which are operationalised as "agency", "continuity" and "distinctness" of
the self. "Agency" describes the individual's conception of the formation and existence of
the self. At level 1, the self is considered to be the result of supernatural, biological or
social forces. At level 2, the self is regarded as the product of talents, abilities and efforts
of the self. At level 3, the self is conceived as influenced by communication with others. At
level 4, the self is viewed as the outcome of personal or moral evaluations. "Continuity" is
defined as the sense of having the same self and the same personal identity. "Distinctness"
covers one's statements about the sense of him/her self as a distinct, separate human being
from others. For these two components, the levels of understanding the self as a
continuous or distinct human being correspond to those of the understanding of the self-
as-object that were described above. For example, "continuity" at level 1 would describe
one's view of him/herself being the same or different over time, as derived from
"categorical identifications", whereas at level 3 "self-continuity" would be established on
the recognition of the self by others.
At this stage of the study, the hypotheses are the following:
1. It is likely that there will be differences in the aspects of self-understanding described
by children with HFAJAS and children with MLD, associated with the type of
handicap in each group.
2. Similar differences are expected to appear between the target group and adults with
Asperger's syndrome, related to maturational factors (i.e., the age) and the amount of
social experiences.
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3. It is predicted that there will be differences in the level of reasoning between the
children with 1-IFAJAS and the children with MILD, compared with literature findings
with normal children on the same interview.
Participants
The same groups that were tested on false-belief attribution tests participated in this phase
of the research. In particular, the semi-structured interview was administered to seven
children with high-ftinctioning autism/Asperger's syndrome, nine children with moderate
learning difficulties and six adults with Asperger's syndrome.
Administration procedure
The self-understanding interview was administered individually to all subjects in a quiet
room in their schoollcollege. All sessions were tape-recorded and transcribed shortly after
the interview. To avoid the problem of participants being reluctant to talk to an unknown
interviewer, the researcher had spent some time with the children and was well known to
them, before the interviews were carried out. The autistic children were interviewed after
three months of informal contacts between the researcher and the children in their
classroom (all were in the same class) and the playground. The researcher attended
classroom sessions and occasionally helped as an assistant, so that the autistic children
would be familiar with her. A similar approach was followed with the adults with AS. The
researcher visited them in their college and went with those students that had been selected
as co-operative and able to respond to an interview in their activities. Lastly, the
researcher spent a few days in the school with MILD with the purpose to meet the children
in advance, so that she was not a stranger to them.
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When a relationship had been established, each autistic child was given the interview
twice, approximately. one week apart. That was regarded as necessary to confirm the
reliability of the data. In the first session, each child was initially presented with a
photograph of him/her self only, to make sure that they were able to recognise themselves.
Then, the interviewer would ask the child to say something about him/her self. If the child
persisted in reporting information that was closely related to the photograph only, then the
photograph was placed out of his/her sight. However, the children with MLD and the
adults with AS were interviewed only once, since they appeared to be more able to
understand the nature of the interview.
The interview session lasted between twenty to forty minutes. Yet, it would be interrupted
if the child seemed to be uninterested or unwilling to talk at that time. It was presented to
them as an opportunity to have "a little chat" or a break from the classroom work; in fact,
this proved to be motivating for them to come along. Also, the use of the tape-recorder
was very helpful in making the experience desirable and appealing to them. Most of them
enjoyed listening to their own voices afterwards or during the session as a reward for their
participation.
Scoring procedure
Each transcript was divided into scorable units ("chunks") of responses to each item. A
chunk included characteristic(s) of the self described by the individual and all statements
explaining the meaning/importance of that characteristic(s). Then, each chunk was coded
according to the self scheme and the developmental level of reasoning. This process
followed the instructions set in the scoring manual developed by Damon Ct al. It has to be
emphasised that each response is scorable only if the subject is given the opportunity to
explicate his/her statement about him/her self. Some chunks can be scorable in two levels
within the same scheme. In this case, only the highest level is recorded. For instance,
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Interviewer	 :"What kind of person are you?"
Subject	 :"I don't know. Tall, I guess."
Interviewer : Why is that important for you?"
Subject	 :"If I wasn't tall I couldn't play basketball as well as my
friends and they wouldn't play me any more."
This response is coded both in level 2 ("comparative assessments") and level 3
("interpersonal implications") of the physical self. However, it is scored only on level 3, as
this is higher than level 2. Also, if some chunks are scorable in the same level of different
self-schemes, all self-schemes are recorded. For example,
Interviewer :"What kind of person are you?"
Subject	 : I go for rides."
Interviewer :"Why is that important?"
Subject	 :"Because I'm in the Biker's Club."
Interviewer	 : Is it important for you to be in the Biker's Club?"
Subject	 :"Yes, it is."
Interviewer : "Why?"
Subject	 : "Because I go for rides."
This statement is scorable in both level 1 of the active self and level 1 of the social self. If a
chunk is scorable at different levels in two or more schemes, only the score for the scheme
with the highest level is recorded. For example:
Interviewer	 "What kind of person are you?"
Subject	 "I'm a Christian."
Interviewer :"Why is that important for you?"
Subject	 :"Because I believe in God."
This chunk could be coded at level 1, social scheme ("I'm a Christian.") as well as level 4,
psychological scheme ("I believe in God."). But it is scored only at level 4, psychological
scheme, since it is clear that this is the personal meaning of "I'm a Christian.". The
assumption, here, is that the higher level incorporates the lower level of reasoning.
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Results
This section will report findings from the interviews on self-understanding from the three
groups of participants. The broad aim of the analysis was to examine differences in the
understanding of the self between children with high-functioning autism/Asperger's
syndrome, adults with Asperger's syndrome and children with moderate learning
difficulties. Individual differences within each group were also noted. However, the
analysis of group differences has concentrated on two specific dimensions: the use of self
scheme and the use of modal level of reasoning for self-understanding. The first part of the
results will describe group differences on knowledge of the self-as-object, as it is
represented in the first four items of the interview schedule. The second part of findings
focuses on the conceptions of the self-as-subject, derived from responses to the last three
items of the interview.
Self-as-object
lien:: Self- definition
The first item of the interview explored general definitions of the self ("How would you
describe yourself?"). All children with HFA/AS described their "physical" self at level 1.
They made references mainly to their gender (e.g., "I'm a boy.", "I'm a female.": four
children), bodily features (e.g., "I've got blonde hair.": four children) and age (e.g., "I'm
eighteen years old.": three children). There were also references to clothes (e.g., "I've got
new trousers today.": two children), physical environment (e.g., "I live in Darlington.":
two children), possessions (e.g., "I've got two pets.": two children), name (e.g., "My name
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is ...": two children), nationality (e.g., "I am a British person.": one child) and health (e.g.,
"I had seven teeth out.": one child).
Four children in the same group also described their "active" self at level 1 through their
daily activities (e.g., play, watching TV, eating). Only one person (the oldest in the group)
referred to her "active" self at level 4; that is, she seemed to have associated her activity
with personal feelings.
Interviewer
Subject
Interviewer
Subject
Interviewer
Subject
Interviewer
Subject
:"Can you tell me about yourself?"
:"Yea. I'd like to leave school."
"Yes."
:"Help me mum in the house."
:"Is this important for you?"
:"Yes, it is."
"Why?"
'Cause I'll feel better then."
Interestingly, one child spontaneously gave an example of using theory of mind ability. She
described her pretend play with her doll (e.g., "I play fips.", "It's where you have a
daughter.", "And she speaks to you sometimes and you look at her, you know..."). The
same child was the only one who made statements related to the "social" self at level I
(e.g., "I like my cousins.", "I don't know really what cousins are.") and level 3 (e.g., "I like
babies.", "They are small, they are patient, they learn to sit beside to me."). Also, she
showed understanding of mental states in the following incident she described:
"Sometimes in my dream I say 'Look up there, look up there'. When he (the dog) tries to
climb up the tree. He climbs right at the top of the tree. The dog is confused and he goes
up. And I say to him 'I'm up here, try and catch me.' He tries to come up but he gives up in
the end." When she was asked to explain why she said that the dog was confused she
replied: "Because he doesn't know where I am. So he never bites me.".
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Further, two children referred to their "psychological" self: one child talked about his
preferences (e.g., "I like listening to tapes.", level 1) and another child mentioned his
abilities (e.g., "I've been good to take up things like interviews" because "importance
means to go ahead. When I was born in 1983 I had to do it.", level 2). Finally, three
children used three self-schemes in their responses, two children used two self-schemes
and two children used one self-scheme only. Also, three children used two levels in their
statements and the other three used only one level of reasoning.
However, adults with Asperger's syndrome seemed to describe mainly their "social" self,
together with "physical" and "active" characteristics. Five adults made statements on the
"social" self two used level 1 (e.g., "I'm a student here in Ashleigh College.") and three
used level 3. In particular, "being friendly" and "getting on with people" seemed to be the
most common responses (e.g., "I get on with most people but there's a few who I don't. I
try quite hard to make friends but I can be a bit shy at first and I can talk a lot."). Under
the "physical" self at level 1 (described by three adults) references were made to
possessions (e.g., "I have a log book.": one person), physical environment (e.g., "I have
been to many schools outside of Newcastle.": one person), gender (e.g., "I'm a male.": one
person) and name (e.g. "I'm ....": one person). The "active" self scheme was expressed at
level I by two adults with AS (typical activities, e.g., "I'm doing independence.") and at
level 3 by one adult (e.g., "Unsettled.", "Like not coping with the place of it at all.", "I'll
fight the place, I'll do anything stupid.", "Like if! got thrown out of, of an important shop
by somebody of a pub or club, then people think I was a troublemaker or a thief, I was
suspect. And they've just picked the wrong person, because they realise that, that this
person wasn't at all the trouble maker."). Lastly, occurrences on the "psychological"
scheme were coded at levels 1 and 2: one adult stated his interest in music and one
referred to his cognitive ability (knowledge of maps).
Similarly, in the group of children with moderate learning difficulties the most commonly
elicited self schemes were the "physical" and "social". Seven children referred to their
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"social" self at level 3; they described characteristics associated with social interaction,
such as "helping people", "caring for people", "sharing with people", "being kind". Also,
eight out of nine children described physical attributes of themselves at level 1: clothes
(five children), bodily features (four children), gender (three children), health (e.g.,
"medical problems. Like fits", "I have leukaemia.": three children), age (one child) and
possessions (one child).
Fewer references were made to the "active" and "psychological" schemes by children with
MILD. The "active" self (four children) mainly covered activities in the classroom (level 1);
one child used level 3 (e.g., "I'm a good person.", "When people fall over I have to help
them."). Three children made statements for their "psychological" self at level 1 (e.g., "I'll
miss that, me friends.") and two children at level 2 (e.g., "I'm a person and I've come to
this school 'cause I was slow at writing.").
hem 2: Self-evaluation
In the second item the focus is on making an evaluation of the self and explaining the
aspects of the self that the individual feels or does not feel proud of ("Is there something
that you really like a lot about yourself?", "Do you feel proud about yourself?"). Only two
adolescents with HFA/AS (one male, one female; both were the oldest in the group) made
general negative self-evaluations. The "active", "physical" and "psychological" self
schemes were observed. Five children described their activities at level 1. Also, the
"physical" self scheme at level 1 was elicited by four children. Three children talked about
their "psychological" self at level 1 (preferences, e.g., "I like dinner, meals.").
In the adult group with Asperger's syndrome, only two persons (one male and one female,
both with the highest intellectual ability in the group) expressed negative feelings about
themselves. Four individuals referred to their activities: three of them explained their
typical activities either in the classroom or in their leisure time (level 1) and another one
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said that the inappropriate behaviour (level 3) he described in the previous item was his
response on this question as well. Two adults made statements related with their
"psychological" self at level 1; they referred to their interests. Only one individual made a
statement in the "social" scheme at level 3, e.g., "whether I look stupid in front of other
people and stuff like, if, if I don't listen it right first time."); this person (female) also made
the only statement on "physical" self at level 1 (aesthetic appearance and bodily features).
In the group of children with moderate learning difficulties, three children (two girls, one
boy) made a low evaluation of themselves. The most common elicited scheme was the
"psychological" self six children described their preferences and another child referred to
his feelings at level 1; only one used level 2 (abiliy in swimming). Two children described
the "social" scheme in terms of social response of other people to their behaviour (level 2)
(e.g., "How lucky I am that I have a mother and father love me. They support me in other
ways."), two children at level 3 (e.g., "Wicked kids. 'Cause they get wicked and always
pick on and things like that.", "People call you names, you do call them.") and one child at
level I (e.g., "I've got family."). Four children described their typical activities ("active"
scheme) at level 1. The "physical" self at level I was elicited only in two children.
Item 3: Self in future and past
This item asks for statements about aspects of the self that will remain the same in the
thture or have changed over time ("What do you think will stay the same about you in five
years", "What was the same about you five years ago?"). Five children with I-WA/AS
described changes in their future "physical" self at level 1 ("age": three children, "body
size": two children). Another two children had difficulty in answering this question: one
said that he did not know what to say and the other said that he would change and he
would be different but did not explain what he meant in each case. Two children made
references to their "psychological" self in terms of their behaviour (level I) (e.g., "I was
cheekier.", "I'll still be good.").
136
Regarding the self in the past, five children with 1-IFAJAS focused on the "physical" self at
level I (size: three children, body: two children, age: two children, physical environment:
two children). Three children referred to their activities in the past, at level 1; one child
used level 2 comparing his abilities in the past with those in the present (e.g., "I couldn't
talk as I talk now."). The "psychological" self at level 1 was elicited in only one child (e.g.,
"Sometimes I think I'm funny, sometimes I don't think I'm funny."). Notably, none of the
children talked about the "social" aspect of the self in the past. Also, four children insisted
that there had been no change in them as persons.
In their responses on the self in the future, adults with AS reported all self schemes. Two
subjects described changes in their "physical" self at level 1 (body and age). Another two
adults referred to changes in their activities at level 1: one talked about a job and the other
about bad habits (e.g., drinking). One adult expressed the wish to develop her social self at
level 3 (e.g., "I think I'll probably be a bit more confident probably.", so that "I might have,
like, a few friends at College."). Only one adult referred to the "psychological" scheme at
level 1, stating that there would not be any chaige in his interests (e.g., "I go around with
me metals.") and emotional behaviour (e.g., "If I don't have my own way I moan.").
Regarding statements on the self in the past, four adults with AS referred to changes in the
dimensions of their "physical" self ("physical environment": two adults, "possessions": one
adult and "age": one adult). One subject emphasised changes in her social behaviour at
level 3 (e.g., "I wouldn't say anything nice to anyone, I'd just be rebellious all the time.", "I
turn saying nasty.", "I used to wind people a lot."). Another mentioned the reactions of
other people to his social behaviour at level 2 (e.g., "But apart from that it gave me a bad
time including so many people who think I am stupid.", "When I was and they thought I
was a suspect."). Another referred to his friends at level 1 (e.g., "I didn't know anybody in
Ashleigh."). The "psychological" self at level 2 was elicited only in one adult (e.g., "I have
no idea how to dress.").
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In the group of children with MILD, the "physical" scheme at level 1 was elicited by seven
out of nine children. Their concept of themselves in the future was based on changes in
their bodies (five children), voice (two children), size (two children), age (one child),
physical environment (one child) and clothes (one child). Two children referred to their
social self at level 3 (e.g., "still stick up for people.") and three children referred to
friendships, family and clubs at level 1. In the "psychological" scheme, three children
perceived change in themselves in terms of interests (level 1); in the "active" seIf two
children described their activities at level 1.
Seven children with MILD described changes in themselves compared to how they used to
be in the past in terms of "physical" characteristics (health: three children, body: three
children, physical environment: two children, age: two children, possessions: one child and
voice: one child). Two children mentioned changes in their social behaviour at level 3
(e.g., "Fight all the time. I would be cheeky."), three children talked about their friends
(level 1) and one child referred to others' reactions (level 2) (e.g., And I was good,
everyone says good, very good man, going like that."). Also, another child used the
"social" self at level 4 (e.g., "I used to kick people in wheelchairs and now I don't.
'Cause I know it's wrong."). Also, the active self at level I was elicited by three children.
Item 4: Self-interest
This item involved the question: "What do you want to be when you grow up?". Four
children with HFAJAS talked about the sort ofjob they wished to have when they grow up
("active" self, level 1). However, the oldest person in the group again referred to her
desire to leave school, so that she could help her parents at home, because she liked them
("active" self level 4). Three children described changes in their "physical" self, level 1
(size: two children and physical environment: one child). One child said that he did not
know how to answer this question.
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In the responses given by the adults with AS, the "active" scheme emerged in the
statements made by five of them. Four referred mainly to their future occupation; another
described activities that are not allowed (e.g., "and without doing anything stupid, like
smashing or doing anything else. Or tipping the whole room upside down."). Two students
talked about their concern for improving their skills for social interaction ("social" self,
level 3) (e.g., "I would like to have a personality like Angela. She's, she's nice to people,
she's, em, oh, she's sort of, she's nice, she's dead confident and she's chatty.", "Good at in,
like attempt of looking for a new, like, to a new future. Including ... coping well with
others, and without doing anything stupid, like smashing or doing anything else. Or tipping
the whole room upside down. Or causing frustration to other people."). One adult gave a
reply that was not scored as valid.
Likewise, seven children with MLD described their self interest in terms of future
occupation ("active" scheme, level 1). Yet, two children made the same type of statement
but at a higher level (level 4); their preference to become "a sign language teacher"/teacher
was related with., their desire to help the handicapped children, "people in wheelchairs",
"little children in the nursery". Two children made statements on the "social" self, one at
level 2 (e.g., "If my father doesn't mind, I want to be in show business.", "I want to prove
them what, what I can do.") and one at level 3 (e.g., "I want to be like Jesus. 'Cause he's
always kind.").
Self-as-subject
Item 5: continuity
This item explored the basis of perceptions about the self s continuity ("Do you change at
all from year to year?"). Five children with I-TFAJAS scored at level 1: they identified stable
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physical properties (age: three children), behaviours (two children). Also, four children
insisted that they remain the same over the years. In a similar way, three adults with AS
used observable behavioural characteristics (three adults), possessions (one adult) and
preferences (one adult) as references for their concept of "continuity" (level 1). Only one
person used statements of level 2: he referred to improvement in his cognitive capabilities
as the basis for perceiving himself as the same person. In addition, two adults refused the
idea of change in themselves and did not make any statements on this item. All children
with MLD, described their sense of "continuity" only at a physicalistic level (level 1).
However, there was greater variety in their responses compared to the other comparison
groups; elements, such as body (five children), behaviour (four children), social
membership group (three children), name (one child), possessions (one child), preferences
(one child) were described.
Item 6: Agency
The question of this item was: "How did you become the person that you are?" Four
children with HFA/AS reported that biological forces influence the formation and
existence of the self (level 1). In other words, they perceived themselves being the way
they were as a result of a biological process ("growing"). Only two children considered
their own abilities and effort as the motivational drive for becoming persons (level 2) (e.g.,
"I drink fast. I eat fast.", "If you buy, eh, ... eat things that are good for you."). One child
said that he didn't know; in this case, my impression was that he really expressed ignorance
rather than inability to understand the question.
There was greater variance of perceptions in the adults with AS. Two stated that they
became as they are as persons through communication with others (level 3). Namely,
guidance and help from others affected their development and progress in their
personality. (e.g., "All the staff may think I'm special. And because I was more than
important they know that I was more than important, they know I was more
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understandable and independable, at the same time.", "People have a lot of patience with
me."). Two adults used explanations at the first level (e.g., "cause I'm growing up.") and
two persons used reasoning at the second level (e.g., "Just through experience. Learning
how people behave, like all I did was "wrong", shout to people for no reason at all. And it
was nice to sit and talk to people, instead of sit and shout at them.").
The picture was different in the group of children with MILD. Five of them referred to
biological forces as responsible for their existence (level 1) and two of them claimed that
social interaction has been the main source of personal development (level 3) (e.g., Mum
had to teach when I, when I was four."). Two children replied that they didn't know how
to reply in this question.
Item 7: Distinctness
Here, the question was: "Do you think that there is anyone who is exactly like you?".
Three children with HFAIAS explained that their sense of being different from other
people was based on physical features (level 1), such as bodily characteristics (two
children) and their name (two children). Only one child referred to common activities of
the self and another person as the basis for sameness (level 2). Three other children were
not able to give any sort of reply to this question. One of them explained her lack of
response: "I don't know what other people are like." The pattern was different in the adults
with AS. Five of them talked about "distinctness" on the basis of different activities (four
adults), personality characteristics (two adults) and cognitive capabilities (one adult) (level
2). One subject did not know what to say to this question. In the group of children with
MILD, six used explanations at the second level. They compared themselves with others on
abilities (one child), activities (three children) and aspects of personality (three children).
Another three children used reasoning at level 1. They described their own physical
properties (three children) and social membership (one child) as the bases for their sense of
distinctness.
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Discussion
This section will only summarise the main findings for each group of participants. These
results will be discussed in the light of the evidence from the experimental testing (Chapter
6) in the following chapter.
Self- as - Object
Self-definition
It is notable that only one child with HIFAJAS referred to the "social" self in her definition
of herself, compared with seven children with MLD. It seems that the target group was
more focused than the MILD on the "physical" and "active" self rather than the "social" and
"psychological" schemes. That is, the aspects of themselves that were mainly elicited were
those that are observable. This finding could be explained in terms of the social handicap in
autism: the self s association with friends/family/groups. Reactions of other people to the
individual's behaviour and social-personality characteristics did not appear in the definition
of the self, since the fundamental deficit area in autism lies in the social domain. In
contrast, it appeared that for the children with MILD "helping other people" was a strong
component of their concept of self. Six out of nine children used definitions referring to
the "social" self at level 3. This type of response could be interpreted as a result of
experience and practice within the school. It is very common for special schools catering
for persons with moderate learning difficulties to admit children with physical handicaps.
Thus, it seems to be considered essential to teach children with MILD to behave in a
respectful and helpful way towards other children with multiple physical problems.
However, five out of six adults with AS referred to friendships (level 1) and social
characteristics (level 3): whether they could get on with people and were friendly towards
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others. It seems that as individuals with AS get older, the "social" aspect of themselves is a
greater focus for them. There appears to be a stronger need to have friends, and this
makes them think about the skills required for forming relationships with others.
Self-evaluation
It seemed that the "active" (level 1, five children) and the "physical" (level 1, six children)
self schemes were the most important aspects of self-evaluation in children with HFA/AS,
whereas in the group of children with MILD, the "psychological" (six children at level 1
and one child at level 2), "social" (two children at level 2, two children at level 3) and
"active" (four children at level 1) self-schemes were frequently elicited. Again, the
emphasis in the HFAJAS group was on external and personal features of the self.
Interestingly, children with MILD used higher levels of reasoning for the "social" self rather
than the "psychological" self. This finding is consistent with their responses on the
previous item; it shows a stable focus on social aspects of the personality in children with
MLD. Similarly to the children with HFA/AS, the "active" self at level 1 emerged as the
main component in the responses from adults with AS, even though, "social" dimensions
had been central in their self-definitions.
Self in future and past
There were no differences between children with HFA/AS and children with MLD in the
use of level of reasoning for the "physical" scheme. However, children with MILD also
emphasised change in their "social" self (level 3: two children; level 1: three children),
whereas the HFAIAS group did not refer to this aspect at all. Thus, there is a greater
concentration on observable characteristics of the self in the autistic group on this item as
well. Yet, there was a greater variability in the responses made by adults with AS:
"physical", "active", "social" and "psychological" schemes were equally represented.
143
None of the children with HFA/AS referred to the past "social" self; they insisted on
having been the same persons and they described changes mainly in their "physical" (level
1: five children) and "active" (level 1: three children; level 2: one child) self. In the children
with MLD, the "physical" (level 1, seven children) as well as the "social" (seven children)
self at all levels were elicited. Similarly, in the group of adults with AS, the "physical"
(level 1) and the "social" (levels 1,2 and 3) schemes were the most common.
Self-interest
On this item, there were more similarities than differences across the three groups. Here,
the main focus was on the "active" self at level 1. Only two adults with AS used level 3
and two children with MILD used level 4 in their statements. The "social" scheme was not
elicited at all in the group of children with HFA/AS; only two adults with AS referred to
their social behaviour (at level 3) and two children with MILD (one at level 2 and one level
3).
Self-as -subject
Regarding "continuity" of the self; all groups perceived themselves as the same persons on
the basis of "physicalistic" features (level 1). Again, the children with 1-IFA/AS insisted on
sameness. Concerning "agency", there was greater variability. In children with 1-IFA/AS,
responses were coded at level 1 (biological forces were taken as the bases for becoming a
person in four children). However, two children identified personal ability and effort as
responsible for the formation of the self (level 2). Interestingly here, there was an absence
of reasoning that emphasised the role of social interaction (level 3); that was elicited only
by two children with MILD. Also, five children with MILD seemed to attribute their sense
of agency to biological forces (level 1). Responses from adults with AS were more
variable. Level 1, level 2 and level 3 were elicited (each by two persons).
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About perceptions on "distinctness" of the self, differences between the children with
HFAJAS and the comparison groups emerged. In the target group, three children based
their views on being distinct from others on their own physicalistic features (level 1) and
one child made comparisons between himself and others (level 2); three children did not
reply. They seemed to find it difficult to think how they were different from other people.
However, six children with MLD used statements at level 2; also, three children used level
1. In the group of adults with AS, five of them used level 2. One did not reply.
The general finding on the perceptions of the "self-as-object" elicited from the children
with HFA/AS is that they persisted on describing physical and active aspects of themselves
and not making references to their social and psychological characteristics. This tendency
was maintained in the cognitions on the "self-as-subject"; physicalistic views were mainly
described for the formation of se1f its continuity and distinctness.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENTAL
TESTING AND INTERVIEWS
This chapter will attempt to discuss findings from the experimental testing in the light of
qualitative evidence from the interviews. As each technique examines a different type of
cognitive ability, a direct comparison between these two sources of data is not feasible.
However, there are some aspects of the findings on the tasks that may illuminate the
quality of responses to the interviews.
It seems that the children with HFA/AS found it easier to pass the test on first-order (all,
except one, passed) than on second-order theory of mind (three out of six were
successful). That was predicted on the basis of task factors (change in the belief question
in the "Sally-Anne" test) and the verbal ability of the group. However, the interesting
finding is related to the type of responses on the justification question in the first-order
belief attribution task. There were more similarities than differences between the children
with FIFA and the children with MILD. Half of the children with HFA who passed the test
gave "mental" explanations, whereas the other half described "physical" events as causes
of the doll's behaviour. The same results were obtained from the adults with AS. Five
children with MLD who passed the test referred to "physical" states and another two used
"mental" explanations.
Interestingly, the three children with HFA/AS who were successful on second-order belief
attribution gave appropriate "mental" (first-order) explanations. However, both implicit
and explicit references to mental states were accepted. Thus, there was no case in which
they passed the test either via another cognitive route or accidentally. The same pattern
was observed in the adults with AS who passed the same test. This is not consistent with
another study by Bowler (1992), who found that no subject with AS (and in the control
groups) made an explicit reference to psychological states. This difference may be
explained as a result of applying stringent criteria, or not, on the justification responses. If
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we accept Bowler's strict criterion, then two children with HFA and one adult with AS
made "all-mental" statements in our study.
On the whole, children with HFAJAS and adults with AS appeared to have an
understanding of beliefs, despite the mixed pattern of physical and mental explanations in
their justifications. These findings may suggest that these individuals have knowledge of
their own mental states but their cognitions may be focused on boih physical and mental
characteristics of persons. This speculative view seems to be useful in the interpretation of
part of the findings from the interviews on self-understanding, as the main purpose of the
interview technique has been to provide an insight in the cognitions that these individuals
hold about themselves and how they describe them.
In particular, the tendency of all participants to describe physical characteristics as well as
actions/abilities of themselves as important in and of themselves (level 1) could be related
with their "physical" justifications on the tasks. A possi'b'ie explanation coulà 'be that these
aspects of the self are observable and behavioural; therefore, they are easier to describe.
But children with HFA/AS and children with MILD also referred to their psychological
attributes (moods, preferences, feelings) at level 1(21.4% and 34.7% of all the statements
on the first four items in each group respectively). Curiously, the "psychological" self
(11.9%) was the less described aspect by adults with AS.
Surprisingly, significant group differences were not observed in the experimental testing
but were found in the responses to the interview. It seems that the questions of the
interview proved useful in discriminating between the target group and the adults with AS
as well as the children with MILD. This is in agreement with findings from other clinical
samples (conduct disorder and anorexia nervosa) using the same tool (Damon & Hart,
1988).
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In essence, there are interesting findings on the centrality of certain aspects of the self,
suggesting that there is a relation between a mental health problem (such as autism) and a
mode of understanding the self. The almost complete lack of statements on the social self
in children with IIFAJAS was notable (1.78% of their statements referred to the "social"
self). Conversely, children in the comparison group and the adult group with AS not only
made more references to their social traits (26.6%) but also these perceptions were at a
high developmental level (level 3); that is, their conceptions of themselves were based on
social-personality characteristics that affect interpersonal relationships. Thus, it seems that
their social behaviour was an important concern for them. This tendency of the target
children could be explained in terms of the social handicap in autism. Children with
HFA/AS did not appear to regard social attributes as important for their self-
understanding. It may be that their interest on the social self increases with age, as implied
by findings from the older AS group. It appeared that the "social" self (28.6%) was the.
second most frequent type of statements on the self made by the adults with AS. Perhaps
as they grow older, they feel a stronger need to have friends and deveiop the necessary
skills. However, this association should not be taken as causal, but only as another
perspective on the understanding of the autistic disorder.
A further aspect of the findings is related to the level of reasoning of conceptions on the
self. Notably, the majority of statements in all four self-schemes in the three groups were
coded at the level of "categorical identifications" (level 1). According to Damon & Hart
(198 8), this level of reasoning is characteristic of early childhood (until 6 years of age).
This may imply a developmental delay in comparison with normal subjects; however, this
delay did not seem to be group-specific but universal. The highest level (level 4) that
represents views on the self as part of systematic beliefs and plans was observed in a few
expressions on the "active" (two statements in the FIFA/AS group and two statements in
the MLD group) and the "social" (one statement by a child with MILD) self- schemes.
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Concerning perceptions on the self-as-subject, a similar persistence on level I was
observed for the children with HFA/AS and the children with MILD. In particular, these
groups based their sense of being the same person over time on "categorical
identifications", such as physical/material/behavioural characteristics. In addition, three
children with MILD perceived themselves as stable over time because of their membership
of social groups; that was not referred to at all by the target group. Also, only one adult
with AS explained his knowledge of remaining the same person through reference to his
cognitive abilities.
Similarly, perceptions on the existence and formation of self ("agency") were concentrated
primarily on supernatural and biological forces (level 1). Only two children with MLD and
two adults with AS referred to social interaction as an important source of personal
development (level 3). Finally, the item on "distinctness" seemed to appear more difficult
for the children with HFA/AS; nearly half of them could not give a reply and for those
who responded physical features (at level 1) appeared to be the main aspects of themselves
that would make them different from other people. However, six children with MILD felt
that they were different from others as a result of comparisons on abilities, activities and
personality traits (level 2). Adults with AS also used the same level of reasoning.
In summary, findings from the experimental testing showed most of the children with
HFA/AS could predict another's mental state and their responses to the interview on self-
understanding revealed a tendency to describe physical, active and psychological
characteristics of themselves. However, these results derived from artificial and semi-
structured techniques illuminate to some extent the use of knowledge of the self and others
in the target group. Therefore, the next step could be to explore whether these children
with 1-IFA/AS apply awareness of mental states of themselves and others in their
spontaneous social interactions.
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CHAPTER 9: MENTAL STATE LANGUAGE: SELF AND OTHERS
AT SCHOOL
Introduction
This chapter will present and discuss the third set of information that has been collected
for the same group of children with HFA/AS for the study of their understanding of
themselves and others. In this section, the intention is to describe, data generated from the
application of a naturalistic methodology that may throw further light on the findings
derived from the experimental testing (Chapter 6) and the administration of a semi-
structured interview to the same target group (Chapter 7). Here, the main research
questions are: (1) What type of mental state utterances do children with HFA/AS use in
their conversations about psychological states of themselves and others in the natural
context of school compared with children with MILD? and (2) How do teachers use mental
state terms and how do they respond to 'anguage about ritema\ states useó 'Dy c'th'iàren
with HFA/AS compared with children with MILD?
Research aims
At this stage of the research the broad aim was to investigate the theoretical assumption
that social interaction plays a part in the development of the cognitive abilities for a theory
of mind. The fundamental premise is that cognitive processes are closely interwoven with
social relationships; they do not develop in a vacuum but through communication with
others. This perspective becomes especially significant for the study of autism, where the
core deficit lies in the social domain. Therefore, it is theoretically interesting to explore the
link between social and cognitive dimensions in the development of knowledge about inner
states.
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This theoretical shift in the research focus from cognitive processes to social relationships
required a similar methodological movement from experimental to naturalistic methods of
data collection. Current evidence on the theory of mind in autism is heavily based on the
hypothesis that awareness of the mental world can be assessed through performance on a
variety of simple and complex tests. Hence, the issue that remains unexplored and which
might extend existing empirical work is the association between children's interactions
with others and the demonstration of a theory of mind. Therefore, it would be illuminating
to examine the uses that individuals with high-level autism/Asperger's syndrome make of
mental state terms in social settings. Specifically, a secondary objective of this study was
to examine systematically spontaneous talk about mental states between children with
HFA/AS and teachers at school.
In this phase the research aims were the following:
1. To investigate the role of social interaction in the demonstration of understanding of
inner states about the self and others, by comparing able autistic children's verbal
interactions with others n the context of school with those of children with MLD.
2. To explore the relationship between children's and teachers' talk about mental states,
by analysing teacher-child conversations in a group of children with HFA/AS
compared with a group of children with MLD.
3. To assist in the interpretation of findings on the understanding of the self derived
from experimental testing and semi-structured interviews with results from
observations in a natural context.
Methodology
Extending the theoretical basis of this research required the application of an additional
methodology. In particular, the next step in the fieldwork was to study how children with
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HFA/AS express their ability for mental understanding of themselves and others in a
natural context. This methodological shift from artificial to natural settings was inspired by
research on the spontaneous use of mental understanding by high-functioning autistic
children (Tager-Flusberg, 1992) and normal children (Brown & Dunn, 1991) through their
family interactions. These studies utilised "language" as the medium for assessing
children's ability for a theory of mind. This technique of systematic observation of
conversations between children and their mothers was applied in the context of school.
The quality of mental state language between children with HFA/AS and familiar others,
such as teachers, appears to have remained unexplored. The context of school was
selected on the basis of its salience as a setting for the development of cognitive abilities in
children. Also, as a natural setting it might offer useful information on demonstrations of a
theory of mind in everyday life. Yet, the organisation and the type of activities at school
follow a set structure; so, it needs to be born in mind that children and teachers express
their knowledge about themselves and others within the constraints of the school schedule.
Further, the focus on spontaneous verbal interaction has been established as an important
methodological tool for the study of the social construction of the understanding of self
and others (see Chapter 4). The analysis of talk has a significant qualitative dimension that
provides an insight about how children's perceptions of themselves and others are shaped
through social relationships. Also, conversations can be examined through quantitative
methods, thereby substantiating theoretical arguments based on other qualitative data sets.
In addition, verbal interaction comprises an important aspect of social communication; this
is highly relevant in the study of autism, where the crux of the disorder is a handicap in
areas of communication and social interaction. Thus, it might provide an interesting way of
investigating autistic children's self-understanding in non-natural situations, such as
experimental tests.
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Research in theory of mind in autism has mainly followed the same tradition as in normal
development. It has primarily examined performance on multiple tests of mental
understanding that have been used with normal children. However, there is some research
on the influence of the social context on children's theory of mind. Judy Dunn (1988,
1991a, 1993, 1994) has studied intensively family interactions in normal children as
another line of inquiry into the same issue. However, there is only one study that has
applied a similar method in the area of autism (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Notably, there
appears to have been no attempt to combine experimental and observational methods
within the same single group of children with HFA/AS for the evaluation of theory of
mind. It is this combination that could provide a useftil perspective on the topic and
comprises the main aim of this research.
At this stage of the study the predictions are the following:
1. There will be differences between children with I-IFAJAS and children with MLD in
the frequency of use of mental state language on the self and other: the target group
will make fewer references to inner states of self and other compared to the
comparison group.
2. There will be group differences in the quality of mental state language: the target
group is expected to make fewer references to cognitions rather than emotions,
perceptions and desires compared to the comparison group.
3. There will be a relationship between autistic children's talk and their teachers' talk
about mental states.
Participants
Data were collected only for two groups. The same group of seven children with I-WA/AS
that took part in the previous stages of this study was observed in the classroom in
153
comparison with seven children with MLD. The exclusion of the adult group with AS was
based on practical considerations. On the one hand, there is a gap of knowledge in the
spontaneous use about mental state language by adolescents and adults with 1-IFA/AS. On
the other hand, the collection of qualitative data as well as their transcription and analysis
for all three groups would go beyond the time scale for this project. Thus, it was
considered more important to focus only on the group of children with HFA/AS.
Procedure
Systematic observations of the target group in their school were carried out over a period
of three months, following experimental testing and administration of interviews. Thus, the
researcher had been already established as a familiar person with all children and the
teaching staff in the class. These relationships were enhanced by the fact that the
researcher would also see these children at home for carrying out ftirther observations
over the same period.
The aim of the fieldwork at school was to audio-tape naturally occurring conversations
between children and their teachers without disturbing the typical schedule. The purpose
was to collect samples of teacher-child verbal interactions that were part of the common
routine of the children's school life. However, observations covered only those activities
that would occur in the classroom. The main reason was that, during break time children
would either play in the garden or have a drink in the class (all sitting around a table). At
that time, the interaction between the children and their teachers was kept to a minimum,
so that the children could relax. Thus, the sessions that were recorded were: (a) group
sessions in the classroom including all seven children with HFA/AS and their teachers;
these sessions focused on encouraging the interaction between the children offered
opportunities for discussions (e.g., "describe what you did in the weekend", "describe
what you enjoyed doing this week at school") and activities (e.g., "write a sentence about
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the book that you got from the library", role playing: "how to make a conversation' 1 ) given
by the teacher. (b) curriculum sessions, involving a teacher working with two/three
children on English or Maths; one session with the speech therapist and four children was
also included in these sessions. The length of sessions ranged from 30 to 45 minutes. The
researcher would sit at a short distance to the persons that were observed, so that notes
related to the context of the interaction could also be taken. The tape-recorder was often
visible; but it was not considered obtrusive to the conversation, since the children and the
teachers were already used to it.
The group of children with MLD was observed for a period of one month. Six of the
children who took part in the other two sets of data were in the same class. Three
observations were carried out for that class (45 to 60 minutes each): group sessions with
conversational activity (e.g., role play, "describe another person in the class"). It was not
possible to collect information on curriculum sessions, because the class with the children
with MLD was not organised in the same way as the class with the autistic children.
Another child with MILD was observed in his class in a different school, working in a
group of four children with the teacher.
Method of analysis
The underlying principle of the analysis of spontaneous conversations in the natural setting
of school was to explore the use (or lack of use) of utterances for mental states of self and
others as well as the context of their expression. Thus, the approach intended to provide a
wider understanding of the mental language used by children and their teachers in the HFA
and the MLD groups. This task was difficult, since no other study using the same type of
data with autistic children has been traced. My method of analysis has followed two main
lines of research. It has drawn upon existing research on mental state language in autism
that has been carried out solely at home (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Also, it has been guided
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by influential studies on the mental state language used by normal children in their
interactions with their mothers at home (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown & Dunn,
1991; Dunn et a!, 1987; Shatz et a!, 1983).
Although the above researchers have collected the same type of evidence, they have
applied a different method for analysing the use of mental state terms. On the one hand,
Tager-Flusberg's study (1992) has focused on the frequencies and the use of mental state
references by autistic children, excluding utterances made by their mothers. This approach
is useful in providing quantitative information on their language; yet, a limitation is that it
does not take into account the context and the sequence of a natural conversation. On the
other hand, Judy Dunn's work has offered a different perspective that illuminates
interactions/associations between children's and mothers' use of mental state language:
here, the focus is on conversational turns and the pragmatic context of the utterance.
My analysis is a combination of these two methods. All transcripts were analysed at two
levels. At the first level, all transcripts were searched for lexical terms that referred
explicitly to four psychological states: perception, desire, emotion and cognition. At the
second level, the aim has been to look for conversational turns in which references to
psychological states were made. A conversational turn was defined as one speaker's
utterance followed by another speaker's utterance.
Level 1: Explicit utterances
The mental state terms that have been identified fall into the following categories.
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PERCEPTION
Vision	 . look, see, watch, notice, observe, pay attention
Hearing ..............hear, listen, loud, noise
Touch ................cold, dry, feel, hard, hot, hurt, touch, wet, warm, freezing
Smell..................smell
Taste..................taste, sour
DESIRE ...........care, want, wish, need
EMOTION .......angry, bad, better, calm, fun, good, happy, hate, like, love, sad, scare,
surprised, upset, worry, glad, funny, enjoy, bored, freight, tired, cry,
proud, embarrassed, make cross, enthusiastic, unhappy, hug, kiss,
scream, smile, laugh
COGNITION ... believe, dream, forget, guess, idea, know, mean, pretend, remember,
think, trick, understand, wonder, ignore, be aware of, understand,
understanding, realise, suppose, hope
Following Shatz et al (1983) and Tager-Flusberg (1992), each utterance was coded in
terms of its "functional use". That is, "true mental state references" were distinguished
from those that did not denote mental states ("conversational" or "idiomatic" uses).
Different categories of functional use were defined for each category of psychological
state. The analysis excluded all terms included in incomplete sentences and
imitative/echolalic utterances made by autistic children. There is a legitimate argument that
terms showing emotional behaviour (such as hug, smile, laugh) should not be included in
the analysis as they show display of emotion rather than understanding of emotion. They
have, however, been used in other research with clinical (Tager-Flusberg, 1992) and non-
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clinical (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown & Dunn, 1991) and the critical question is
whether references to hugging, smiling, etc, are used in appropriate situations. In practice,
observational data indicated consistently that these terms were used appropriately, and it
was therefore decided to retain them in the analyses.
Perception
•	 True Mental State Reference: the utterance clearly represents actual perception
related to one of the five senses (e.g., "1 did not hear that.").
• Conversational Use: the term is used to draw attention to one's needs (e.g., "Watch
that.", "Listen to Paul.").
•	 Idiom: e.g., "See you later.", "you see".
Desire
•	 True Mental State Reference: the utterance clearly expresses a wish (e.g., "I want to
play outside.")
• Conversational Use: the term is used either for making a request (e.g., "1 want a
tissue.' meaning "Give me a tissue.") or for introducing an activity (e.g., "Do you
want to write it down, please?" which could be paraphrased as "Write it down
please.")
Emotion
•	 True Mental State Reference : the utterance is used to describe feelings/emotions
(e.g., "I was scared."). Also, terms showing emotional behaviour (such as "hug",
smile", "cry", "laugh", "scream") are included in the analysis.
Cognition
•	 True Mental State Reference: utterances describe cognitive states (such as belief,
knowledge, understanding, thought, dream, imagination) (e.g., "I don't think that's
true.").
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• Conversational Use
- Modulation of Assertion : cognitive terms used to show the degree of certainty
about something (e.g., "Do you know where they are?", "I think they are at that
drawer.").
- Directing social interaction (e.g., "Know what?").
- Introducing an activity (e.g., "Do you think you can tell us a few sentences?").
- Clarification (e.g., "It's a person, I mean, a man.").
- Reminders for action-memory (e.g., "Don't forget to take your book with you.").
• Idiom: (e.g., "You know.").
• Special Code: "I don't know".
Level 2: Conversational turns
Following Dunn et al (1987) and Brown & Dunn (1991), each conversational turn was
coded in terms of (a) which participant expicity reIerreà to the interna'l state (teacher or
child), (b) the person to whom the statement was addressed (teacher, child/children) and
(c) whose psychological state was referred to (referent: self, other, self and other).
Teacher's talk directed to another teacher in the class during the lesson was also included
in the analysis. In addition, following Shatz et al (1983), I examined the use of mental
verbs through three categories: (a) initial use of a term in a sequence of conversation, (b)
repetition of the teacher's word in the previous two turns, and (c) repetition of the child's
word in the previous two turns. Further, each conversational turn was coded in terms of
the pragmatic context of the utterance. Pragmatic context referred to the explicit or
inferred intention of the speaker who made the utterance. Different categories of
pragmatic context, adopted from Brown & Dunn (1991), were defined for teachers' and
children's utterances. Teachers' references were classified in four categories:
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1. Didactic/Controlling efforts to control the behaviour of the child, teach moral
lessons, impose discipline (e.g., "If you were listening, you would know.")
2. Commentary: identification of one's mental state, discussion, simple comments,
narratives (e.g., "I know what's happening.", "What I want to do is ...").
3. Questioning/Clarifving making a question about a mental state, clarifying a mental
state (e.g., "What have you liked to do in school this week?").
4. Directing/Guiding Behm'iour: the teacher is giving instructions for a task (e.g., "Try
to think of something.").
Children's utterances were coded under five categories of pragmatic context.
1. Self-interest: drawing attention to one's own needs, soliciting comfort! assistance
(e.g., "I need a tissue.").
2. Sophisticated: comforting another, teasing, deception, explaining one's actions,
attempts to avoid blame (e.g., "He's dreaming all day.").
3. Commentary: simple comments without giving explanation (e.g., "I feel like you,
Gail. I don't like the cold.").
4. Describing a Mental State: giving information to the teacher as a response to her
request (e.g., "I haven't heard about that.").
5. Questioning/Clarifying: asking a question about a mental state (e.g., "How do you
think ...?", "What do you mean?").
Two types of verbal interactions between teachers and children were observed for both
groups in their classroom: group sessions and curriculum sessions. The total amount of
recorded "group sessions" was 137 mm. for the FIFA group and 118 mm. for the MILD
group. There was a larger difference in the length of observations of "curriculum"
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sessions: 197 mm. for the HFA group and 33 mm. for the MILD group. The main reasons
for our decision to obtain this amount of data from the comparison group were both
methodological and practical. My primary theoretical focus has been to explore
understanding of self and others in a single group of individuals with HFA in different
contexts. Also, this task has been demanding within time constraints for a full-time
research degree. Thus, given that the collection of data on the comparison group has the
purpose to complement the main corpus of information on the target group and the limited
time for fieldwork, it was not feasible to gather and analyse the same amount of evidence
for the MILD group.
As the sets of observations for group sessions and curriculum sessions for each group
were not of the same time length, it was necessary to define a means of standardisation for
the application of statistical analyses on the data. Thus, the standardisation of the longest
to the shortest sessions was determined as the technique for resolving this problem. For
example, the comparison of all utterances between teachers in each group on group
sessions could be carried out, if the longest observations (the group sessions of the HFA
class) were standardised to the shortest observations (the group sessions of the MLD
class). The same process was followed for comparisons between teachers and children in
each group on all features of mental state utterances that were coded. The formula that has
been applied was:
axbN =
	,where
C
a= the number of mental state utterances by children with FIFA,
b= the total amount of recorded time of group sessions for the MILD group, and
c= the total number of recorded time of group sessions for the HFA group.
Then, the number of utterances by children with HFA would be standardised to the 118
mm. of the observations of the MILD group. For example, if children with HFA made 187
mental state utterances in group sessions lasted 137 mm. and the comparable sessions for
the children with MILD lasted 118 mm., the formula applied would be:
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N—	
187x118
137
Differences were examined within (Tables 1-8) and across (Tables 9-16) the two groups.
Comparisons were made between: (a) teachers and children with 1-IFA, (b) teachers and
children with MILD, (c) teachers of children with 1-IFA and teachers of children with MILD
and (d) children with HFA and children with MILD. Also, all utterances were analysed at
proportion level (Tables 17-19). For example, a comparison between children with FIFA
and children with MILD on references to others' psychological states does not provide
information on whether the two samples are significantly different in the use of the referent
"other" in proportion to their overall use of referents. All group comparisons were
performed using chi-square, as this test is appropriate for the study of differences between
categorical data from two independent samples (Siegel, 1956).
Reliability of Observations and Codings
Ideally, a second observer would have been present for some of the observations to
establish inter-observer reliability. Unfortunately this was considered too intrusive, both in
the classroom and in the home setting (Chapter 10). An alternative would have been to use
a video camera, but, this, too, was considered too intrusive. The procedure adopted by
Brown & Dunn (1991) and Tager-Flusberg (1992) was followed strictly, and extensive
discussions were held with the candidate's supervisor to establish consistent treatment of
observations on the borderline between two categories (e.g., cognitive terms used to
represent a true mental state differentiated from cognitive terms with a converstational
use). It could be argued that ideally a second rater should have coded a sample of
observations in order to establish the reliability of the coding system. In practice, the
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second rater would have had to be trained by the candidate and this would largely have
defeated the purpose of the exercise. It was felt that the procedure adopted was more
appropriate: namely to establish consistent treatment through informal discussion with an
experienced person.
Results
In presenting the results, Tables with results of particular educational and clinical
importance have been placed in the text and other Tables have been placed in Appendix 4.
C'onzparisons within groups
Overall use of mental state language
As Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show, significant differences emerged between teachers and children
in the general use of mental state language. That is, teachers used significantly more
utterances referring to psychological states than children in group and curriculum sessions.
Also, these significant results were not group-specific: they were observed in the HFA and
in the MLD group.
Table 9.1 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers
and Children in Both Groups.
Groups	 Teacher
	 Child	 x2
HFA
	
414
	 187
	 85.7, df= 1, p< 0.001
MLD
	
781
	
138
	
449.9, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
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Table 9.2 Overall Frequencies of Mental Slate Utterances in Curriculum Sessions:
Teachers and children in Both Groups.
Groups	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
HFA
	
473	 140
	
180.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
MLD
	 62	 12
	 33.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Categories of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers in each group used significantly more utterances referring to
perceptions and cognitions than children (Tables 9.3 and 9.4). Also, children with 1-IFA
used significantly fewer terms referring to desires than their teachers. Another interesting
finding is that no significant differences were found between children with HFA and their
teachers in the use of terms about emotions, whereas children with MLD made
significantly less use of the same type of utterances than their teachers.
Table 9.3 Frequencies of Each category of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions:
Teachers and Children with HFA.
Mental States	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception	 115
	
44
	
31.7, df= 1, p<0.00l
Desire	 43	 12
	
17.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
Emotion	 64	 56
	
0.5, n.s.
Cognition	 192	 75	 51.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
Note: n.s.= non-significant.
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Table 9.4 Frequencies of Each categoiy of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions:
Teachers and children with MLD.
Mental States	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception	 86	 11	 57.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
Desire	 26	 3	 n/a
Emotion	 342	 103	 128.4,df=1,p<0.001
Cognition	 327
	
21
	
269.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
Note: n/a= not applicable.
In curriculum sessions, significant "within-group" differences were found only in the 1-IFA
group and observed across all categories of psychological state: teachers used significantly
more terms referring to perceptions, desires, feelings and cognitions (Table 9.5). In
proportion terms, the largest teacher-child difference was observed in the use of "desire"
terms. No significant differences were found between teachers and children with MLD
(Table 1 in Appendix 4).
Table 9.5 Frequencies of Each Galego,y of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum
Sessions: Teachers and children with HFA.
Tt2i SL	 T eacheT	 Child	 xl
Perception	 132	 31
	 62.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
Desire	 77
	
9
	 53.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Emotion	 51
	
26	 8.1, df= 1, p< 0.01
Cognition	 213
	
74
	 67.3, df= 1, p< 0.001
Referents of mental state utterances
Interestingly, different results were obtained for the HFA group between group and
curriculum sessions. In group sessions, children with I-WA referred significantly more to
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their own internal states than their teachers (Table 9.6); but the reverse was found in
curriculum sessions (Table 9.7). Also, no significant differences emerged between teachers
and children in their references to others' mental states in group sessions, although in
curriculum sessions, teachers referred significantly more to others' mental states than their
pupils. Yet, children with MILD described others' mental states significantly less than their
teachers in group sessions (Table 2 in Appendix 4).
Table 9.6 Referents of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA.
Referent	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Self	 105	 141	 5.3, df= 1, p< 0.05
Child/Teacher	 218	 8	 195.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
Other	 31
	
28
	
0.1, n.s.
Table 9.7 Referents of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA.
Referent	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Self
	
144
	 91	 11.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
Child/Teacher	 174	 20
	
122.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
Other	 36
	
15	 8.6, df= 1, p< 0.01
Functional use of mental state utterances
Children in each group used significantly fewer utterances to represent "true" internal
states than their teachers in group sessions (Table 9.8 below, Table 5 in Appendix 4) and
curriculum sessions (Tables 7 and 9 in Appendix 4). In particular, children with HFA
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appeared to make significantly less "mental" use of utterances describing perceptions,
desires and cognitions (Table 4 in Appendix 4). Children with MILD were found to use
significantly fewer terms representing "true" perceptions, emotions and cognitions than
their teachers (Table 6 in Appendix 4). Lastly, teachers made significantly higher
"conversational" and "idiomatic" use of mental state terms than children with HFA in
group sessions (Table 9.8 below).
Table 9.8 Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA.
Functional Use
	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
True Mental State
	
349	 163	 67.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational 	 40	 7
	
23.1, df= 1, p<O.001
Idiomatic	 25	 6	 11.6, df= 1, p<O.001
Use of mental state utterances
Teachers in each group initiated significantly more mental state utterances than children in
group sessions (Tables 11 and 13 in Appendix 4) and curriculum sessions (Tables 15 and
17 in Appendix 4). In the 1-IFA group, teachers made significantly higher initial use of
terms referring to all psychological states than children across all sessions (Tables 12 and
16 in Appendix 4). Also, they used significantly more terms describing "cognitions" that
they had repeated than children. In the MILD group, teachers initiated significantly more
utterances referring to perceptions, emotions and cognitions than children in group
sessions (Table 14 in Appendix 4). Also, they used significantly more terms describing
emotions that had been repeated by them and by the children.
Comparisons across groups
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Overall use of mental state language
Interestingly, teachers of children with HFA were found to make significantly less use of
mental state language in group sessions than teachers of children with MLD (Table 9.9
below). However, no significant differences were observed between children with HFA
and children in the comparison group on the general use of terms of psychological states in
group sessions (Table 9.10) not in curriculum sessions (Table 19 in Appendix 4). Finally,
there were no significant differences between teachers in the general use of mental state
language in curriculum sessions (Table 9.11 below).
Table 9.9 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers
of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA
group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Groups	 1-IFA
	
MLD	 x2
Teacher	 356	 781	 158.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
Table 9.10 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Children
with HFA and Children with MLD ('observations of the HFA group standardised to length
of observations of the MLD group).
Groups	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Child	 161	 138
	
1.8, n.s.
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Table 9.11 Overall Frequencies of Mental Slate Utterances in Curriculum Sessions:
Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the
HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Groups
	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Teacher	 79	 62
	 2.0, n.s.
Categories of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA used significantly fewer terms referring
to emotions and cognitions than teachers in the comparison group (Table 9.12). In
curriculum sessions, teachers of children with MLD were only found to use significantly
fewer terms representing "perception" than teachers in the 1-IFA group (Table 20 in
Appendix 4). Children with I-IFA used significantly more terms describing perceptions and
cognitions and fewer referring to emotions than children with MLD in group sessions
(Table 9.13), whereas no significant differences were observed in curriculum sessions
(Table 21 in Appendix 4).
Table 9.12 Frequencies of Each Category of Psychological State Utterances in Group
Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD
(observations of the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD
group,).
Mental States	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Perception	 99
	
86
	
0.9, n.s.
Desire	 37
	
26	 1.9, n.s.
Emotion	 55	 342
	
207.4, df= 1, p< 0.00 1
Cognition	 165
	
327
	 53.3, df= 1, p< 0.001
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Table 9.13 Frequencies of Each Categoty of Psychological Slate Utterances in Group
Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD ('observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Mental States
	 HFA
Perception	 38
Desire	 10
Emotion	 48
Cognition	 64
MILD
11
3
103
21
x2
14.8, df= 1, p< 0.01
n/a
20.0, df= 1, p< 0.00 1
21.7, df= 1, p< 0.001
Referents of mental state utterances
Teachers of children with 1-IFA referred significantly less to their own, to children's and to
others' internal states than teachers of children with MILD in group sessions (Table 22 in
Appendix 4). However, there were no group differences in curriculum sessions (Table 24
in Appendix 4). Interestingly, there were no significant differences in the use of referents
between children in the two groups in group sessions (Table 23 in Appendix 4).
Functional use of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA were found to use significantly fewer
psychological state utterances to represent "true" internal states and significantly more
utterances as idioms than teachers of children with MILD (Table 9. 14). However, teachers
of the target children appeared to make significantly more frequent "mental" and
"conversational" use of terms than teachers of the comparison group in curriculum
sessions (Table 9.15). Finally, no significant differences were observed between children
with HFA and children with MILD in the categories of functional use of all terms across all
sessions (Tables 27 and 30 in Appendix 4).
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Table 9.14 Functional Use of Menial State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of
Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD ('observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 1-IFA
	
MLD	 x2
True Mental State	 300
	
734
	
182.2, df= 1, p< 0.00 1
Conversational
	
34	 38
	
0.2, n.s.
Idiomatic	 21	 9
	
4.8, df= 1, p< 0.05
Table 9.15 Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA
group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
True Mental State	 331
	 51	 205.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational
	 58	 9	 35.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Idiomatic	 18
	
2	 n/a
Use of niental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with MLD initiated significantly more mental state
terms (this was also true in the curriculum sessions, Table 35 in Appendix 4) and repeated
significantly more utterances that had been used by them and the children than teachers of
children with HFA (Table 31 in Appendix 4). Interestingly, children with HFA initiated
significantly more mental state utterances (as was also found in curriculum sessions, Table
37 in Appendix 4) and repeated significantly fewer terms that had been used by the teacher
than children with MILD in group sessions (Table 33 in Appendix 4).
Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
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In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA used significantly fewer mental state
terms for making comments, asking questions and giving guidance than teachers with
MILD (Table 9.16). In curriculum sessions, teachers in the HFA group made significantly
higher use of mental state utterances for questioning than teachers in the MILD group
(Table 39 in Appendix 4). Also, children with HFA used significantly fewer terms for
providing information than children with MILD in group sessions (Table 38 in Appendix
4).
Table 9.16 Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Group
Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD
('observations of the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD
group).
Categories	 HFA
	
MILD	 x2
Didactic	 11
	
3	 n/a
Commentary	 172	 375	 98.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
Questioning	 87	 286	 106.1, df = 1, p<O.001
Guiding	 71	 113	 9.6, df= 1, p<O.Ol
Comparisons across groups
Categories of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA appeared to refer significantly more to
perceptions and desires and significantly less to emotions in proportion to their total
amount of mental state language compared with teachers of children with MILD (Table
9.17). No significant group differences emerged in the curriculum sessions (Table 40 in
Appendix 4). In group sessions, children of the target group were found to talk
significantly more about perceptions and cognitions and significantly less about emotions
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(similarly to their teachers) in proportion to their overall use of utterances on
psychological states than children with MLD (Table 9.18).
Table 9.17 Comparison of Frequencies of Utterances for Each Category of Mental State
as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of
Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Mental States	 FIFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Perception	 115 (27.7)	 (86) 10.9	 45.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
Desire	 43 (10.4)	 (26) 3.3	 23.3, df= 1, p< 0.001
Emotion	 64(15.4)	 342 (43.7)	 63.9,df= l,p<O.001
Cognition	 192 (46.3)	 327 (41.8)	 1.3, n.s.
Total
	
414
	
781
Table 9.18 Comparison of Frequencies of Utterances for Each Category of Mental State
as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances in Group Sessions: c'hildren with
HFA and 6'hildren with MLD.
Mental States	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Perception	 44(23.5)	 11(8)	 11.3, df = 1, p<O.001
Desire	 12 (6.4)	 3(2.1)	 n/a
Emotion	 56 (29.9)	 103 (74.6)	 32.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 75(40.1)	 21(15.2)	 16.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
Total	 187	 138
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Referents of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with I-WA seemed to make significantly more use of
references to their own psychological states and significantly less to others' mental states in
proportion to all their referents, compared with teachers of children with MLD (Table 42
in Appendix 4). No significant differences were found between teachers in curriculum
sessions (Table 44 in Appendix 4). Interestingly, there were no significant differences in
the use of referents between children in group sessions (Table 43 in Appendix 4).
Functional use of mental state utterances
In group sessions, no significant differences were observed in "true mental" use of
utterances between teachers and between children (Table 46 and 47 in Appendix 4,
respectively). Also, teachers of children with HFA appeared to make significantly more
"conversational" and "idiomatic" use of terms in proportion to their overall
compared with teachers of children with MILD. No significant differences were found
between teachers and between children in curriculum sessionc (Tables 48 and 49 in
Appendix 4).
Use of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA initiated significantly more terms and
used significantly fewer terms which they had repeated in proportion to their general use
of utterances, compared with teachers of children with MILD (Table 50 in Appendix 4).
Children of the target group were found to initiate significantly more utterances and repeat
their teachers' terms significantly less in proportion to their total use, compared with
children with MILD in group sessions (Table 51 in Appendix 4). No significant differences
between teachers and between children emerged in curriculum sessions (Tables 52 and 53
in Appendix 4).
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Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
In group sessions, teachers of children with HFA appeared to use significantly more
utterances for didactic purposes and providing guidance to the children and significantly
less for making questions in proportion to their overall use of categories of pragmatic
context, compared with teachers of children with MLD (Table 9.19). Yet, no significant
differences were observed in curriculum sessions (Table 54 in Appendix 4). Also, there
were no differences between children in their use of mental state terms for giving
information across all sessions (Tables 55 and 56 in Appendix 4).
Table 9.19 Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances
as a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories in Group Sessions: Teachers
of Children wi/h HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Categories	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Total
11(3)
172 (46.9)
101 (27.5)
82 (22.4)
366
3(0.3)
375 (48.2)
286 (36.8)
113 (14.5)
777
13.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
0.1, n.s.
6.2, df= 1, p< 0.05
9.0, df= 1, p< 0.01
Discussion
This part of the fieldwork aimed to explore the quantity and the quality of mental state
language on the self and the other used by teachers and children with 1-IFA, compared with
teachers and children with MLD. This section will only summarise the main findings; the
principal discussion of the most significant results will be developed in Chapter 11.
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Comparisons within groups
First, it is necessary to evaluate whether observations of two different types of classroom
sessions (group sessions and curriculum sessions) were useftil in bringing out differences
in the type and use of utterances on psychological states made by teachers and children. In
fact, the use of categories of internal states as well as the referents of terms were not
consistent across all sessions (for the HFA group only). In particular, no significant
differences were found between children with HFA and their teachers in the use of terms
of "emotions" in group sessions as a proportion of their overall use of categories of mental
states; yet, the same children referred significantly less to feelings than their teachers in the
curriculum sessions. This finding was not surprising, taking into account that group
sessions are intended to encourage group discussion, whereas curriculum sessions are
rather target-oriented: to teach English and Maths. In addition, the lack of significant
differences in the use of terms describing emotions between teachers and children with
HFA in group sessions is an interesting finding compared with the results from the MLD
group who used significantly fewer utterances on feelings than their teachers.
Another interesting finding was that teachers in each group referred significantly more to
perceptions and cognitions than the children across all sessions. It seems that these mental
states are more relevant to teaching/learning processes than emotions and desires. It also
shows a greater emphasis on the use of skills of perception and cognition in these
classrooms.
Another difference between group sessions and curriculum sessions emerged in the use of
referents in the HFA group. In group sessions, children with HFA talked more about their
own mental states, whereas in curriculum sessions they made significantly fewer references
to themselves. Also, there were no significant differences between teachers and children in
describing others' psychological states in group sessions (yet, children with MLD were
observed to make significantly fewer references to others than teachers); in curriculum
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sessions, children with HFA referred significantly less to others' internal states than
teachers. These results could be also explained in relation to the nature of the sessions:
group sessions are aimed to encourage talk about the self and others, whereas curriculum
sessions are rather target-oriented.
Results were consistent across all sessions on the general amount of mental state language:
teachers in each group used significantly more mental state utterances than children. It is
surprising that teacher-child differences were found even in group sessions, although these
have the purpose to encourage children to participate in conversation; it seems that these
sessions tend to be directed mainly by the teacher.
In addition, findings were consistent on the functional use of mental state utterances made
by children in each group. They used significantly fewer utterances representing "true"
psychological states than their teachers. Finally, children in each group initiated fewer
mental state terms than their teachers across all sessions.
Comparisons across groups
The overall picture of findings suggests that significant differences were more often found
between teachers and not between children as had been expected.
Firstly, there were no significant differences in the general use of mental state language
between children across all sessions. It is important that these results are consistent in
group sessions and curriculum sessions; it suggests that the nature of the session does not
have an effect on the amount of utterances on psychological states used by children with
HFA. However, differences were observed between teachers in each group in group
sessions: teachers of children with HFA used significantly fewer mental state terms than
teachers of MiD (there were no significant differences in curriculum sessions).
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Interesting results were obtained on the type of categories of psychological states that
were described by the speakers. In group sessions, children and teachers in the HFA group
used significantly fewer terms on emotions than children and teachers in the MILD group.
Also, teachers of children with HFA referred significantly less to cognitions than teachers
in the comparison group. However, children with HIIFA talked significantly more about
cognitions and perceptions than children with MILD.
Secondly, it was surprising not to find any significant differences between children in
references to their own and others' mental states in group sessions. Instead, teachers of
children with HFA referred significantly less to their own, to the children's and others'
mental states than teachers of children with MILD in group sessions.
Significant differences between teachers in each group were also observed on the
fttnctional use of mental state utterances: teachers of the target children appeared to use
significantly fewer terms for representing "true" psychological states in group sessions and
made significantly higher "mental" use of utterances in curriculum sessions than teachers
of children with MILD. Yet, no significant differences were found between children in each
group in frmnctional uses in group sessions.
Interestingly, children with 1-IFA initiated more mental state terms than children with MLD
across all sessions. However, teachers of the target group initiated more psychological
state utterances in group sessions and significantly more in curriculum sessions than
teachers of the comparison group.
Another significant difference between group sessions and curriculum sessions emerged
between teachers in each group. In the former sessions, teachers of children with HFA
used mental state terms significantly less for making comments, asking questions and
giving guidance as a proportion of their general use of categories of pragmatic context
compared with teachers of children with MILD. In the latter sessions, teachers of the target
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group used significantly more mental state utterances for asking questions than teachers of
the comparison group. In group sessions, children with HFA used significantly fewer
mental state utterances for giving information than children with MILD.
In summary, the comparison of verbal interactions between children with 1-IFA and their
teachers revealed similarities on the use of terms describing emotions and differences in the
use of utterances about perceptions and cognitions across all sessions. However, this does
not imply that these children were not able to talk about these mental states, because their
comparison with children with MILD revealed that they used more terms on perception and
cognition. It is also interesting that significant differences were found in the use of
categories of mental state and their pragmatic context across teachers than children in each
group. Given these surprising results, it should be illuminating to examine whether these
tendencies are consistently observed in conversations with parents at home.
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CHAPTER 10: MENTAL STATE LANGUAGE: SELF AND
OTHERS AT HOME
Introduction
This chapter will describe and discuss the fourth set of data that has been obtained
from the same group of individuals with HFAJAS for the study of their understanding
of themselves and others. This part of the thesis will present evidence from another
application of a naturalistic methodology that may complement and illuminate the
findings from the experimental testing (Chapter 6), the semi-structured interview on
knowledge of the self (Chapter 7) as well as the observations of conversations between
autistic children and their teachers (Chapter 9). At this stage of the study, the main
research questions are: (1) How do children with HFA/AS talk about psychological
states of themselves and others in the natural context of home compared with children
with MLD? and (2) How do parents ol ci1dren with HIFA)AS use menta' state
language and how do they respond to their children's talk about internal states
compared with parents of children with MILD?
Research aims
In this phase of the research, the general aim was to explore further knowledge of the
self and the other as it is used by individuals with HFA/AS in a d?fferent natural
context. The theoretical assumption is that the social context may play a critical role in
the application of social understanding by the target group. Therefore, looking at
another area of autistic children's social interaction in their everyday life might provide
a greater insight in the ways that their ability to show a theory of mind is employed, or
not. The main premise is that the use of mental abilities in practice is based on
cognitive processes as well as social relationships; it is not a phenomenon that can be
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explained only through cognitive skills or deficits. Besides, this perspective on research
into theory of mind could be particularly significant for the study of autism, since the
essence of the disorder is "a triad of impairments" in the social domain.
As in Chapter 9, the broad theoretical focus on the social context required an
appropriate methodology that would provide naturalistic information. It was regarded
as useflul to extend empirical evidence derived from the classroom setting with similar
information collected from the natural context of home. Although existing research on
social understanding in 1-IFAJAS remains primarily within the experimental tradition,
some naturalistic work has been also carried out (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). However, its
purpose has been to examine exclusively the autistic child's mental state language,
without paying attention to issues related to the interaction between the child and
others.
At this stage the research aims were the following:
1. To explore the role of social context in the application of understanding of mental
states about the self and the other, by comparing able autistic children's verbal
interactions with their parents at home with those of children with MLD.
2. To examine the relationships between children's and parents' language about
psychological states, by analysing parent-child conversations in a group of
children with HFAJAS compared with a group of children with MILD.
3. To extend findings derived from experimental testing, semi-structured interviews
and observations of mental state language in the classroom in the same target and
comparison group of children.
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Methodology
In this part of the fieldwork, the theoretical interest has been to investigate further how
autistic children use understanding of the self and the other in a different real-life
setting. For this purpose, the family context was regarded as appropriate, because of
its informal and familiar nature. Autistic children may show different aspects of social
understanding in their interactions with their parents/siblings or relatives. In contrast to
the classroom, the family environment is a more private social area, providing more
opportunities to the children to behave and talk in more natural ways.
Since the theoretical objective has been to collect similar information from another
natural setting, the technique applied here was on the same lines as that in the previous
part of the fieldwork. Thus, the main focus was on systematic observation of mental
state language used by children with HFA/AS and family members at home.
As noted in Chapter 9, the amount of relevant research on high-functioning autism is
minimal. The main piece of work that has been carried out compared the spontaneous
talk of able autistic children at pre-school age with that of children with Down
Syndrome matched on chronological age, mental age and language ability (Tager-
Flusberg, 1992). However, the analysis of language on inner states concentrated on the
utterances used by children in both groups, without taking into account dimensions of
natural verbal interactions, such as the complexity and sequence of conversations. This
neglected aspect might have thrown further light on the findings that autistic children
tended to use fewer mental state terms than mentally retarded children. Thus, my
research aimed to expand existing knowledge on spontaneous mental language of
children with 1-IFA/AS by looking at an older target group and applying a different
analysis that combines single utterances with interactional aspects of the conversation.
As in chapter 9, this direction of analysis has been based on work carried out Brown &
Dunn (1991) on conversations between pre-school children and their mothers at home.
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At this stage of the study the predictions were the following:
1. There will be differences between children with HIFA/AS and children with MILD
in the amount of mental state language on the self and the other: the target group
is expected to use fewer utterances on inner states of self and other compared to
the comparison group.
2	 There will be group differences in the quality of mental state language: the target
group is expected to make fewer references to cognitions rather than emotions,
perceptions and desires compared to the comparison group.
3. There will be a relationship between autistic children's talk and their parents' talk
on mental states.
Participants
Two groups of children were observed at home: six children with FIFAIAS and three
children with MILD. All families with autistic children, except one, were willing to take
part at this stage of the research. However, it was more difficult to obtain the co-
operation of families with children with MILD; four families refused to give their
consent for home visits, because they had been involved with other relevant research in
the past. Therefore, the amount of data collected from the comparison group was not
the same as the target group.
Procedure
All children were observed at home during three home visits, each one week apart.
These observations were carried out at the same period as the observations of the
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same children in the classroom. In most cases, the researcher went with the children on
their return to their homes. This arrangement facilitated the establishment of the
researcher as a familiar person for all children. Some of the parents of autistic children
had been approached through an annual meeting with the administrative staff of all
units of the school.
Similarly to the technique applied in the classroom, spontaneous conversations
between children and others at home were audiotaped.with a portable tape-recorder.
The length of the home visits varied from 30 to 50 minutes, depending on whether the
parent and the child would feel at ease with the recording. Three home visits were
carried out for each child. It has to be noted that, some of these conversations involved
siblings and relatives who happened to be at home at that time, since the aim was to
obtain naturalistic evidence, without disturbing the family routine. The researcher was
present in the room where the conversation was taking place, keeping notes on the
ongoing activities and avoiding taking part in the interaction.
Method of analysis
All conversations were transcribed and analysed following the same principles that
have been described in Chapter 9. However, some modifications have been applied to
the coding system.
Level 1: Explicit Utterances
First, additions have been made to the list of terms that were identified as mental state
utterances, representing "perception", "emotion" and "cognition". These are included
in the following table.
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PERCEPTION
Touch	 . cool, stroking
EMOTION..........mood, relieve, fancy, sick of, aggravate, aggression, adore,
satisfaction
COGNITION......joking, misunderstand, reckon, doubt
In addition, the functional use of utterances describing emotions was expanded to
include "conversational use" of these utterances, e.g., "I'd like that little bowl."
meaning "I need that bowl", "I'm afraid you were struggling a lot" meaning "I think
you were struggling a lot."
Level 2: Conversational Turns
All utterances made by another person other than the parent were also included in the
analysis. All other codings followed the same system as the analysis of transcripts from
school (Chapter 9).
Eighteen home visits were transcribed for the children with HFA and nine home visits
for the children with MLD. The total amount of recorded time was 684 mm. for the
target group and 325 mm. for the comparison group. All transcripts from home
observations were analysed at two levels: (1) within each group (Tables 1-5) and (2)
across groups (Tables 6-10). Comparisons were made between: (a) parents and
children with 1-IFA, (b) parents and children with MILD, (c) parents of children with
HIFA and parents of children with MILD and (d) children with 1-IFA and children with
MILD. In addition, all observations at home were compared with those from school
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(Tables 11-15); they were compared separately for group sessions and curriculum
sessions. Thus, the following groups were examined: (a) parents of children with HFA
and teachers of children with HFA, (b) parents of children with MILD and teachers of
children with MILD, (c) children with HFA at home and school, and (d) children with
MILD at home and school. Finally, all home transcripts were analysed at proportion
level (Table 16). For example, it is possible to compare the number of "perception"
utterances by parents of children with MILD with the number of "perception" terms by
parents of children with 1-1FA within the period (i.e., an across-groups comparison).
However, that does not tell me whether the two samples made the same use of
"perception" utterances as a proportion of jj psychological state terms. To investigate
that, separate analyses were needed. As in Chapter 9, all comparisons were carried out
using the chi-square, as the most appropriate statistical test.
As the sets of home observations for the two groups were not of the same length, it
was necessary to devise a means of standardisation for the application of statistical
analyses on the data. Thus, all transcripts collected from the HFA group were
standardised to the transcripts obtained from the MLD group (since the latter were
shorter than the former). The same technique was used for the comparison between
home and school observations: all home visits were standardised to group sessions and
curriculum sessions for both groups. For example, the comparison of children with
FIFA at home (684 mm) and in group sessions (137 mm) is possible, if the longest
observations (i.e., the home visits) are standardised to the shortest recorded time (i.e.,
the group sessions). The formula that has been applied was the same as in Chapter 9.
Results
With regard to reliability of codings, special reference has been made to the section on
reliability of observations and codings in Chapter 9. As in Chapter 9, Tables with
186
results of particular educational and clinical importance have been placed in the text
and other Tables have been placed in Appendix 5.
Comparisons within groups
Overall use of mental state language
As Table 10.1 shows below, parents in each group used significantly more mental state
utterances than children with HFA and children with MLD. The largest difference in
absolute terms emerged in the target group.
Table 10.1 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits:
Parents and children in Both Groups.
Groups	 Parent	 Child	 x2
HFA
	
1249	 850	 75.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
MLD
	
706	 392	 89.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Categories of mental state utterances
Parents were found to use significantly more terms referring to "perception",
"emotion" and "cognition" than children with HFA; but this was not true of "desire"
(Table 10.2). The largest difference was observed in the use of utterances about
feelings. Parents in the MILD group made significantly higher use of all four categories
of psychological states than children (Table 10.3). The largest difference appeared in
the use of terms on perceptions.
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Table 10.2 Frequencies oj'Each Category of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits: Parents and Children with HFA.
Mental States	 Parent	 Child	 x2
Perception	 265
	
171
	
20.3, df= 1, p< 0.001
Desire	 156
	
126	 3.2, n.s.
Emotion	 350
	
216
	
31.7, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 478
	 337	 24.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
Table 10.3 Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits: Parents and Children with MLD.
Mental States	 Parent
	 Child	 x2
Perception	 183
	 58	 64.8, df= 1, p< 0.00 1
Desire	 64
	
42
	
4.6, df= 1, p< 0.05
Emotion	 91
	
42
	
18.0, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 368
	
250	 22.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
Referents of mental state utterances
As Table 10.4 shows, children with HFA used significantly more mental state
utterances referring to themselves than their parents. Also, children in each group
referred significantly less to another person's psychological state than their parents
(Tables 10.4 and 10.5).
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Table 10.4 Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and
Children with HFA.
Referent	 Parent	 Child	 x2
Self	 445	 590	 20.3, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Other	 123	 65	 17.9, df = 1, p<0.001
Table 10.5 Referents of Menial State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and
Children with MLD.
Referent	 Parent	 Child
Self	 284	 250	 2.2, n.s.
Other	 95	 41	 21.4, df1, p<0.001
Functional use of mental state utterances
Parents were found to make significantly more use of mental state utterances to
represent "true" mental states in all categories of psychological states and for
conversational purposes than children with HFA (Tables I and 2 in Appendix 5). A
similar pattern was observed in the MILD group (Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix 5). In
addition, parents of children with MILD made significantly more conversational and
idiomatic use of "perception" terms than children.
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Use of mental state utterances
Parents initiated significantly more mental state utterances than children with 1-IFA
(Table 5 in Appendix 5). Also, they used significantly more internal state terms as a
repetition of their own use of these terms than children with HFA. Similar results were
obtained from the MLD group (Table 6 in Appendix 5). In addition, parents of children
with MILD repeated terms used by children significantly more than children.
Comparisons across groups
Overall use of niental state language
As Table 10.6 shows, parents of children with HFA used significantly fewer utterances
referring to mental states than parents of children with MILD in all home visits.
Interestingly, there were no significant differences between children with HFA and
children with MILD in their overall use of mental state language (Table 10.7).
Table 10.6 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits:
Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD ('observations of the
HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Groups	 HFA	 MILD
Parent	 593	 706	 9.8,df=1,p<0.01
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Table 10.7 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits:
children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Groups	 HFA
	
MLD
Child
	
404	 392
	
0.2, n.s.
Categories of mental state utterances
Parents of children with MLD used significantly more terms describing "perception"
and "cognition" and significantly fewer terms referring to "emotion" than parents of
children with HFA (Table 10.8). On the other hand, children with HFA made
significantly more use of terms representing "perception" and "emotion" and less use of
terms describing "cognition" than children with MLD (Table 10.9).
Table 10.8 Frequencies of Each Categoy of Psychological State Utterances in All
Home Visits: Parents of children with HFA and Parents of children with MLD
(observations of the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD
group).
Mental States	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Perception	 126
	 183
	
10.5, df = 1, p< 0.01
Desire	 74
	 64	 0.7, n.s.
Emotion	 166
	 91	 21.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 227
	 368	 33.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
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Table 10.9 Frequencies of Each Gategoiy of Psychological State Utterances in All
Home Visits: Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA
group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Mental States	 HFA
	
MILD	 x2
Perception	 81
	 58
	
3.8, df= 1, p= 0.05
Desire	 60	 42
	
3.2, n.s.
Emotion	 103
	
42
	
25.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 160	 250	 19.7, df= 1, p< 0.001
Referents of mental state utterances
Parents of children with MILD referred significantly more to their own and others'
mental states than parents of children with HFA (Table 10.10). Also, no significant
differences were found in references to children's psychological states between parents
in both groups. However, there were no significant differences between children in
each group in the use of referents (Table 7 in Appendix 5).
Table 10.10. Referents of Mental Stale Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents of
Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD ('observations of the HFA
group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA
	
MILD	 x2
Self
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284
	
10.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Child	 292	 285	 0.1, n.s.
Self+ Child	 10	 13	 0.4, n.s.
Other	 58	 95	 8.9, df= 1, p< 0.01
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Functional use of niental state utterances
Parents of the target group were observed to make significantly less "mental",
"conversational" and "idiomatic" use of all psychological state utterances than parents
of children with MLD (Table 8 in Appendix 5). In particular, they used significantly
fewer terms describing perceptions and cognitions to denote true mental states than
parents of the comparison group; also, they were found to use significantly more terms
referring to "true" feelings (Table 9 in Appendix 5).
In general, children with HFA appeared to make significantly less idiomatic use of
mental state utterances than children with MILD (Table 10 in Appendix 5). Yet, when
they were compared on each psychological state, they were found to use significantly
more terms indicating "desire" and "emotion" to represent true internal states and
significantly fewer terms describing "cognition" to represent true psychological states
than children with MILD (Table 11 in Appendix 5).
Use of ne;tat state utterances
Parents of children with MLD initiated significantly more mental state terms than
parents in the comparison group (Table 12 in Appendix 5). No significant differences
were found between children with HFA and children with MILD in the use of
utterances (Table 13 in Appendix 5).
Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
In general, parents of children with 1-IFA were found to use mental state utterances
significantly more for asking questions and significantly less for commentaries and
giving guidance to the children, compared to parents of children with MILD (Table 14
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in Appendix 5). In particular, parents of children with MILD used significantly more
terms indicating "perception" for didactic/controlling purposes and guiding children's
behaviour than parents of children with HFA (Table 15 in Appendix 5). Parents of
children with HFA used significantly more terms showing "desire" to address questions
to the children than parents of children with MLD. Also, they used significantly more
terms describing "emotion" for making comments and asking questions in their
conversations with their children than parents in the comparison group. Finally, parents
of children with MLD used more cognitive terms to make comments than parents in
the target group.
Overall, children with HFA were observed to use mental state utterances significantly
more for giving information and significantly less for comments and questions (Table
16 in Appendix 5). In particular, significant group differences emerged only in the use
of cognitive terms. Children with MILD used significantly more cognitive terms to
make comments and significantly fewer for giving information to others than children
with HFA (Table 17 in Appendix 5).
Across groups comparisons: parents and teachers of children with HFA
Overall use of mental state language
As Table 10.11 shows, teachers of children with HFA used significantly more
psychological state utterances in group sessions and curriculum sessions than parents
of the same group of children at home.
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Table 10.11 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances: Parents and Teachers
of Children with HFA in All Sessions (observations of home standardised to
observations of school).
Sessions	 Teachers	 Parents	 x2
Group	 414
	
250
	
40.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
Curriculum	 473
	
358	 15.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
Categories of niental state utterances
Teachers of children with HFA used more terms referring to "perception" and
"cognition" in group sessions (Table 18 in Appendix 5) and curriculum sessions (Table
19 in Appendix 5) than parents of the same children at home. There were no significant
group differences in the use of utterances indicating "desire" and "emotion" between
home and group sessions. Yet, teachers of the target children used significantly fewer
terms indicating "desire" and "emotion" in curriculum sessions than parents of the
target group (Table 19 in Appendix 5).
Referents of mental state utterances
Teachers of children with 1-IFA used significantly more mental state terms to describe
children's internal states in group sessions than parents of the same children (Table 20
in Appendix 5). There were no significant group differences in the use of all referents
between parents at home and teachers in the curriculum sessions (Table 21 in
Appendix 5).
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Functional use of mental state utterances
In total, parents of children with 1-IFA used significantly fewer mental state utterances
for describing "true" mental states and in conversational ways than teachers in group
sessions and curriculum sessions (Tables 22 and 24 in Appendix 5, respectively). In
particular, teachers of children with HFA used significantly more utterances referring
to "perception" and "cognition" to represent true mental states across all sessions than
parents at home (Tables 23 and 25 in Appendix 5). Also, teachers used significantly
more cognitive terms in idiomatic ways than parents of the children with HFA.
However, parents made significantly higher use of terms indicating "desire" and
"emotion" to represent true mental states than teachers in curriculum sessions.
Use of mental state utterances
Overall, parents of children with HFA were found to make significant less "initial" and
"repetitive" use of mental state utterances than teachers in group sessions (Table 26 in
Appendix 5). Parents of children with HFA made significantly less initial use of terms
referring to "perception" and "cognition" than teachers of the same children in group
sessions (Table 27 in Appendix 5). Also, they used significantly fewer terms indicating
"desire" and cognition" as a repetition of their own initial use than teachers.
Parents of the target group were observed to make significantly less "initial" use of
utterances than teachers in curriculum sessions (Table 28 in Appendix 5). Teachers of
children with HFA made significantly higher initial use of utterances on "perception",
"desire" and "cognition" in curriculum sessions than parents at home (Table 29 in
Appendix 5). In addition, parents of the same group of children used significantly
fewer "desire" terms as a repetition of their own use than teachers in curriculum
sessions.
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Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
In general, teachers of children with 1-IFA used significantly more mental state terms to
guide children's behaviour in all sessions than parents at home (Tables 30 and 31 in
Appendix 5). Also, parents of children with HFA used significantly fewer
psychological state utterances for making comments than teachers of the same children
in group sessions.
Across groups comparisons: parents and teachers of children with MLD
Overall use of mental state language
As Table 10.12 shows, teachers of children with MLD used significantly more terms in
group sessions than parents at home, but that was not true in curriculum sessions.
Table 10.12 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and
in All Sessions: Parents at Home and Teachers of children with MLD 'observations
of home standardised to observations of school).
Sessions	 Parent
	
Teacher	 x2
Group	 256
	
781	 265.8, df = 1, p<
0.001
Curriculum	 72
	 62
	
0.74, n.s.
Categories of mental state utterances
Teachers of children with MLD used significantly more terms describing emotions and
cognitions in group sessions (Table 32 in Appendix 5) and significantly more
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utterances referring to desires in curriculum sessions (Table 33 in Appendix 5) than
parents at home.
Referents of mental state utterances
As Table 10.13 shows, teachers of children with MLD used significantly more mental
state utterances in group sessions to refer to their own, to the children's as well as to
another person's internal states than parents at home. However, there were no
significant differences in the use of referents between parents at home and teachers in
curriculum sessions (Table 34 in Appendix 5).
Table 10.13. Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home
standardised to observations of group sessions,).
Referent	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Self
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133	 3.8, df= 1, p= 0.05
Child	 103	 466	 231.6, df = 1, p<
0.00 1
Self and Child	 5	 21	 9.8, df= 1, p< 0.01
Other	 34	 89	 24.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
Functional use of mental state utterances
Teachers of children with MILD were observed to use significantly more mental state
utterances to represent "true" internal states and in conversational ways in group
sessions than parents at home (Table 35 in Appendix 5). Parents of children with MLD
used significantly more "desire" and significantly fewer "emotion" and "cognition"
terms to represent true mental states than teachers of the same children in group
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sessions (Table 36 in Appendix 5). In general, there were no significant differences in
ftinctional use between home and curriculum sessions (Tables 37 and 38 in Appendix
5).
Use of mental state utterances
In general, parents of children with MLD were found to use significantly less all types
of use than teachers in group sessions (Table 39 in Appendix 5). Teachers of children
with MLD made significantly greater initial use of "perception", "emotion" and
"cognition" terms than parents at home (Table 40 in Appendix 5). Also, they used
significantly more "emotion" and "cognition" utterances as a repetition of their own
initial use and significantly more "emotion" terms as a repetition of the child's initial use
of the terms than parents at home. No significant differences were found between
home and curriculum sessions (Tables 41 and 42 in Appendix 5).
Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
Parents of children with MLD made significantly less use of mental state utterances for
making comments and guiding children's behaviour and significantly higher use of
terms for questions about internal states than teachers in group sessions (Table 43 in
Appendix 5). Also, parents used significantly more psychological state utterances for
making comments than teachers in curriculum sessions (Table 44 in Appendix 5).
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Across groups comparisons: children with HFA at home and school
Overall use of mental state language
As Table 10.14 shows, no significant differences were found between home and group
sessions in children with HFA. Yet, they used significantly fewer mental state
utterances in curriculum sessions than at home.
Table 10.14 Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA
Between Home and School (observations of home standardised to observations of all
sessions).
Home	 Group	 x2
Sessions
HFA Children	 170
	
187
	
0.9, n.s.
Home	 Curriculum	 x2
Sessions
HFA Children	 245	 138	 29.9, df= 1, p< 0.001
Categories of mental state utterances
Children with HFA used significantly more mental state utterances referring to "desire"
at home than in group sessions at school (Table 45 in Appendix 5). However, they
used significantly more "perception", "desire" and "emotion" terms at home than in the
curriculum sessions at school (Table 46 in Appendix 5). There were no significant
differences in the use of "cognition" terms between home and school.
Referents of mental state utterances
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Children with HFA referred significantly more to their parents' mental states at home
than to their teachers' in school (Tables 47 and 48 in Appendix 5). Also, they described
significantly more others' psychological states in group sessions than at home. Finally,
they talked significantly more about their own mental states in curriculum sessions than
at home.
Functional use of mental state utterances
In general, there were no significant differences on all types of functional use between
home and group sessions (Table 49 in Appendix 5). In particular, children with HFA
made significantly less use of "perception" terms to represent true mental states and
significantly more use of "desire" utterances to describe true mental states at home
than in group sessions at school (Table 50 in Appendix 5). Also, they used significantly
more "desire" and "emotion" terms to represent "true" mental states at home than in
curriculum sessions at school (Table 52 in Appendix 5).
Use of mental state utterances
Overall, children with HFA were found to repeat their teachers' cognition terms (but
not other terms) in group sessions significantly more than their parents' utterances at
home (Tables 53 and 54 in Appendix 5). Also, they appeared to initiate significantly
more terms indicating "desire" at home than in group sessions. Also, they initiated
terms describing desires, emotions and cognitions significantly more at home than in
curriculum sessions at school (Table 56 in Appendix 5).
Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
Children with HFA used significantly more mental state utterances for making
comments and questioning at home than in all sessions at school (Tables 57 and 58 in
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Appendix 5). Also, they were observed to use significantly more terms for giving
information at school than at home.
Across groups comparisons: children with MLD at home and school
Overall use of mental state language
As Table 10.15 shows, children with MLD used significantly more mental state
utterances at home than in curriculum sessions. No difference was found in the overall
use of mental state language between home and group sessions at school.
Table 10.15. Overall Frequencies of Mental Stale Utterances in children with MLD
Between Home and School (observations of home standardised to observations of all
sessions).
Home	 Group	 x2
Sessions
MLD Children	 142	 138	 0.05, n.s.
Home	 Curriculum	 x2
Sessions
MLD Children	 40
	
12
	
15.1, df = 1, p= 0.001
Categories of mental state utterances
Children with MLD used significantly more terms describing feelings and significantly
fewer utterances referring to cognitions in group sessions than at home (Table 59 in
Appendix 5).
Referents of mental state utterances
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No significant differences were found in references to the self and other between home
and school in children with MILD (Tables 60 and 61 in Appendix 5).
Functional use of mental state utterances
Children with MLD used significantly more terms describing "emotion° and
significantly fewer utterances indicating "cognition" to represent true mental states in
group sessions than at home (Table 63 in Appendix 5).
Use of mental state utterances
Children with MILD initiated significantly more utterances at home than in group
sessions (Table 64 in Appendix S); also, they i.epeatec.l teims that 'n 'oter 'x 'ciy t'n
teacher significantly more than terms repeated by their parents at home. In particular,
they initiated significantly more utterances referring to "emotion" and significantly
fewer describing cognitions in group sessions than at home (Table 65 in Appendix 5).
Pragmatic context of mental state utterances
Children with MILD used significantly more mental state utterances for providing
information in group sessions than at home; no other significant differences were found
(Table 66 in Appendix 5).
Across group comparisons
Overall use of mental state utterances
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As Table 10.16 shows, children with MILD used significantly fewer mental state
utterances than children with 1-IFA in home observations as a proportion of the total
amount of utterances on mental states. Notably, there were no significant differences
between parents in each group.
Table 10.16 Comparison of Overall Frequencies Mental State Utterances as a
Proportion of Overall Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and Children in Both
Groups.
Groups	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 frequency(percent)
Parent	 1249 (59.5)	 706 (64.2)	 2.70, n.s.
Child	 850 (40.5)	 392 (35.7)	 4.26, df = 1, p<
0.05
Total
	
2099	 1098
Categories of mental state utterances
Parents of children with HFA used significantly fewer mental state utterances referring
to "perception" and "cognition" and significantly more terms describing "desire" and
"emotion" in proportion to the overall use of mental state language than parents of
children with MLD (Table 67 in Appendix 5). Children with HFA made significantly
more use of utterances describing perceptions and feelings and significantly fewer
references to cognitions as a proportion of their overall use of mental state language
than children with MILD (Table 68 in Appendix 5).
204
Referents of mental state utterances
Parents of children with HFA referred significantly more to children's mental states and
significantly less to others' internal states as a proportion of their overall use of
referents than parents of children with MILD (Table 69 in Appendix 5). No significant
differences were found in the use of different referents as a proportion of the overall
use of referents in both groups of children (Table 70 in Appendix 5).
Functional use of mental state utterances
Parents of children with 1-IFA used significantly more terms indicating "true" desires
and emotions and significantly fewer utterances to represent "true" cognitions than
parents of children with MILD (Table 72 in Appendix 5). Also, they used significantly
fewer utterances on "perception" in idiomatic ways than parents of the comparison
group. Children with HFA used significantly fewer utterances on desires, emotions and
cognitions to represent true mental states than children with MILD (Table 74 in
Appendix 5).
Use of mental state utterances
Parents of children with HFA used significantly more utterances as a repetition of their
own initial use of these terms as a proportion of their overall use of utterances than
parents of children with MILD (Table 75 in Appendix 5).
Pragmatic context of nzental state utterances
Parents of children with 1-IFA used significantly more utterances referring to
perceptions, desires, emotions and cognitions for asking questions than parents of
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children with MILD (Table 78 in Appendix 5). Parents of children with MLD used
significantly more utterances describing perceptions for making comments and guiding
behaviour; also, they used significantly more terms referring to cognitions for
commentaries.
In general, children with HFA used significantly fewer utterances for making
comments and asking questions and significantly more for giving information than
children with MILD (Table 79 in Appendix 5). In particular, children with MILD used
significantly fewer utterances referring to emotions for making comments and to
cognitions for asking questions and significantly more to cognitions for commentaries
(Table 80 in Appendix 5).
Discussion
As in chapter 9, in this section the intention is to identify the most 'interestIng findings
of the analysis of use of language on mental states between children in each group and
their parents. These results will be discussed in connection with those from the
interaction analysis at school in the next chapter.
Comparisons within groups
Interestingly, parents in each group made significantly more use of mental states in
their talk than children. This tendency might be explained as a result of parents' effort
to engage children in the ongoing conversation. In addition, parents of the target and
the comparison group described the same type of psychological states (perceptions,
emotions and cognitions) at a significantly higher level than children.
Another notable difference between parents and children was observed in the use of
references to the self and the other: children with HFA were found to talk significantly
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more about their own mental states and significantly less about others' mental states
than their parents. Also, children with MLD appeared to refer to another person's
internal states significantly less than their parents. In contrast, there were no significant
differences on references to the self between children and parents in the MLD group.
Comparisons across groups
Here, the expected significant differences between children with HFA and children
with MLD in the general use of mental state language were not found. Instead,
significant differences between parents were observed: parents of the target group
appeared to use significantly fewer mental state utterances than parents of the
comparison group at home. This could not be explained as a result of socio-economic
status differences, as one third of families in each group had a parent in a
"professional" occupation and the remaining two thirds in manual occupation.
Another interesting finding was that parents of children with HFA made significantly
more references to emotions than parents of child ren with MLD. Also, they described
significantly fewer perceptions and cognitions. The picture was somewhat similar
between children: children with HFA were found to refer significantly more to
perceptions and emotions and significantly less to cognitions.
Also, significant differences between parents rather than between children were also
observed in the use of referents: parents of children with HFA seemed to talk
significantly less about their own and others' mental states than parents of children with
MLD. Yet, no such differences were found between children in each group. This is
inconsistent with Tager-Flusberg's (1992) results, and is discussed ftirther in chapter
11.
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In addition, parents of the target group used significantly fewer terms for representing
"true" mental states and initiated fewer psychological state utterances than parents of
the comparison group. However, there were no significant differences between
children on the "mental" nor on "initial" use of terms.
Finally, parents of children with HFA were found to use mental state utterances
significantly less for making comments and giving guidance and significantly more for
asking questions than parents of children with MLD. Children with HFA were also
observed to make significantly less use of psychological state terms for comments and
significantly higher use for giving information.
C'ornparisons between parents and teachers in each group
Overall, parents of children with HFA used significantly fewer mental state utterances
than teachers in all sessions. In particular, they were observed to refer significantly less
to perceptions and cognitions than teachers in all sessions. However, there were no
significant differences between parents and teachers in the use of terms describing
desires and emotions in group sessions. In the MILD group, parents were found to use
significantly fewer mental state terms than teachers in group sessions only. Specifically,
they used significantly fewer terms on emotions and cognitions than teachers in group
sessions.
In addition, parents of the target group seemed to describe significantly less children's
psychological states than teachers in group sessions only. Also, parents in each group
were found to use significantly fewer mental states for representing "true" mental
states than teachers in group sessions. Notably, parents in each group seemed to use
significantly fewer psychological state utterances for making comments and guiding
children's behaviour than teachers in group sessions and curriculum sessions.
208
Comparisons of children in each group between home and school
However, children in each group were found to use significantly fewer mental state
utterances in curriculum sessions than at home. Interestingly, there were no significant
difference for children in each group between home and group sessions in the amount
of talk on psychological states. In addition, there was no significant difference in the
use of cognitive terms between home and school in children with HFA. Also, they
seemed to describe all the same mental states (except desire) at home and in group
sessions; that was not true for curriculum sessions.
Regarding the use of referents, children with HFA were observed to talk significantly
less about others at home than in group sessions at school; yet, they appeared to refer
to themselves at home at the same level as in group sessions. Also, no significant
differences were found in the use of mental states for representing utrue internal states
between home and group sessions in children in each group.
Notably, children with HFA and children with MILD used mental state utterances
significantly more for giving information in group sessions than at home. Also, children
in the target group seemed to use significantly more terms for making comments and
asking questions at home than in group sessions.
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CHAPTER 11: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS FROM
OBSERVATIONS OF MENTAL STATE LANGUAGE ON SELF
AND OTHERS AT SCHOOL AND HOME
This chapter will examine the findings from the two sets of naturalistic evidence in
relation to the principal aim of this study: to explore the use of knowledge of the selfs
and others' mental states in children with HFA/AS in different contexts. Thus, it is
essential to consider critical issues, such as: (a) whether there are similar tendencies or
differences in the use of mental state language on the self and others by children with
HFA between home and school compared with children with MLD, and (b) whether
the use of mental language by teachers and parents could explain children's talk on
internal states.
In general, it was found that children in each group were exposed to language on
mental states significantly more at school (across all sessions for the HFA group; only
in group sessions for the MLD group) than home. But, teachers 4 parents were
found to talk more about mental states than children. These findings may indicate that
the structure of the group sessions at school was mainly teacher-guided; also, parents
may have made a greater effort to engage the children in the ongoing conversation.
On the other hand, there were no consistencies between the total amount of mental
state language used by teachers/parents and children with HFAJAS between home and
school. Although teachers talked about internal states across all sessions more than
parents, children with 1-IFA were found to describe mental states at the same level in
group sessions and at home, but not in curriculum sessions. This shows that the type of
context where the conversation took place was critical for the children with HFA; they
may have been more encouraged to talk about psychological states in group sessions as
well as at home and they have done so.
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However, the quality of language used in school and at home also needs to be
considered. First, parents in each group were similar in the type of mental states they
described: perceptions, emotions and cognitions. In both groups, desires seemed not to
feature in their conversations at home. But parents of children with HFA talked
significantly more about feelings than parents of the MILD group. That seemed to be an
interesting finding in the light of old psychodynamic theories that parents of autistic
children are "emotionally refrigerated" persons. On the other hand, parents of the
target group described fewer perceptions and cognitions than parents of the
comparison group. Interestingly, a similar picture emerged between the children:
children with HFA talked more about emotions and less about cognitions than children
with MILD at home. It is clear that there is a consistency between parents and children
in each group. This may indicate that the type of psychological states that are used by
children (irrespective of their handicap) is closely related with that used by their
parents. At school, a similar picture emerged only in the use of emotion terms by
teachers and children with HFA. Children with HFA and their teachers were found to
make fewer references to feelings than teachers and children with MILD in group
sessions. My findings are not in agreement with those by Tager-Flusberg's (1992)
study. She did not find any significant differences between young children with HFA
and children with Down's syndrome in the use of terms on emotions in their
conversations at home.
Another interesting finding was that, although parents of children with HFA talked less
about cognitions than teachers, children with HFA made similar use of cognitive
utterances at home and school. Also, the target children described cognitions more
than children with MILD at school, although their teachers talked less about cognitions
than teachers of the children with MILD. This consistency in the use of terms describing
thoughts and beliefs by the HFA group is particularly interesting, taking into account
the hypothesis that even high-ftinctioning autistic children find it extremely difficult to
understand and talk about cognitive states. This argument has gained support from
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experimental testing (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1989b) and naturalistic
observations at home (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Tager-Flusberg found that young
children with HFA were observed to make no use of cognitive terms at all compared
with children with Down's syndrome. Yet, I found that autistic children described
cognitions at home, although at a significantly lower level than children with MLD. It
could be argued, then, that as able autistic children become older they seem to talk
more about cognitive states. However, it is not possible to evaluate the results of the
American study, since they do not include an analysis of the mothers' use of mental
state terms. It has to be noted that when the chi'dren with HFA in our study were
compared with children with MLD in their use of cognitive terms at school, they were
shown to make a significantly higher use than the comparison group. This shows that
the context of the conversation, as well as the participants in the conversation, may
have an effect on the type of language used by children. Also, the developmental
aspect of the research design could offer an explanation for the above result: the
chronological age of the autistic children in this study needs to be considered in
connection with their educational/social experiences at school and home.
It was notable to find that teachers and parents in both groups described significantly
more perceptions and cognitions than children. In addition, the use of terms on
"emotions" appeared to be interesting: children with HFA talked about feelings at the
same level as their teachers in group sessions, but significantly less than their parents.
Yet, children with MLD talked about emotions less than their teachers.
Another interesting finding was the difference in the type of mental states used by
children in each group between home and school: children with HFA talked about
perceptions, emotions and cognitions at the same level at home and in group sessions,
whereas children with MILD talked less about cognitions and more about feelings at
home than in group sessions. Also, teachers of children with MILD talked more about
emotions than teachers of 1-IFA.
212
Although children in each group appeared to use significantly more terms to represent
their own mental states than those of others in proportion to their overall use of
referents (in line with Tager-Flusberg's findings), there were no significant differences
between children with HFA and children with MLD in their references to their own
and others' internal states at school as well as home. Also, children with HFA referred
to others' mental states significantly more in group sessions than at home, although
their teachers (and their parents) referred significantly less to others' psychological
states than teachers (as well as parents) of children with MLD. Also, children with
HFA were not observed to differ in references to others' mental states from their
teachers in group sessions, whereas children with MLD referred to others'
psychological states less than their teachers in the same sessions. It seems that children
with HFA had a stable tendency to describe others' internal states, irrespective of the
persons they were having a conversation with.
In general, all children talked more about their own (in curriculum sessions) and others'
(in group sessions) mental states at school than at home. In addition, children with
HFA talked about their own internal states at the same level at home and in group
sessions. Also, children in each group described others' mental states less than their
parents.
Results on the pragmatic context of mental state utterances present an illuminating
picture. Children in each group appeared to use more mental state terms to express
questions and make comments at home than in group sessions at school. Also, all
children described internal states for informational purposes more to their teachers in
group sessions than to their parents at home. Yet, children with HFA made fewer
comments and gave more information at home than children with MILD. This could be
explained in relation with another finding: parents of the target group seemed to ask
more questions and make fewer comments and directions to the children than parents
of the comparison group. In addition, teachers in each group used more mental state
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utterances for making comments and directing children's behaviour than parents.
Finally, parents in each group used fewer mental state utterances for giving guidance
that teachers at school. This was expected, because of the nature of the context.
Although the analysis of language on mental states of the self and others in natural
contexts has been fruitftil in expanding the empirical evidence obtained from the data
of the experimental testing (Chapter 6) and the interviews on self-understanding
(Chapter 7), a major limitation is notable. Its quantitative analysis, as the dominant
tradition in the relevant area (Brown & Dunn, 1991; Tager-Flusberg, 1992; Shatz et al,
1983) does not cover qualitative aspects of social interactions. A crucial weakness of
this technique is that, it does not ftilly reveal the use (or the lack) of theory of mind
ability, which may not be expressed through mental state terms. Therefore,
ethnography of such behavioural incidents of spontaneous social interactions may
provide a valuable qualitative insight into mental understanding of self and others in
children with high-functioning autism.
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CHAPTER 12: ETHNOGRAPHIC OBSERVATIONS
Introduction
This part of the thesis will present and discuss the fifth set of information that has been
collected for the same single group of persons with high-functioning autisni/Asperger's
syndrome. Specifically,, this chapter will focus on findings based on another qualitative
methodology (ethnographic observation) that was applied with the purpose to extend
results from the experimental testing (Chapter 6), the semi-structured interviews on self-
understanding (Chapter 7), the analysis of mental state language on the self and others
between teachers and children across different sessions (Chapter 9) and between parents
and children at home (Chapter 10). At this stage of the project, the primary research
question is: How do individuals with HFAJAS behave in circumstances, arising
spontaneously in their daily routine at school, that require the
	 e. of
understanding?
Research aims
In this phase of the study, the broad aim was to investigate spontaneous behaviours of
children with HFA/AS that would either demonstrate or would fail to apply mental skills in
their social interactions in natural contexts. The underlying theoretical assumption is that
the role of the social context in the use of theory of mind by persons with autism may be
significant. Thus, the exploration of different aspects of the social environment may
provide a further insight in the everyday social behaviour of the target group, with a
special interest on occasions that ask for the use of "mind-reading" abilities.
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At this stage the research aims were the following:
To investigate the use/non-use of mental understanding of the self and others in a
group of children with HFA/AS on events occurring spontaneously in the social
context of school.
2. To extend findings on the same target group derived from experimental testing of
theory of mind, semi-structured interviews on self-knowledge and systematic
observations of talk on psychological states of the self and others in school and at
home.
Methodology
At this stage of fieldwork, the theoretical interest has been to look into spontaneous
behaviour of children with HFA/AS on incidents that require knowledge of mental states
of the self and others, taking place in a social context. For this purpose, the classroom
setting was selected as appropriate, since it was accessible for longer periods in the day
(six hours) than home. Also, there were more frequent opportunities to observe informal
interactions. During the home visits the researcher was concentrating mainly on obtaining
information for the language analysis (Chapter 10). At school there were times when the
researcher was present, without being directly involved in collecting the data presented in
chapters 6-9.
The above theoretical aim required the application of a qualitative methodology that
would provide a full account of incidents on first- and second-order theory of mind. Thus,
notes based on informal observations were selected as a suitable technique. However, it
was difficult to observe explicit expressions of second-order theory of mind. For this
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reason, this ability (or the lack of it) was examined through behaviours of advanced mental
understanding (e.g., deception, manipulating of another's feelings). The focus was to
record behavioural acts that would arise in periods without a specified learning target (i.e.,
break time, lunch time). The hypothesis was that the loose structure of these time-period
would encourage children to interact (verbally or behaviourally) with other children and
adults in ways that more tightly structured teaching sessions would not allow. In addition,
free observations of more structured sessions (i.e., group sessions and curriculum
sessions) that were not recorded for analysis were carried out.
Another set of the data was derived from the transcripts of verbal interactions between the
target children and their teachers and parents. Although the benefits of applying
quantitative analysis on that data are substantial, there are also important limitations. On
the one hand, it has been important to evaluate in statistical terms the amount of mental
state language produced by children and adults: this method has been traditionally used in
the analysis of language in normal and atypical populations. On the other hand, there is
other qualitative information that might be complementary or contradictory to the
quantitative evidence. For this purpose, all conversations at school and home were
examined in search of behavioural incidents or exchanges that show the use/non-use of
mentalising skills. For example, mental understanding of the self and others could be
evident in children's expressions without mental state utterances and, thus, would not have
been included in the quantitative analysis.
Overall, the technique applied in this study shares common features with the ethnographic
method which has been widely used in educational settings (Hammersley & Atkinson,
1983; Delamont, 1992). It has been appraised as providing rich qualitative information,
describing a phenomenon in a context of interactions, rather than as a single unit of
observation. For this reason, the recording of notes is not guided by pre-selected
categories of behaviours. Above all, the general objective of ethnographic observations is
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Lfl understanding of events/relationships rather than testing hypotheses. Yet, it has to be
nade clear that the informal observations collected in the present investigation did not
'ollow the principles of "cyclical hypothesizing" and participant observation involved in
;ome ethnographic techniques. The actual method used here was intended to record
)ehavloural incidents (opportunistic event sampling) as evidence for the application (or the
[ack of it) of skills of mental understanding of oneself and others in social contexts. Finally,
this technique is flexible in technical terms; so, it could be employed alongside systematic
observations at school (Chapter 9).
Participants
Ethnographic notes were collected for all seven children with HFAIAS in a single class in
the special unit. It was not possible to collect similar data on the comparison group of
children with MILD. For practical reasons, the time available for the overall fieldwork of
this project was limited.
Procedure
All children were observed during their activities at school in sessions that had not been
recorded for the analysis of the use of mental state language (i.e., lunch time, break time,
group sessions, curriculum sessions). The researcher would keep ethnographic notes
sitting at a distance that would be close enough to hear and see the children, but not
disturb their activities. Also, she would not respond to any questions addressed to her by
the children, being pre-occupied with writing notes on a notepad. However, most children
were already familiar with the researcher being around them and they did not seem to take
much notice of her.
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Results
This section will describe behavioural incidents that show the use/non-use of skills for
mental understanding of the self and others in the same group of children with HFA/AS,
drawn from the following sources: (a) free observations of children's behaviour during
sessions with a loose structure (i.e., break time, lunch time), (b) observations during
structured sessions (i.e., group sessions and curriculum sessions) that had not been
recorded for the analysis of language, (c) behavioural incidents arising in structured
sessions at school and conversations with parents at home that had been analysed for the
use of mental state language, and (d) incidents about past events described spontaneously
by parents and teachers about the children. All ethnographic data have been grouped by
the type of theory of mind ability demonstrated.
Recognition of another's desire
Understanding of desire is regarded as fundamental in the mental understanding of human
behaviour (Dennett, 1978). It is an essential mental state in explaining one's actions.
Experimental research has shown that autistic children are able to understand desires, as
they do not involve metarepresentation but represent "drives" to objects (Baron-Cohen,
1991d). This seemed to be consistent with our ethnographic observations.
Knowledge of another's desire was evident to be a target child's underlying reasoning for
his own behaviour, as illuminated by the researcher's questioning. For example, Matthew
described his actions on the basis of his teacher's desire. The teacher, Michelle, praised
Matthew: "Oh, that's a clean cup!" and he replied: "I know it's cleaned, 'cause I cleaned it
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especially for you.". Then I asked him: "Why did you do it especially for Michelle?" and he
said: "Because I thought Michelle would like it cleaned. '
In addition, identification with another's desires was observed in conversations in the class
and at home. Diana identified with her teacher's desire, by saying: "Claire, I feel like you,
you know. I don't like them (the windows) closed ". Awareness of another's wishes and the
reasons for them was also evident in a conversation between Matthew and his mother. He
said that Claire (another teacher in the same class) did not like it when his teacher,
Michelle, went to meetings every Thursday. When his mother asked him to explain this,
Matthew replied: "I can see she doesn't like it. ' "It, because she has to work with all the
children at the same time. So I have to move to Rachel, f I have to, and I don't like it.".
In another incident, a conversational exchange on desires was initiated by the teacher and
the target child also recalled another familiar person's desire. Four children were sitting
around a table in the classroom having their break; a senior teacher (Claire) and two
assistants (Juliet and Rachel) were supervising them. Bill had made sandwiches in the
morning; he had placed them on the table so that everybody could have one as a snack.
Claire asked Bill whether he would like to take two of them for his parents at home. He
replied: "Yes, I will take one for my dad and one for my mum." and added: "Actually, I'll
have three 'cause my nana likes them ".
The same child took into account another child's desire, when that child had made his
preference clear. At lunch time, I asked Bill what he was going to have for pudding and he
said: "I think I might have some grapes or a banana.". Then, Robert said: "I'll have a
banana.". Bill picked some grapes only adding: "There's only one banana.". I asked him
why he did that and he replied that he did it because Robert wanted the banana.
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The ability to attribute desires and perceptions to others was also evident in a target child's
interaction with a pet. Karen was watching a little mouse pushing hard at a door to get out
of his toilet and explained his behaviour: "He say 'I think I would like to get out please'. ".
Then she started singing: "Can I get to see outside?" and talking, as if she was the mouse:
"The best chain I've ever seen in the whole world ", "When will I get a wife? I want to
marry me. ". When her sister wanted to frighten the mouse, Karen said: "He says 'I don't
care, I'm a mouse'.". Then she pretended that the mouse was crying.
Attribution of physical state to another person was evident in a comment by a high-
functioning adolescent. During dinner time, Matthew went to take his pudding from
another table and his teacher Juliet said to him: "You could do with less talking,
Matthew.". Then Patrick, who was sitting on the same table, said to Juliet: "If he was less
talkative it would be nice for us. Maybe he's got a sore throat because he's Ja/kinga lot. ".
Awareness of own feelings
There was some evidence that the oldest person with 1-IFA/AS in the group was aware of
her true feelings. When the teacher Michelle said that Diana liked doing the writing, Diana
laughed and said: "Not really. I don't really enjoy it. ". Michelle said: "You get a good
result when you're doing your writing right." and Diana laughed saying: "I just do it
because I have to. ".
A description of links of events with emotional states was evident in the same person's
short story. Diana wrote about her visit to the "Spastics Society" shop: "When we had
finished we had a cup of tea. We went downstairs and we all went outside the shop. I got
my I//I, 'cause I was cutting the rhythm across the door to open that "Spastics" shop. After
that, we went outside, I got a bouquet of flowers and they took my photo again. When I
went upstairs, I got a glass of wine. So I enjoyed that day.".
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Also, Diana was able to articulate her emotional attitude towards a teacher. The following
dialogue illustrates awareness of her problem at school and its emotional effects on her.
Mother : "You got no worries when you go to school."
Diana	 : "I have."
Mother : "What?"
Diana	 : 'Michelle getting on us."
Mother	 : "She cannot be that bad." (laughs)
Diana	 : "She is!" (smiling)
Father	 : "It's because you are the leader of the bad ones."
Diana	 : "Ah! (sighs) She is (that bad)! No, I've been nice to her."
Embarrassment
The cognitive theory on theory of mind predicts that awareness of embarrassment will be
impaired in autistic individuals, as it requires the use of an audience (it is a socially
mediated feeling) and is based on complex mental states, such as beliefs. However, there
was some evidence of embarrassment in our target group.
On one occasion, embarrassment was expressed through physical signs (blushing). For
example, Matthew asked Karen: "Why did you say all those things for Robert? That he is
dreaming and is switched off?". She did not reply, although it was clear that she had heard
that question. Then I asked Matthew why he did not like Karen saying these things to
Robert. When he said that he did not like her saying these things to people, Karen blushed
showing her embarrassment and awareness ofMatthew's criticism of her behaviour.
Embarrassment appeared to be related to praise as well. The following event illustrates this
point. In the afternoon break, Diana said that Patrick never gets punished and a teacher
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explained: "It's because he always keeps quiet; he has good manners.". Then Michelle,
another teacher turned to Patrick saying: "Being praised again! "; Patrick blushed and she
asked him: "You're embarrassed, aren't you?". Patrick just gave a smile and did not say
anything.
Embarrassment was also expressed verbally by the same high-functioning adolescent. His
teacher, Michelle asked Patrick whether he liked watching himself on the video and he
said; "no". When she asked him: "what he didn't like about it", he said that he felt
"embarrassed".
Recognition of another 'sfeeling state
Here, the existing evidence has shown that autistic children did not have difficulty in
understanding simple emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger), but they were not able to
recognise complex emotions, arising from beliefs (i.e., surprise) (Baron-Cohen, 199 Id).
All the incidents reported below support autistic children's ability to predict another
person's simple emotions, such as happiness, frustration and dislike.
The following incident shows that a person with 1-IFA/AS can make an apposite prediction
of others' feelings (first-order theory of mind), although its verbal expression does not
include an explicit reference to emotional states. For example, when Patrick was sitting
next to his teacher, Michelle, during dinner time, he gave her a pat on the back and said
with a little smile: "You are lucky to be here for lunch. ". Michelle nodded and smiled to
him. Then, the teacher explained to me that the normal arrangement was not to have lunch
with the children (as was happening on that day) but to be on her break at that time, so
that she would be with them when they would be playing in the garden. However, she did
not like being outside, "unless it's a really warm day" (as Patrick added a few minutes
later). Patrick knew that. Michelle had been lucky to be with the children at dinner time,
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because she had to replace a classroom assistant, who had not been in the class on that
day. Yet, as Michelle told me it was quite a surprise for her to hear Patrick initiating this
topic and making a valid comment about her feelings.
In the next dialogue, although the same target individual used the same words and
gestures as in the above incident, his questioning showed social interest in his teacher and
he made an appropriate prediction of her emotions. At lunch time Patrick was sitting next
to his teacher Juliet and offered to take her plate away,..when she had finished her lunch.
He asked Juliet whether she was covering lunch every Monday and Wednesday and she
said: "It depends on the rota. It could be Tuesday and Friday next week.". He commented:
"lucky you" and gave her a pat on the shoulder. Juliet explained to me she might be
"lucky" next week as Patrick had said, because it is riot bettet to covet o'n \rnth Oh those
days than on Mondays and Wednesdays when the dinner is rather slow and awkward.
In another conversation between the same high-ftinctioning autistic individual and the
same teacher, he described his teacher's feelings with accuracy, using an explicit reference
to them. At dinner time, Patrick was sitting next to Juliet. He asked her: "Did you enjoy
yourself today?" (as that day was the last of term) and she replied: "Yes". Then Patrick
added: "You'll enjoy yourself even more tomorrow. ". She gave the same reply ("Yes") as
before.
Patrick seemed to understand not only his teacher's but his mother's feelings as well (after
his mother's repetition of her feeling). In one home visit, he was playing a computer game
with his mother. He is very good at it; he was winning yet again. His mother was finding it
hard to keep on playing with him. The following dialogue took place (words that are not
clear in the recordings are indicated by this symbol: "I//I//I").
Mother	 : "Should have called "frustration" this game. Shouldn't it? Eh?"
224
Patrick	 : "Do know."
Mother	 : "'Frustration'."
Patrick	 : "For you?"
Mother	 : "Aha. And your dad get the same f//I//I. (Patrick laughs) His dad gets the
same lI/I/I//I//I/I. 'Frustration'." (laughs).
Additional evidence on prediction of another's feeling state comes from the other oldest
(CA= 18.7) and mildly autistic (see Appendix 1) adolescent (Diana) in the group.
Although her verbal (VJQ= 38.5) and non-verbal (NVIQ= 58.8) abilities were low, her
performance on both theory of mind tasks was successftul. She gave an appropriate mental
explanation only on the second-order belief attribution test, whereas her justification on
the "Sally-Anne" test included an appropriate description of a physical state.
In one occasion, Diana initiated a conversation with her teacher, referring to her teacher's
feelings about an anticipated event (school holidays). Diana and Matthew were doing
crafts on the same table. They were cutting pictures from magazines and sticking them on
cards. Two teachers were sitting next to them, but only one was really supervising them;
the other was browsing a magazine. Suddenly Diana smiled to her teacher saying: "You
glad, Annette?". The teacher did not hear that (being absorbed in the magazine) and
asked: "What?". Diana repeated the question (with the same happy face expression) and
added: "Because it's last week, next week.". Annette also smiled, showing that she was
really glad for that. Although it is possible that Diana started this talk, because she felt
happy herself for the same reason, she guessed her teacher's feelings accurately.
However, the teacher's questioning strategy may illuminate the basis of the target child's
prediction of another's emotions. In the next dialogue, Robert was able to take part in a
conversation about feelings and relate physical states (i.e., getting up early) with emotions
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(i.e., feeling tired), although his teacher explained his responses as pure attributions of his
own emotional states. Robert's answers can be evaluated better by taking account of the
context: this conversation took place at the end of a session (Michelle having a "little chat"
with Robert and Matthew) and there was no obvious sequence of events that might have
led to this discussion about feelings.
Michelle : "Robert? Rob?"
Robert
Michelle
Robert
Michelle
Robert
Matthew
Michelle
Robert
Michelle
Robert
"What?"
"How d'you think? How do I feel? How do I feel?"
"Feel tired."
"Why d'you think I feel tired?"
:"Because you've got up, out of bed so early."
"So am I."
"How d'you know I got up early?"
"Because you're so tired." (laughs)
"Did you get up ear1y?'
"I think I've nearly got up, eh, about a quarter past seven."
The teacher wanted to test further the child's understanding of emotions and asked him to
give names of feelings to her facial expressions. Robert seemed to be able to recognise
emotions on his teacher's face; this was expected, on the basis of experimental evidence
(see Chapter 3) that autistic children are able to recognise simple/basic emotions (i.e.,
sadness, happiness). However, he could not give an explanation for them. This could be
interpreted in terms of the interaction between the teacher and the pupil with autism. The
teacher used a method that seemed mechanistic rather than naturalistic. In other words, the
teacher's emotional expressions were not presented as a result of events (for example, in
the context of a story), making it more natural and easier for the child to justify his correct
predictions of her expressions. The following conversation took place:
Michelle : "I would, I try to change my face expression. How d'you think I feel Robert
now?"
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Robert	 : "You feel happy."
Michelle : "Why d'you think I feel happy?"
Robert	 : "Cause I don't know."
Michelle : "What makes you say I'm happy?"
Robert	 : "I don't know."
Next, the teacher applied the same technique with Matthew, asking him to recognise and
explain the researcher's emotions. Although Matthew has higher verbal intelligence (VIQ=
78) than Robert (VIQ= 41) and milder autistic handicap (see Appendix 1), his responses
were similar to those of Robert: result of guessing. The reason for that could be the lack of
information about my own preferences; so he was just guessing that I might be happy
because that day the class would go for swimming and I might like that. But, when
Matthew had information about his teacher's preferences (that she likes swimming), then
he used this knowledge for easing her. In this case, the child's lack of familiarity with
another's preferences may explain his inability to relate his predictions of another's feeling
state to causes; but, when this information was available, he used it for teasing purposes,
as the following dialogue shows.
Michelle
Matthew
Sophia
Matthew
Sophia
Matthew
Michelle
Matthew
Michelle
Matthew
Michelle
Sophia
"How d'you think Sophia feels?"
"Happy."
"Why?"
"Eh, because she, feel happy."
:"Yea, but why I feel happy?"
"I don't know. Haven't a clue."
:"So why say happy? Why not say sad, miserable or angry? Why say happy?"
"Because she's look, she's happy today."
:"Why? Why do you think that?"
"Because she's happy it's not swimming."
"But Sophia doesn't come swimming with us."
"Do you know whether I like swimming or not?"
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Matthew	 : "No."
Sophia	 : "So how do you say that, eh, I am happy because I don't go swimming?"
Matthew	 : "I don't know. I don't know what."
Michelle	 : "I'm happy because we're not going swimming. I don't like going swimming.
I don't like getting wet."
Matthew	 : "You're going next week."
Michelle	 : "Yea."
Matthew	 : "You'll have to." (laughs)
In a home observation, the same target child referred to his classmate's feeling state, who
was crying at school, because "he didn't like the grill. ". Also, Matthew thought that his
friend's reactions were reasonable: "I think, I think he's right. It's (using the grill) really
dangerous.".
Another incident illustrates the ability to predict others' feelings and their causes, although
this was revealed through the researcher's questioning. In particular, Bill described
accurately his teachers' emotions (on the basis of their behaviour towards him) as a result
of his own behaviour. Two teachers, Claire and Rachel, had reprimanded him for his
swearing. Then, I asked him: "How do you think that Claire and Rachel feel when you use
bad language for them?" and he said: "Upset". When I asked him "why?" he explained:
"Because of the bad laniage." implying his accurate understanding of the effect of his
language on his teachers' feelings.
It could perhaps be argued that Bill's responses were illustrative of verbal behaviour rather
than evidence of understanding feelings as mental states. That argument, however, is hard
to sustain in view of this explicit link between the teacher being upset and hiw own bad
language. To argue that Bill was not showing awareness of mental states in this situation
would be uncomfortably close to arguing that he could not have been showing such
awareness on account of his autism.
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However, another child was able to explain another's desire with reference to physical
sensations. In a home observation, the whole family was standing around a table, watching
a mouse. The following dialogue took place:
Father	 :"Why do you think he goes into that, Karen?"
Karen	 : "'Cause he likes it.
Father	 : "Why does he like it?"
Karen	 : "It's ooh! It's.nice and soft. I'll go in.....Soft and neat."
Another child in the target group seemed to avoid talking about his own feelings. While
Anthony was talking about playing with his computer, the teacher asked him: "how d'you
feel when the computer wins?". However, he kept on saying what he does when the
computer wins: "you press "escape".
Understanding that some comments may be hurtfulfor others
The "theory of mind" deficit hypothesis predicts that autistic children will not be able to
appreciate the emotional reactions that their comments may have on other people.
However, there was conflicting evidence for some children with 1-IFAJAS between their
inability to understand that their comments might be offensive for others in their past
history, and their present awareness of others' feelings.
Interestingly, some persons with HFA/AS appeared to be aware that their comments may
be hurtful to other people. Diana seemed to predict how her teacher might think and feel,
hearing her comment. This event was described to me by the teacher Juliet. During break
time she was with other children in the garden. Diana approached her saying: "Oh, I like
you. You love cuddling.". Juliet thought that Diana was teasing her and responded: "You
mean cuddling like a teddy bear?". Diana replied: "Oh, no. Cuddling like mum. ". Juliet's
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interpretation of Diana's response was that Diana seemed to think that she may have
offended Juliet with her comment; so, she tried to explain what she really meant.
However, understanding of others' emotional reactions to hurtful comments may be the
result of training. For example, Patrick heard his teacher saying something rude for
another person and told her: "Oh, that wasn't a good thing to say. ". But Rachel explained
to me that he has been trained to understand that certain things may be offensive and
impolite to others. She referred to a behaviour of the past, when he was using the word
' fat"for Juliet and he did not seem to realise that it could be hurtful for her. At that time,
he had been taught the words "fat" and "thin" as used for pens, but he used them for
people as well (literally). His teacher pointed out that he seemed to be very confused when
they explained to him that it was not appropriate to make such comments for her.
Another similar event of past history was described to me by another child's mother. She
said that Karen used to make comments on people like: "How fat you are!". But after
explaining to her how the other person may feel, this behaviour was gradually eliminated.
Manipulating another 'sfeelings
An interesting event between a target child and his teacher showed his ability to
manipulate her feelings. Matthew was working with Michelle writing some sentences and
Annette told him: "Last chance. Game is over, ok? Watching everybody else.". Matthew
replied: 'Michelle is the teacher. ". When Annette asked: "Pardon?", he repeated:
"Michelle is the teacher.". Annette looking annoyed replied: "I'm your teacher as well,
Matthew.". Then Michelle interfered: "Yea. I've just asked Annette to watch you. Because
I was over here. We're both trying to help you." and Matthew replied to her: "What do
you mean? What about, what about it?". In this case, Matthew did not want to comply
with what his teacher had asked him to do. It is clear that he wanted to make her upset and
he succeeded.
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The same child showed similar behaviour in a session with another teacher. He wanted
Michelle's attention while she was working with Anthony. He kept saying to her: "You
make me cross. ". He was using his emotional reaction to manipulate her behaviour.
Understanding that "seeing leads to knowing"
Here, two incidents with contradictory behaviour will be reported. The first event took
place in the session with the speech therapist (Jane). She presented Bill with three sets of
stories that have been used in an experiment carried out by Baron-Cohen et al (1986). Bill
was asked to explain what happened in each sequence of pictures. In the third story, he
described the scenario: a boy had placed a box of chocolates in a place and left; then his
mother came and put the same box somewhere else; when the boy came back, he did not
know where to look for the chocolates, because he had not seen where his mother had put
them. It was a surprise that Bill suggested to Jane to "play the story" together: he went
out of the room and Jane hid a chocolate; when he came back, he was looking for them
and said that Jane had hidden them. Jane asked him whether he knew where they were and
he said "no". In this case, Bill demonstrated his understanding of the whole story, which
involved "putting himself in another person's mental state"; also, he was confident that he
did not know where the hidden object was, because he had not seen where Jane had put it.
Thus, he seemed to understand that "seeing leads to knowing".
It has to be noted that Bill is high-ftinctioning (see Appendix 1) although his non-verbal
ability (NVIQ= 62) was not over the normal level and meets the criteria by lCD- 10 for
Asperger's syndrome. Yet, his verbal (VIQ= 97) ability is high. He passed both tests on
belief attribution (Chapter 6); he gave a mental explanation for his response to the second-
order belief attribution task and used a reference to a physical state in his reply to the first-
order theory of mind task.
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In the second incident, the target child did not appear to grasp that "seeing leads to
knowing". Anthony was making "squeaking noises" and his teacher, Michelle said: "You
shouldn't make these noises. We don't like them." Anthony asked her: "Can we do them
outside?" Another teacher said: "Oh, no. It drives me nuts." Anthony asked again: "Can
we do them away from you?" and the teacher replied: "We won't know, will we?". He
gave no reply to that. The different conceptual understanding of these two children may be
explained in terms of their general level of intelligence and autistic handicap. Anthony is
lower-functioning (NVIQ= 38) and he met eleven criteria for autistic disorder in DSM-III-
R (see Appendix 1); also, he failed on the second task. Bill had a non-verbal IQ of 62,
milder autism and was successful on both tests.
Recognition of another's thoughts
Awareness of advanced mental states, such as thought and knowledge, is supported to be
impaired in autistic children (Baron-Cohen, 1993). However, there was evidence that
some individuals with HFAJAS were able to demonstrate understanding of another's
thoughts and knowledge. For example, during a curriculum session Patrick was saying to
his teacher, Rachel: "You don't understand the questions sometimes. "; he was referring to
a book full of questions that were described by Rachel as a real "tease for the brain", a
book with "tricky language".
In another conversation of the same target person with the same teacher, he seemed to be
aware of his teacher's initial lack of knowledge and the change in her mental state after
their conversation. Patrick was talking to his teacher, Rachel, about dinosaurs and seemed
to know a lot of things about them. Rachel also seemed to be interested in them and they
spent some time talking. At the end of the session, Patrick said to her: "You didn't know
about them. I've taught you something though. ".
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Also, Patrick appeared to be able to "put himself in his teacher's place" and guess her
thoughts. He said to Juliet: "You've been saved today, because Robert is not sitting On the
same table. ". His teacher smiled at him. Just before, another teacher sitting close to
Robert had asked him to hurry up eating his dinner. Patrick might have heard that before
making his comment to Juliet, meaning that she did not have to look after Robert while he
was having his dinner.
It has to be noted that each of these incidents illustrate the use of understanding others'
feelings by Patrick, who was one of the oldest persons in the group (CA= 15), with high
verbal and non-verbal IQs (81.3 and 80, respectively), and mild impairment in "social
interaction" and "verballnon-verbal communication" (see Appendix 1). Also, he passed
both theory of mind tests, but he used a mental explanation only on the first-order belief
attribution task; he justified his successful response to the task on second-order belief
attribution with a reference to physical states. It could be inferred then, that his mild
autism and near-normal intelligence have enabled him to uwiecstanct otht ctc&
states and apply this knowledge in his social interactions.
On another occasion, an adolescent with HFAJAS was able to uncover her teacher's
knowledge and thoughts with exceptional accuracy. The following dialogue illustrates this
point:
Helen	 : "I can't think who might have hidden it."
Diana	 : "I think you can. You might know who has hidden it."
Helen	 : "Who?"
Diana	 : "Me."
Helen	 : "Why?"
Diana	 : "You know I don't like wearing it."
On another occasion, the same target individual also made an exact prediction of another's
thoughts about her. Although she did not articulate a mental state, she was able to "read"
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her teacher's mind correctly. For example, the teacher said to Diana: "I know what your
best things are, I bet. I'll put my money on your best thing this week.". Diana laughed and
said: "Spastics Society", meaning her visits to the shop run by the Spastics Society, where
she was helping as an assistant. The teacher confirmed that with excitement: "Yes! I won,
yes. That's what, I was thinking of.". In theory, this phrase could be said only to show
first-order understanding of reality. However, the fact that the phrase did not include a
term describing a mental behaviour does not mean that it does not refer to mental states
(i.e., her teacher's thoughts).
In a curriculum session, the interaction between the teacher and two children offered one
child the opportunity to describe the other child's mental state. For eKantple, {iche&e was
working with Matthew and Robert. She asked Robert whether he knew the meaning of the
word "damage" and used an example to help him give an answer: "How was it (the pencil)
damaged?". Robert replied: "Because it's little. ... It was damaged.". Then Matthew
spontaneously made the comment: "I don't think he knows what you mean. I don't think he
knows what you mean there. ". Matthew's second-order theory of mind statement is
especially interesting, as he failed the second-order task (but passed the firstorde r theory
of mind test). This is a clear example of contradiction between the child's performance on
the experiment and his spontaneous use of the same cognitive ability in a natural social
situation. However, the critical question is which situation is reliable for Matthew's
mentalising skills.
In addition, the same target child showed the ability for self-reflection (awareness of his
cognitive difficulties) through the researcher's probing. In a curriculum session ("domestic
science"), Matthew had finished the task and was saying that when he was making tea, he
found "the beginning harder than the end"; in other words, he found it more difficult to
look for everything he needed to start making tea. When I asked him why he said that, he
replied: "It's because thinking is too hardfor me.
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Intentionality
Theory of mind suggests that children with FIFA will not be aware of their own intentions.
However, one target child described his own intentions openly, after his teacher's
questioning. During a break in the class, all children were sitting around a table having a
drink. When they had finished their snack, Bill was collecting their glasses. He passed the
jug to Karen instead of Patrick (who was on his other side), so that he would collect
Robert's glass last. Claire, the teacher noticed that and asked Bill why he did it, but he did
not reply. After a while, another teacher (Michelle) came in the class and Matthew told her
what Bill had done: "Bill forgot ...". Michelle asked him: "Do you think that he forgot or
do you think he did it deliberately?". He did not have the chance to reply, because Bill was
saying: "I did it deliberately, because I wanted Robert to be served last.".
Also, the child's awareness of others' intentions was evident in the following
conversational exchange. When Michelle asked Matthew to tell her what he had done last
night, he asked her: "Why do you want to know? ". His question clearly showed that he was
aware that Michelle might be intending to ask her question.
But the same ability was not observed in the following dialogue, where it is clear that the
target child did not think of any reason behind his teacher's request.
Michelle :"Why did I tell you to get the chair?".
Robert	 : "Because I don't know."
Moreover, prediction of another's intentions seemed to be difficult for the two oldest and
high-ftinctioning adolescents in the group. After the teacher's repeated questioning, their
responses showed lack of awareness of another person's intentions and were focused on
observable characteristics of behaviour. For example, when Helen (teacher) asked Diana
and Patrick whether they knew why I was keeping notes, Patrick said: "I don't know." and
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Diana replied: "To keep a record ". Then Helen asked: "Of what?"; Diana replied: "I don't
know." and Patrick said: "She's recording things. ".
However, Diana seemed to be aware of her father's intentions, when he was questioning
her about her new habit of waking up at half past six in the morning and sitting in the
lounge. They wanted to know why she had started doing that referring to his belief that
she had been drinking wine from an open bottle in the cupboard. They suggested the new
gas fire as one attraction. Then her father asked: "Do you know what the other is?" and
Diana replied: "What's the other one? I don't have any other one. What are you on
about? ".
Mental explanation of behaviour
Attribution of mental states for the interpretation of others' behaviour has been shown to
be impaired in children with autism (Baron-Cohen, 1993). However, three children of the
target group seemed to describe another's behaviour with appropriate mental explanations.
The use of feeling states as an explanation for change of another's behaviour was used by
an adolescent with HFA/AS. In this case, Patrick observed a change of Karen's behaviour
and gave a mental explanation for that, by linking her behavioural action with her
emotional state. In particular, he was sitting in the same table with his teacher Michelle
and the following group of children: Diana, Karen, Bill and Robert. It had been a while,
since all had started having their lunch. Karen accidentally spilled some water over her
teacher and Diana. She cleared up all the mess and got on with the rest of her food. Soon
after that, Michelle asked Robert to speed up eating his food (he was usually slower than
the others) and Robert said: "Karen, don't knock it over.". At that moment, Karen started
eating faster and her movements seemed rather nervous. Patrick commented: "I think
that's upsetting. ", referring to Karen's change in her behaviour, as a response to what
Robert had said to her.
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On another occasion, the same target individual explained another's behaviour with a
mental state. All children were in the dining room playing the "Tuck Shop". Robert went
to buy some sweets from "The Shop". Patrick was at the counter. Robert made an error
when he was calculating how much he would have to pay. He didn't ask for help from
Patrick and he didn't know what to do next. When the teacher taking notice of that asked
what happened, Patrick explained: "He gets confused ".
However, reference to physical states (facts) was also applied by the same target child for
explaining another's behaviour. Here, Patrick was aware of the reason's behind his friend's
behaviour, but did not use a mental explanation for that. At the end of a curriculum
session, Helen (the teacher) said to Patrick: "Diana has been very kind to you. She did the
washing for you.". Diana added: "I washed your bowl." Patrick asked: "Was it because I
did the washing up last week?" and the teacher agreed: "That's it! ". Patrick's explanations
in the above incidents seem to share the same characteristics with his responses to the
justification questions of the experimental tasks (Chapter 6). He passed both tests of false
attribution but used explicit and implicit mental explanations for his justifications: he made
an explicit reference to a belief for his justification on the first-order belief attribution task
("because she thinks it's in there"), but he described implicitly another's knowledge
("because that's what the ice-cream said he would be all day").
A mental description of another's behaviour was also given by another adolescent with
HFAIAS. In an group session, it was Robert's turn to say what he liked doing that week,
when Karen said: "He's dreaming every day." and explained: "He wasn't listening. He was
like this, covering his ears with his hands.". Karen also used an appropriate explicit
reference to a mental state in her response to the justification question of the first-order
theory of mind task (which she passed) ("Because she thinks it's in there.").
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In another occasion, a target child did not give any explanation for his opinion on another
child's behaviour (interest in a conversation). Matthew was observing a conversation
between Karen and Diana about clothes. Diana seemed to be very well "in tune" with
Karen, whereas Karen did not ask any questions to Diana. When the teacher asked
Matthew to explain how he knew that Diana was interested in what Karen was saying, he
replied: "Haven't a clue. ".
Moreover, an adolescent with HFAIAS seemed to understand that her teacher's request
was a reaction to her own grimace. At lunch time, Diana finished her food and took her
plate away; then, she came back to take the bowl with the fruit, making a facial expression
that showed that she did not like doing that at all! Her teacher saw her grimace and asked
her to go back and take again her bowl with the pudding. When the teacher asked Diana
whether she realised why she had asked her do it again, she replied: "Yes" and was
nervous (she bumped her bowl), showing she understood the reason for her teacher's
irritation.
In addition, there was evidence that two target children considered that knowledge of
another's mental states may be difficult, as these mental states are private. The following
dialogue was initiated by Karen, while I was sitting next to her at the end of a curriculum
session. She made an observation of my behaviour and gave a mental explanation; yet, she
appreciated that my thoughts might not be accessible to her.
Karen	 : "Sophia, you are quiet."
Sophia	 : "Yes, I am."
Karen	 : "I am usually like that when I think something in my brain. What are you
thinking?"
Sophia	 : "Can you guess?"
Karen	 : "I don't know." (laughing) "I don't know what you are thinking."
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Also, another individual with 1-IFAJAS explained her lack of knowledge about her teacher's
thoughts, because they were not expressed publicly. For example, when Diana was asked
by her mother whether she knew if her teacher wanted a family photograph of her, she
replied that she didn't know, because "she (the teacher) doesn't explain things to me, you
see ' 'she doesn't tell us everything".
Inappropriate social behaviour
In some case, the target children's understanding of another's emotion seemed to be related
to inappropriate social behaviour. Karen's mother described an incident to me that was
quite impressive for her daughter's ability to understand how people feel, but was followed
by "strange" social behaviour. Once they were in gifi shop in a castle and suddenly Karen
went and kissed another lady. Karen's parents were embarrassed and apologised. But the
lady remarked: "This is the only time since the death of my husband that someone has
made me feel so happy!". In this case, Karen had observed the sad face expression of this
lady and being sensitive to that, she rushed to give her a kiss. This positive behaviour may
throw light in the mind of a high-level autistic person: being able to recognise emotions in
others but without the ability to think whether some behavioural reactions to these feelings
are socially appropriate or not.
However, in other cases negative thoughts about another person may be expressed with
honesty. Matthew's mother described an incident with his grandmother. They went to his
nana's house to have their dinner. When they were leaving, Matthew told her: "And I hope
you're not coming to our house, 'cause I don't want you to conie. ". His mother asked him
why he had said that and he replied: "Ijitsi felt like it. ".
Yet, it is not clear whether Matthew intended to hurt the other person's feelings; in that
case, his behaviour seems reasonable. However, when his mother kept on talking about
this, he seemed to be upset about it, as expressed in the next dialogue:
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Matthew : "Don't talk about it, ok?"
Mother : "Why?"
Matthew : "It's distracting me. On this."
Mother	 : "You don't want to talk about it 'cause you don't like what you hear."
Matthew : "I don't like what you say. Talk about it, talk about, talk about it. I don't want
to hear that. I don't hear, 'cause it's rubbish what you say. I want to talk about
things I like."
Apart from the above incidents that were described to me by parents, I observed another
similar spontaneous but socially inappropriate behaviour towards me. After a short period
of observation of the conversation between Robert and his parents, he asked in a loud
voice: "Can Sophia go home now?" (I was in the same room as him). However, when his
father asked him: "Why do you want her to go home?", he replied: "I don't know.". Then
his mother asked him: "It's because you want to go upstairs and read your book, isn't it?"
but he didntt respond to her. After a while, Robert asked: "Can I watch "Crystal Maze"
now?". But the observation was continued. Later, he repeated the same questions: "Have I
finished with Sophia?", "Will Sophia go home?". It was obvious that he did not want the
conversation to be continued, so that he could watch his favourite program; but he
expressed this in a rather tactless way.
Another incident of inappropriate social behaviour was mentioned in a conversation
between an adolescent with HFAJAS and his parents. Diana's mother said that when her
daughter was twelve years old, the teacher had sent a note to them, saying that Diana was
showing her underclothes at school and they would have to "put her in trousers".
Teasing
There was some evidence of teasing in children's interactions at school. For example,
Robert said that he would not have any kidney beans for his dinner, as he did not like
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them. Bill heard him and said: "Kidney beans for Robert. ", laughing at the same time. He
repeated this sentence four times with the same smile on his face, until Michelle asked him
to stop it. He was obviously teasing Robert, who showed no reaction.
Also, the target child's ability to understand that another person might be trying to tease
him/her was evident in a home observation. The following dialogue illustrates that:
Diana	 : "Somebody's in a bad mood." (laughs)
Father	 : "Neil." (laughs)
Diana	 : "Aye." (laughs) "He had a bad day at school."
Father	 : "Did you talk to him?"
Diana	 : "Aye. I talked to him this morning."
Father	 : "Aye! You go outside for?" (Diana laughs) "Diana's got a boyfriend!"
(laughs)
Diana	 : "No! I haven't!" (laughing)
Sense of hunwur
In one occasion a target child replied in a way that showed his intention of making a joke.
When Bill said that he did his homework in the weekend, his teacher, Michelle, asked him
who helped him with it. He replied that his mother did. Then she asked him: "Did she tell
you the answers?" and when he replied "She did!", everybody laughed. Michelle argued:
"She didn't! She didn't tell you the answers", and Bill said "I guessed them all". Michelle
replied: "You know them all, you didn't guess them". Here, Bill claimed that his mother
gave him the answers for his homework with the purpose to make a joke. However, it is
not certain whether his mother really helped him or not.
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Another spontaneous incident of making a joke occurred in the interaction between two
children. Patrick was talking about his picture of a dinosaur and Karen asked him how he
had made it; he replied laughing: "1 used a pencil". Karen also laughed, showing that she
had understood the joke.
In a curriculum session, an adolescent with HFA was teasing her teacher. Rachel was
using two pens as an example in her explanation of the concepts of "similarity" and -
"variation". Diana commented that they were "chewed in". Rachel agreed saying: "Yea,
that's all. Thanks to me. Can I just chew my pens away?" and Diana niade a joke: "You
have them for tea at night time. ". Patrick and the teacher laughed.
Interestingly, the same individual with HFA used a metaphor for making a joke, showing a
sophisticated use of thought and language. When Diana's mother asked her to explain why
she didn't like her teacher, she laughed saying: "it's a long story.". Her mother insisted:
"Right. Cut the story short. Tell us why you doit Vike hot." an(% Diana repiieà \aug'tñng:
"There a pair of scissors there. ".
Inability to understand the rules of a game on deception
There was naturalistic evidence that taking part in a game on deception may be difficult for
a target child. Robert is 9 yrs old, with a very low verbal IQ (38) but high non-verbal IQ
(114). However, his level of autistic handicap is severe; he met a large number of
symptoms in DSM-III-R than the other children in the class (see Appendix 1). In the
following situation, he seemed not to be able to understand the strategy of hiding a ball, so
that the person looking for it would not know where it was. This game is very similar to a
242
naturalistic experimental test on deception (the penny-hiding game) used by Baron-Cohen
(1992).
All children were playing a game with a rope and a ball in it. Everybody, except one
standing in the middle, was sitting in a circle. The purpose of the game was to hold the
rope and pass the ball to the next person in such a way, that the child who was in the
middle of the circle would not see it; this child would have to guess which one was hiding
the ball in his/her hands. Robert was the only child who had great difficulty understanding
this game: he was not hiding the ball, but holding it in a way, that was very easy to see
whether he had the ball or not. The teacher had to explain to him what he was supposed
to do.
Hiding ('disclosing facts)
There were some interesting but puzzling observations on intentional disclosure of facts by
some individuals with HFA. In the following dialogues, Anthony appeared to be aware of
his own and others' intentions but did not make the link that if they knew his intentions
they might change their plans. For example, while he was playiflg a board game with his
mother, he kept revealing his thoughts to her: "I'm waiting for you to move your back
ones, you know. ", "I'd move there, that pawn over there. Getting your castle. I'm waiting
for it.". But he appeared to have knowledge of his mother's intentions in the game: "You're
waiting for my knight /////////// out of the way, mum. ". Later, when Anthony was playing
with his father, he was revealing to his father the type of movements of pawns he did not
want him to make; then, his mother said: "Ssh! You don't tell, you haven't got to tell'im
what you wanted to do... 'Cause if you tell'im to, he won't do it.".
In another occasion, the same child was hiding from his mother that he was cheating.
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When she discovered that she said: "You're not supposed to change back. You cheat.". He
admitted that: "I like cheating. I like changing them back." His mother repeated: "Ei!
You're a cheat, you are." Anthony explained his reasons and was teasing her: "I'm
changing them back, so, so it makes you, I win this time. Am I allowed?".
In the next example, a target adolescent seemed to be able to predict another's disclosing
behaviour and the motives behind it. While Patrick and Diana were having a curriculum
lesson, their teacher Helen wondered: "Somebody must. have borrowed this hair band."
and Patrick suggested to her: "I can think of someone who might have hidden it.". When
his teacher asked: "Why do you think Diana might have hidden it?", Patrick explained:
"Because then she wouldn't have to wear it. ". Here, Patrick knew that Diana did not like
to wear her hair band and used this knowledge to explain why she may have hidden it.
The same teacher described Diana's past habit of hiding objects she didn't like with the
intention to avoid working on them. When Helen used to teach Diana in the class, she had
noticed that her folders for English and Maths were often missing.
Observations of conversations at home also supported Diana's ability to conceal
information that could be used against her. Her parents were concerned to know whether
she had damaged her video. Yet, as the next dialogue shows, it had been difficult for them
to find the truth from her; Diana was hiding the truth, so that she could avoid being
blamed for it.
Mother	 :1 want to ask you something and I want you to tell us the truth, right?"
Diana	 : "Oh!"
Mother	 : "Promise?"
Diana	 : "Yea."
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Mother	 : "Did you do anything to the video, to your video?"
Diana	 : "No."
Mother	 : "You sure?"
Diana	 : "Sure."
Mother	 : "Honest?"
Diana	 : "Yea." (laughs)
Mother	 : "Stop laughing."
Later her mother added: "But she won't tell us what she did.".
The ability to understand "hiding" was also evident in a child's description of a game.
When it was Matthew's turn to say how he had spent the weekend, he described a game of
hide-and-seek: "I mean, and they and they didn't' find me. I went in a hard place. I was
behind the back wall and they didn't know. They looked around there and I/I he wasn't
there then. I went in the garden.".
In a curriculum session with the speech therapist, involving the activity of one child hiding
an object and the other children trying to find out what it might be, Bill and Matthew were
sitting on the same table and Karen was hiding something from them. While they were
questioning her for clues about the hidden object, Bill said: "It's a secret" and laughed.
His comment showed that he understood the meaning of the activity.
The teacher's questioning strategy could throw interesting light on the target child's
perceptions and on the other children's. On one occasion, the teacher asked Robert what
he liked doing in the weekend. He said that he went to Newcastle for shopping with his
parents and his mother took some money from the Bank. Michelle asked him how much
money his mother had taken out. When he replied: "Fifty pounds cash.", everybody
(except him) laughed. It was clear that the other six children realised that telling the class
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how much money hi mother had taken out was socially inappropriate. It was also clear
that they understood that Michelle had asked the question to see whether he would
disclose this "secret", but he naively replied with honesty to his teacher's question.
However, in another occasion the same target child interrupted his narration, because he
seemed to be anxious that his teacher might be hiding something from him. Robert had just
come back from his session with the speech therapist and sat at his table to do some work.
He asked: "When I was at Jane,. have you got something hidden, Jan?".
In addition, another time Robert was hiding his own movements from his teacher, knowing
that they were not allowed. Juliet asked Robert whether he was twiddling his fingers under
the table. He reftised to admit that he was doing that.
Lying
A target child was observed to be lying in a conversation with his father, as a way of
avoiding reprimand. In particular, Matthew's father was asking him about an incident that
had occurred that morning at school and Matthew said that his teacher was "force feeding"
him at dinner time. When his father asked him whether he was telling the truth, Matthew
admitted that his teacher was not really doing that.
Another child with HFA/AS was able to uncover his mother's lies. Anthony and his mother
were playing a game and his mother suggested: "And you can jump on that one there."
Anthony replied: "You're telling me lies, I saw that mum.".
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Pretending
Experimental research has shown that understanding of pretence will be as difficult as
understanding belief in autistic children (Baron-Cohen, 1991c). However, a natural
incident of pretending was reported to me by a teacher. It involved an authentic metaphor;
in other words, it was a metarepresentation of an object. In a curriculum session (on
cookery), Karen was eating an apple with the red skin on it and said: "Ii's like a snow-man
when he bites a poisoned apple ".
Another event of pretence was particularly interesting, as it involved a target child's
planning and acting out of a behaviour, so that it would be convincing for her teacher:
Diana pretended that she needed to be taken home with the intention of avoiding staying
at school for another day. In one of the conversations between Diana and her parents, her
mother recalled this story of the past. One day the school rang her asking her to take
Diana home because she was very ill ("she was very hot"). So her parents went to pick her
up. To her mother's surprise, Diana said on the way back: "I'm a/right now, nnm. Can we
go to the beach?". However, when her father commented that this behaviour "doesn't
work now though, does it?", Diana agreed with him: "It's not worth it though, 'cause I
knew I//Il nobody believe.". Thus, she was able to evaluate her teacher's mental attitudes
(i.e., beliefs) to another similar pretending behaviour.
Nevertheless, not all the children with HFA shared the same ability to understand pretence.
The following example illustrates how the same pretending behaviour may cause different
reactions in the same group of children. For example, Anthony thought that his teacher
was really crying, when she was pretending to do so. In contrast to him, three other
children (Bill, Matthew and Patrick) were laughing, as they clearly understood that Juliet
was only pretending. Then the same teacher pretended that she was upset and Patrick was
laughing very loudly, showing that he understood that she was teasing Anthony again.
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Later, another teacher confirmed Anthony's difficulty in distinguishing between "true" and
"pretending" behaviour, by giving an example: if she pretended that she was brushing her
teeth, he would believe that was true.
However, one high-functioning child described her pretending play as "copying-out". In a
curriculum session, Karen was writing about a game she plays with her sister: "it's when
you play mums and children's.". When I asked her to tell me more about it, she replied:
"Well, she 'ii play as mum with the dolls and Sara (her sister) would make as big aunt.
And whatever. So they're just, they're just ///////, you know, copying what a mum will do.".
The same target child showed a spontaneous ability to pretend in a game she was playing
with her father. However, it is possible that her familiarity with the whole set-up made it
easier for her to understand the rules of the game and participate actively. Karen and her
father were playing a game of tying one another and trying to escape. Her father asked her
to "play the little girl who tries to tie him up.". Karen asked him to pretend to go to sleep.
Her father found it very difficult to escape from the knots that she made and asked her
whether she had the key for the padlock, but she denied that.
Behavioural signs of interest
There was evidence from the group sessions that some of the HFA children were able to
relate eye-contact to a mental state. For example, Matthew and Karen were having a
conversation about pets in front of the other children in the class. The teacher (Michelle)
asked Diana whether Karen was listening to what Matthew was saying. She replied: "I
think she was." and the teacher added: "She looked like she was, didn't she? She was
looking at him. And, eh, she didn't but in.". Later, the teacher emphasised how eye contact
can be a behavioural sign of interest in what the other person is saying.
248
In another group session, two other children were able to make a correct judgement of
another's interest in a conversation. Patrick was having a conversation with Robert about
their visit to a museum of dinosaurs and he asked him whether he enjoyed looking at the
dinosaurs. Robert replied: "I have looked at the dinosaurs.", but he did not seem to
understand the question. When Patrick repeated his question, he said: "Yes, I have.".
Patrick made no other attempt to pursue the matter with Robert. Matthew made the
comment that Robert was not interested. Michelle asked him to explain that and he said:
"Robert was looking all over the place." Michelle asked Karen whether Robert was
listening carefully to Patrick's questions. and she replied that he was not paying attention
'cause he was looking at Diana. And I know that. ". Thus, both Matthew and Karen were
able to relate the eye-contact with a mental state (being interested).
Awareness of other's criticism
The target child's awareness of pressure by others was shown through behavioural signs.
For example, Robert was very slow eating his meal and everybody on the table was
waiting for him to finish, so that they could have their pudding. Diana was moaning and
Bill said: "Come on, Robert. He's always so slow! ". Karen was looking at Robert and
Patrick was talking to him. Robert looked as if he was under a lot of pressure: he put his
hands over his ears and seemed to make a real struggle to eat his meal.
But on another similar occasion, Robert's reactions were not the same as above. At lunch
time, Bill said to Robert: "Could you please hurry up?", "Hurry up, Robert."; but, Robert
was looking at his plate. He did not give any signs of awareness of Bill's pressure on him.
Discussion
The general picture from the evidence derived from the ethnographic observations of the
group of children with HFAIAS supports the consistency in the use of mentalising skills
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both in experimental situations and in real-world social interactions. Specifically, all
(except one) children who were successful on the first-order belief attribution task,
appeared to apply their understanding of others' mental states in social situations as well.
For example, they showed the ability to recognise another's desires, feelings, thoughts,
knowledge and intentions. But the behaviour of one child has been very difficult to
explain. Although he passed the first-order theory of mind test (and that was not expected
on the basis of his low verbal mental age: 5.4), he revealed to his parents his strategy in a
game, without realising that they could use this knowledge to win the game. Yet, he
appeared to be aware of his mother's intentions in the game and thought that she might be
telling him lies. Also, he hid his own cheating from her; but, he behaved also naively in
thinking that his teacher could know about his activity, without seeing him. In this case, it
is really difficult to evaluate which context (the experimental or the natural) demonstrates
with greater reliability this child's real mentalising skills. However, there is greater
consistency between his behaviours and his failure on the more advanced test of theory of
mind. Another explanation of this child's behaviours could be that he was "groping"
towards a theory of mind.
Another case of agreement between task performance and social behaviour refers to the
child with HFA/AS who failed the "Sally-Anne" task and showed to a great extent lack of
mental understanding of others (e.g., inability to take part in a deceptive game, tactless
behaviour, naive honesty to questioning). This individual was severely autistic (see
Appendix 1), although his performance IQ was very high (114). His failure on the task was
expected on the basis of his low verbal ability (VMA= 4 yrs). Therefore, it seems that low
verbal skills as well as severe autism may help to account for his general lack of theory of
mind.
A similarly puzzling but more complicated picture emerges from the comparison between
children's successfl.il performance on the second-order belief attribution task and their
spontaneous social understanding. As it was difficult to observe statements of second-
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order theory of mind, this ability has been evaluated in terms of the application of
advanced social understanding. The children who were successful on this task appeared
not only to recognise a range of mental states but also to apply them in mental explanation
of others' behaviour. In other words, they seemed to make sophisticated uses of their
theory of mind: using pretence to convince others, making jokes, teasing, feeling
embarrassed, describing others' actions with mental attitudes. However, one of the oldest
individuals with HFAJAS was reported to show socially inappropriate behaviour in the
past (e.g., hurtfiul comments to others); it seems that his long social training improved his -
behaviour, as well as his general near-normal intelligence and mild autism.
Two other children who failed on the "ice-cream man" task also showed a range of
abilities. However, one of them made a second-order theory of mind statement: "I don't
think he knows what you mean.". That was the only striking example of inconsistency in a
strict comparison between passing the second-order belief attribution task and use of this
skill in everyday social interaction in the target group. Moreover, the same individual used
appropriately many advanced mentalising behaviours, such as, teasing, recognising other's
intentions, manipulating other's feelings, self-reflection, understanding pretending,
deception and lying. But he also made a socially inappropriate statement (he asked his
grandmother not to visit his house again); when he was asked to explain his behaviour, he
simply said: "I just felt like it". Therefore, his behaviour appeared to be more advanced
than his test performance; his competence in real-life situations seemed higher than his task
performance. He was high-functioning (see Appendix 1) with verbal IQ (78) and non-
verbal IQ (89).
The other child who did not pass the second-order theory of mind task showed
behaviours, such as embarrassment, awareness of thoughts as private states, understanding
of pretending, mental explanation of other's behaviour. But she also showed inappropriate
social behaviour in the past (gave a kiss to a lady that had a sad expression).
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CHAPTER 13: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This chapter will summarise the main findings of this study and discuss their implications
for theoretical work on autism as well as for professional practice. Also, it will identify
some future areas of research arising from this project. It needs to be mentioned that the
review of the literature in Part I had identified the need for a combined methodology, and
the questions arising from the empirical work had already been discussed in chapters 8,
11 and 12.
The study set out to examine how children with HFA/AS use knowledge about self and
others in different contexts. In addition, the research aimed to evaluate the application of
a mixed methodology as fruitful in throwing light on multiple aspects of the subject of
our inquiry. Specifically, the intention was to examine how individuals with HFAJAS
who have succeeded or failed on theory of mind tests, would describe themselves in an
interview as well as the type of mental states they would refer to in their natural
conversations with familiar adults. This information was further complemented by
informal observations of their spontaneous mental understanding in everyday social life.
The principal findings of this study were the following:
First, the group of children/adolescents with HFAJAS was more successful on the first-
order than the second-order belief attribution task, but there were no significant
differences between the target group and the comparison groups on both tests. These
results, in line with 'those from other studies, can be explained in terms of task factors and
the verbal ability of the HFA/AS group. However, responses to the justification questions
in each task were different. On the "Sally-Anne" test all groups used references to
physical and mental states (explicit expressions), whereas on the "Ice-Cream-Man" test,
justifications of the children with HFAJAS and the adults with AS who were successful
included appropriate explicit and implicit references to mental states only. Thus, nearly
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all children with HFA/AS showed an understanding of another's mental state, but only
three of them were able to predict another's internal states at an advanced level.
Second, this tendency to describe physical/observable facts together with mental state
language also emerged in the interview responses to questions about cognitions of the self
by the children with HFA/AS. However, the striking group difference was found on the
description of the social self. In contrast to adults with AS and children with MLD,
children with HFA/AS did not refer to their social skills and social relationships as an
important component of their self-understanding. This was explained in terms of the
social handicap in autism and it could be inferred that this area of their personality
becomes more important for them as they grow older. However, all groups tended to use
a low level of reasoning for their perceptions of themselves: they described their
characteristics/skills/activities as important in and of themselves. That was explained as a
delay in reasoning ability, which was not found to be autism-specific but present also in
children with MLD and adults with AS. Overafl, Damon & Hart's (19SS) self-
understanding interview proved useful in differentiating qualitative aspects of the self
between the groups, showing that autism is associated with a different conception of the
self.
Third, the analysis of use of mental state language related to the self and others at school
and home was fruitful in showing differences in the frequency of mental state utterances
used by children in each context. It was also useful to look at the teaching context within
the school, as children with HFA/AS referred to mental states more often in their
conversations with teachers in group sessions than with their parents at home. Moreover,
the analysis of language used by teachers and by parents proved useful in explaining the
above results. That is, the finding that teachers used more mental state language than
parents, may help to explain the differences in children's use of terms of psychological
states.
4-
The findings show the value of an interactive analysis of language used by children and
adults. For example, there was a similar tendency between children with HFA and their
parents to describe more feelings and fewer cognitive states than children with MLD and
their parents. Moreover, children with HFA and their teachers used fewer terms about
emotions than children with MLD and their teachers in group sessions. Hence, the type of
mental states used by children in each group was associated with the context of the
interaction and the participants in it. But this aspect of that data would have remained
unrecognised if the more conventional individualistic approach (focused solely on the
child's utterances) had been followed.
However, the picture was not the same for the use of cognitive terms by the target group:
they talked about cognitions at a similar level at school and home. Also, this comparison
revealed group differences: compared with children with MLD, children with 1-IFA/AS
made fewer references to cognitive states at home, but more references in group sessions
at school. However, their own use of these terms appeared to be stable across contexts,
although the input by adults was not the same: parents talked less about cognitive states
than teachers. But, this consistent use of cognitive references does not support the
hypothesis that children with HFA/AS are deficient in their ability to perceive cognitive
states, because children with HFA/AS described significantly more cognitions than
children with MLD at school, but significantly fewer at home. The observation of use of
mental state language in two different natural contexts illuminated group differences
between children with HFA and children with MLD, that have been supported in the
literature (Tager-Flusberg, 1992). Also, this finding throws further light on the
experimental results: children with HFA/AS showed knowledge of mental states while
responding to the task and they also described cognitive states in naturalistic contexts.
Nevertheless, another finding shows inconsistency in the use of references to others'
mental states by children with HFAIAS, thereby indicating a context effect. The target
group seemed to talk about others' internal states more in group sessions than at home,
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although there were no differences between teachers and parents in their references to
others. However, children with HFAIAS seemed to talk about their own and others'
mental states at home and school at the same level as children with MLD. Moreover, the
study of mental state language in different contexts was illuminating with regard to the
pragmatic context of utterances used by children. In particular, all children used more
mental state utterances to ask questions and make comments at home than in group
sessions at school, although parents made fewer comments than teachers and they used
the same number of questions about mental states. 	 -
Overall, the results demonstrate the importance of examining differences across contexts,
in order to identify consistencies and discrepancies in the use of mental state language.
The educational significance of the findings lies in identifying the verbal interactions
between children with HFA/AS and different adults which may encourage or inhibit
knowledge of the self and others.
Finally, the picture from the ethnographic data is consistent with the performance of
children with HFA/AS on experimental tasks. However, there was one case of an
individual who did not pass the second-order belief attribution test, but expressed second-
order comments and showed advanced mental understanding in his real-world social
interactions. Overall, the ethnographic technique offered complementary qualitative
evidence to the experimental data.
To summarise, this study represents an extension to current theoretical traditions focused
on the measurement of autistic children's performance in an artificial task situation.
Although the use of naturalistic experiments on theory of mind is growing, a critical area
has not been much explored: autistic children's mental understanding in real-world social
settings. The evidence that autistic children who were successful on theory of mind tasks
have persisting problems in everyday life poses a challenge for current psychological
theories of autism. Hence, future work needs to explore systematically autistic children's
255
behaviour in their natural social environment. However, it is critical to adopt an
interactive perspective that will consider the child's use (or lack) of skills in relation to the
adults' responses in the context of interaction.
On the whole, the present study has observed consistencies and inconsistencies in the use
of utterances between children with HFAJAS and familiar adults. The next step could be
to explore qualitative aspects of these interactions, by looking at the processes involved
in applying skills related to mental state language, so that.a.deeper understanding can be
achieved. For example, this study has suggested that the use of emotion terms varies
between conversations with parents and with teachers. The following stage could be to
examine the ways (i.e., qualitative dimensions of conversations about mental states)
teachers/parents talk about feelings in their interactions with autistic children. Also, the
intentions in using mental state language appear not to be the same in each context,
although autistic children seem to respond to what is asked of them in a verbal
interaction. However, we need qualitative information on specific processes used in each
context for the development of knowledge of the self and others. The present research is
only one step in this avenue for illuminating the puzzling picture of autism.
Overall, hypotheses based on experimental testing of cognitive abilities need to be
measured against evidence from observations of children's behaviour in the real-world.
However, new techniques need to be developed that provide qualitative information on
these issues. An appropriate methodology will explore a range of natural social settings.
Different relationships may have different effect on autistic children's use of social
understanding.
The present study has shown significant context effects in the use of mental state
language on the self and others by children with HFAJAS. This finding has implications
for the design of intervention strategies. It seems that parents need to become aware of
their contribution to their children's use of utterances on mental states. Although there
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have been studies of teachers teaching high-functioning autistic children mental skills
(Ozonoff & Miller, 1995), the use of parents in similar programs remains largely
unexplored. Their role as socialising agents in the life of the autistic individual is crucial.
But there is not much information about the quality of their verbal interactions with their
children: how they describe and explain mental states to them.
In general, this study has explored some of the dimensions of autistic children's use of
knowledge of themselves and others in experimental and natural situations. Further
research on the qualitative processes involved in autistic children's use of cognitive
abilities in their relationships in everyday social contexts may provide valuable insight in
our understanding of persons with autism.
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APPENDIX 1: DIAGNOSTIC DATA
DSM-III-R CRITERIA FOR AUTISTIC DISORDER
CHILDREN
1	 2	 3	 45	 6	 7
RECIPROCAL SOCIAL INTERACTION
1. Impaired awareness of others
2. Abnormal comfort seeking
3. Impaired imitation
4. Abnormal social play
5. Impaired ability to make
friends
x	 x	 x	 x
x
x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x
x x	 x x x x	 x
VERBAL/NON VERBAL COMMUNICATION AND IMAGINATION
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
1. No mode of communication
2. Abnormal non-verbal
communication
3. Impaired imaginative activity
4. Abnormal speech production
5. Abnormal speech content
6. Impaired conversational ability
x	 x	 x	 x	 x x	 x
x	 x	 x	 x	 x
x x	 x
x x	 x x	 x
x	 x	 x	 x	 x x	 x
RESTRICTED REPERTOIRE OF ACTIVITIES AND INTERESTS
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
1. Stereotyped body movements 	 x	 x	 x
2. Unusual attachments to objects	 x	 x	 X	 X
3. Distress over changes	 x	 x
4. Insistence on routines 	 x	 X	 X	 X
5. Restricted interests
	
x	 x	 X	 X	 X	 X	 X
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DRAFF ICD-1O CRITERIA FOR ASPERGER'S SYNDROME
CHILDREN
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
1. Impaired social interaction	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x
2. Restricted interests/activities	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x
3. No language retardation - past 	 x	 x	 x	 x
-present	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x
Key for reference to Chapter 12:
1. Anthony
2. Bill
3. Diana
4. Karen
5. Matthew
6. Patrick
7. Robert
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APPENDIX 2: RESULTS ON THE JUSTIFICATION QUESTIONS
First-order belief attribution task
HFA IA S group
1. "Because she put it in." (physical state)
2. "Because she thinks it's in there." (mental state)
3. "The fact that she left it last."(physical state)
4. "'Cause she thinks it's still in there." (mental state)
5. "Because she might, she might not, she might say, it might be in there. And it might be,
and it's in the box. To see if it's in there. And if it's not in there, she'll look in the box."
(physical state)
6. After the prompt questions he spontaneously said "She didn't see that one. She doesn't
know it's in there." 'When the "Why" question was asked, he replied : " 'Cause she might
know it's in there (pointed to the basket). She might not know it's in there (pointed to the
box). 'Cause she might know it's in the basket." (mental state)
7."'Cause she better look for it." (physical state)
MLD group
1. "She don't know if it was in there or nor" (mental state)
2. "'Cause she put it in there." (physical state)
3. "Because she put in there before." (physical state)
4."'Cause she's put it there." (physical state)
5. "She knows it's in there." (mental state)
6. 'Put the marble in there." (physical state)
7. "Because she thinks it's in." (mental state)
8. "'Cause she put it in there." (physical state)
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Adults with AS
1. "'Cause she thinks it might be in there." (mental state)
2. "Because that was the first place she had it." (physical state)
3. "'Cause that's where it was." (physical state)
4."'Cause Ann took the marble from there." (physical state)
5. "Because that's where she thinks she left it." (mental state)
6."'Cause she's put it there. She doesn't know Anne's taken it." (mental state)
Second-order belief attribution test
HFA IA S group
1. "Because he thought the van was gonna stay in there." (mental state)
2. "Because that's where the ice-cream man said he would be all day." (mental state)
3. "Because, em, his mum said he could buy an ice-cream." (physical state)
4."'Cause he (John) thinks the ice cream man is still there. "(mental state)
5. "Because the ice-cream man wants to sell the ice-cream outside the church."
(mental state)
6."'Cause there's no ice-cream in there (park)." (physical state)
MLD group
1. "They didn't go IIIII//I/I/I. They were just talking to the I/Il/I/I/I//I//I." (physical state)
2."'Cause that's where the ice-cream man was." (physical state)
3. "Because that's where he said he'd been, when he said that, where he'd been selling the
ice-cream." (mental state)
4."'Cause the ice-cream wasn't there when she got home." (physical state)
5. "The ice-cream man at the church." (physical state)
6. "Because she might have thought he (the ice cream man) was still at the park." (mental
state)
7. "This is down there. The ice cream van." (physical state)
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Adults with AS
1. "Just to buy an ice-cream I think". (physical state)
2. "That's where the ice-cream man said he was staying all afternoon." (mental state)
3. "Cause the ice-cream man said he would be in the park all afternoon." (mental state)
4."'Cause he didn't have his money on him." (physical state)
5. "He wants ice-cream". (mental state)
6. "Because she neven heard the ice-cream man saying he was going to the church."
(mental state)
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APPENDIX 3: THE SELF-UNDERSTANDING INTERVIEW BY
DAMON & HART
Item 1: Self-Definition
Could you tell me what kind of person you are?
What's the most important thing to say about you?
Tell me about yourself.
How would you describe yourself?
What's the most important thing to know about you?
What can you say about the kind of person that you are?
Tell me about ... (name of the child).
Probe Question: Whay is that important?
Item 2: Self-Evaluation
What are you especially proud of about yourself?
What do you like about yourself?
What are you not proud of?
Is there something that you don't like about yourself?
Probe Question: Whay is that important?
Item 3: Self in Past and Future
Do you think you will be the same or different five years from now?
What do you think will stay the same about you in five years?
What was the same about you five years ago?
How about when you are an adult?
How about when you were a baby?
How have you changed in the past five years?
What will be the same about you in five years?
Do you think you will be the same when you get older?
How about when you were younger?
Probe Questions: What will be the same? What will be different? Why is that important?
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Item 4: Self-Interest
What do you want to be when you grow up?
What kind of person do you want to be?
Who would you really like to be like?
Probe Questions? Why is that good for you? Why do you want to be like that?
Item 5: Continuity
Do you change at all from year to year?
If you change from year to year, how do you know it's still you?
What would you like to change about yourself?
Probe Questions: In what ways do you stay the same? Why is this important? What stays
the same?
Item 6: Agency
How did you become the kind of person that you are?
How did you get the way that you are?
How could you become different?
Probe Questions: What difference did that make? How did that make you the person that
you are?
Item 7: Distinctness
Do you think there is anyone who is exactly like you?
What makes you different from anyone you know?
What makes you different from all the children in your class?
Probe Questions: Why is that important? How do you know?
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APPENDIX 4: ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON MENTAL STATE
LANGUAGE: SELF AND OTHERS AT SCHOOL
All Tables in this Appendix are referred to in the text.
Table 1. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum
Sessions: Teachers and Children with MLD.
Mental States	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception	 11
	
7
	
0.9, n.s.
Desire	 15
	
0	 n/a
Emotion	 6
	
2	 n/a
Cognition	 30
	
3	 n/a
Table 2. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and Children
with MLD.
Referent	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Self
	
133
	
107	 2.8, n.s.
Child/Teacher	 466
	
5
	
451.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
Other	 89
	
22
	
40.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
Table 3. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with MLD.
Referent	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Self	 19	 4	 n/a
Child/Teacher	 33	 5
	
20.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Other	 8	 3	 n/a
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Table 4. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 93
Conversational	 14
Idiomatic	 8
Desire
True mental state	 25
Conversational 	 18
Emotion
True mental state	 64
Cognition
True mental state	 167
Conversational	 8
Idiomatic	 17
44	 17.5, df= l,p<O.001
o	 n/a
o	 n/a
11	 5.4, df= 1, p< 0.05
1	 n/a
56
	
135,n.s.
52
	
60.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
6
	
0.3, n.s.
6
	
5.3, df 1, p< 0.05
Table 5. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and
Children with MLD.
Functional Use
	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
True mental state	 734	 130
	
422.2, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 38	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 9	 0	 n/a
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Table 6. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and
Children with MLD (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 65	 11	 38.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 14	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 7	 0	 n/a
Desire
True mental state	 9	 3	 n/a
Conversational	 17	 0	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state	 342	 103	 128.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition
True mental state	 318	 13	 281.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 7	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 0	 n/a
Table 7. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
and Children with HFA.
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
True mental state	 384	 118	 140.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 68	 4	 n/a
Idiomatic	 21	 2	 n/a
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Table 8. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
and Children with HFA (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 102	 30	 39.3, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Conversational	 15	 1	 n/a
Idiomatic	 15	 0	 n/a
Desire
True mental state
	 27	 8	 10.3, df = 1, p< 0.01
Conversational	 50	 1	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state 	 51	 26	 8.1, df = 1, p< 0.01
Cognition
True mental state 	 204	 54	 87.2, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Conversational	 3	 2	 n/a
Idiomatic	 6	 2	 n/a
Table 9. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
and Children with MLD.
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child
True Mental State	 51	 11	 28.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational 	 9	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 0	 n/a
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0
0
n/a
n/a
2 n/a
2	 n/a
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
Table 10. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
and Children with MLD (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state
	 11
Conversational	 0
Idiomatic	 0
Desire
True mental state 	 6
Conversational 	 9
Emotion
True mental state	 6
Cognition
Mental	 28
Conversational	 2
Idiomatic	 2
7
	
0.9, n.s.
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
Table 11. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and Children with
HFA.
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
(1) 289	 116	 73.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 96	 39	 24.1,df=1,p<0.001
(3) 29	 32	 0.1, n.s.
Note: (1) Initial use, (2) Repetition of the teacher's use of mental term, (3) Repetition of
the child's use of mental term.
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Table 12. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions. Teachers and Children with
HFA (in each mental state).
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
(1) 92	 29	 32.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 15	 10	 1.0,n.s.
(3) 8	 5	 0.7, n.s.
Desire
(1) 27	 9	 9.0,df=1,p<0.01
(2) 16	 3	 n/a
(3) 0	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 47	 28	 4.8, df = 1, p< 0.05
(2) 13	 9	 0.7, n.s.
(3) 4	 19	 n/a
Cognition
(1) 123	 50	 30.8, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 52	 17	 17.7, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 17	 8	 3.2, n.s.
Table 13. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and Children with
MLD.
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
(1) 330	 60	 186.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 383	 56	 243.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 68	 22	 23.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
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Table 14. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers and Children with
MLD (in each mental state).
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
(1) 68	 9	 45.2, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 13	 2	 n/a
(3) 5	 0	 n/a
Desire
(1) 22	 3	 n/a
(2) 4	 0	 n/a
(3) 0	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 104	 32	 38.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
(2) 183	 50	 75.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 55	 21	 15.2,df=1,p=0.001
Cognition
(1) 136	 16	 94.7, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 183	 4	 n/a
(3) 8	 1	 n/a
Table 15. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA.
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
(1) 375	 100	 159.2, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 74	 26	 23.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 24	 12	 4.0, df = 1, p< 0.05
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Table 16. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with HFA (in each mental state).
Use
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
Teacher
110
18
4
58
18
1
37
6
8
170
32
11
Child
23
6
2
7
2
0
20
5
1
52
13
9
x2
56.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
6.0, df = 1, p< 0.05
n/a
40.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
n/a
n/a
5.1, df = 1, p< 0.05
0.09, n.s.
n/a
62.7, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
8.0, df = 1, p< 0.01
0.2, n.s.
Table 17. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with MLD.
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
(1) 37	 5	 24.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 23	 5	 11.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
(3) 2	 2	 n/a
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Table 18. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers and
Children with MLD (in each mental state).
Use	 Teacher	 Child	 x2
Perception
(1) 6	 2	 n/a
(2) 4	 3	 n/a
(3) 1	 2	 n/a
Desire
(1) 9	 0	 n/a
(2) 6	 0	 n/a
(3) 0	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 4	 2	 n/a
(2) 1	 0	 n/a
(3) 1	 0	 n/a
Cognition
(1) 18	 1	 n/a
(2) 12	 2	 n/a
(3) 0	 0	 n/a
Table 19. Overall Frequencies of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions:
Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Groups	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Child	 23	 12	 3.4, n.s.
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Table 20. Frequencies of Each Category of Psychological State Utterances in
Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with
MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD
group).
Mental States	 HFA
	
MLD
Perception	 22
	
11
	
3.6, df= l,p= 0.05
Desire	 13
	
15
	
0.1, n.s.
Emotion	 8
	
6
	
0.2, n.s.
Cognition	 36
	
30
	
0.5, n.s.
Table 21. Frequencies of Each Category of Psychological State Utterances in
Curriculum Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the
HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Mental States	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Perception	 5
	
7
	
0.3, n.s.
Desire	 1
	
0	 n/a
Emotion	 4
	
2	 n/a
Cognition	 12
	
3	 n/a
Table 22. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children
with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Self	 90	 133
	
8.3, df = 1, p< 0.01
Child	 188	 466	 118.2, df = 1, p< 0.001
Other	 27	 89
	
33.1, df = 1, p< 0.001
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Table 23. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Children with HFA
and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Self
	
121
	
107
	
0.8, n.s.
Teacher	 7
	
5
	
0.3, n.s.
Other	 24
	
22
	
0 .1, n.s.
Table 24. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of
Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Self
	
24
	
19
	
0 .6, n.s.
Child
	
29
	
33
	
0.2, n.s.
Other	 6
	
8
	
0.3, n.s.
Table 25. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Self	 3	 4	 n/a
Teacher	 5	 5	 n/a
Other	 1	 3	 n/a
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Table 26. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of
Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 80	 65	 1.5, n.s.
Conversational	 12	 14	 0.1, n.s.
Idiomatic	 7	 7	 n/a
Desire
True mental state	 21	 9	 4.8, df = 1, p< 0.05
Conversational	 15	 17	 0.1, n.s.
Emotion
True mental state	 55	 34-2	 207.5, df= 1, <Q.QQt
Cognition
Mental	 144	 318	 65.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 7	 7	 n/a
Idiomatic	 15	 2	 n/a
Table 27. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Groiw Sessions: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
True mental state	 140	 128
	
0.5, n.s.
Conversational	 6	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 9	 8
	
0.05, n.s.
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38
0
0
9
1
48 101
45
5
5
9
13
0
0
8
Perception
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Desire
True mental state
Conversational
Emotion
True mental state
Cognition
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Special code
11	 14.9, df= 1, p= 0.001
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
3	 n/a
0	 n/a
18.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
17.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
n/a
n/a
0.6, n.s.
Table 28. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
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4
	 6	 n/a
8
	
9
	
0.06, n.s.
68 0.3, n.s.
34
	
28
	
0.6, n.s.
1
	
0	 n/a
1
	
2	 n/a
Table 29. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions:. Teachers
of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA
group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Perception
Mental
Conversational
Idiomatic
Desire
Mental
Conversational
Emotion
Mental
Cognition
Mental
Conversational
Idiomatic
17
	
11
	
1.3, n.s.
2
	
0	 n/a
2
	
0	 n/a
Table 30. Functional Use of Men:al State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Children
with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length
of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use
	
HFA	 MLD	 x2
True Mental State	 20	 11	 2.6, n.s
Conversational	 1	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 1	 1	 n/a
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79
13
7
23
14
0
Table 31. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children with
HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised
to length of observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
(1) 249	 330	 11.3, df= 1, p< 0.01
(2) 83	 383	 193.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
(3) 25	 68	 19.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
Table 32. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children with
HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised
to length of observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
40
11
3
106
45
15
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
68
	
0.8, n.s.
13	 n/a
5
	
0.3, n.s.
22
	
0.02, n.s.
4	 n/a
0	 n/a
104	 28.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
183	 152.5, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
55	 n/a
136	 3.7, df= 1, p= 0.05
183	 83.5, df= l,p<O.001
8	 2.1,n.s.
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Table 33. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
(1) 100	 60	 10.0, df = 1, p< 0.01
(2) 33	 56	 5.9, df = 1, p< 0.05
(3) 27	 22	 0.5, n.s.
Table 34. Use of Mental State Utterances in Group Sessions: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
25
9
4
8
3
0
24
8
16
43
15
7
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
9	 7.5, df= 1, p< 0.01
2	 n/a
0	 n/a
3	 n/a
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
32	 1.1,n.s.
50	 30.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
21	 0.7, n.s.
16	 12.3, df = 1, p< 0.001
4	 n/a
1	 n/a
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Table 35. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children
with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
(1) 63	 37	 6.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
(2) 12	 23	 3.4, n.s.
(3) 4	 2	 n/a
Table 36. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children
with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x-
18
3
10
3
1
6
1
1
28
5
2
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
6	 6.0,df=1,p<0.05
4	 n/a
1	 n/a
9	 0.05, n.s.
6	 n/a
0	 n/a
4	 n/a
1	 n/a
1	 n/a
18
	
2.2, n.s.
12
	
2.9, n.s.
0	 n/a
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0
1
4
129
3
3
2
3
18
20
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
n/a
n/a
n/a
83.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
n/a
Table 37. Use of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Children with HFA
and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
(1) 17	 5	 6.5, df = 1, p= 0.01
(2) 4	 5	 n/a
(3) 2	 2	 n/a
Table 38. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Group
Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Categories	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Table 39. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Curriculum
Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD
(observations of the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD
group).
Categories	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Didactic	 1	 1	 n/a
Commentary	 30
	
31
	
0.01, n.s.
Questioning	 22	 11	 3.7, df = 1, p= 0.05
Guiding	 22
	
18
	
0.4, n.s.
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Table 40. Comparison of Frequencies of Utterances for Each Category of Mental State
as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers
of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Mental States
Perception
Desire
Emotion
Cognition
Total
HFA
frequency(percent)
132 (27.9)
77 (16.2)
51(10.7)
213 (45.0)
473
MLD
frequency(percent)
11(17.7)
15 (24.1)
6(9.6)
30 (48.3)
62
x2
2.1, n.s.
1.9, n.s.
0.1, n.s.
0.1, n.s.
Table 41. Comparison of Frequencies of Utterances for Each Category of Mental State
as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Children
with HFA and Children with MLD.
Mental States	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequencr(percent)
Perception	 31(22.1)	 7(58.3)	 5.8,df= 1, p<O.OS *
Desire	 9(6.4)	 0	 n/a
Emotion	 26 (18.5)	 2 (16.6)	 n/a
Cognition	 74 (52.8)	 3 (25)	 n/a
Total	 140	 12
* chi-square is questionable here.
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Table 42. Comparison of Referents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children
with MLD.
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent) 	 frequency(percent)
Self
	 105 (28.6)	 133 (18.7)	 10.6, df = 1, p< 0.01
Child
	 218 (59.4)	 466 (65.7)	 1.5, n.s.
Self/Child
	
13 (3.5)	 21(2.9)	 0.2, n.s.
Other	 31(8.4)	 89 (13.6)	 3.6,df= 1, p= 0.05
Total
	
367	 709
Table 43. Comparison of Referents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents in Group Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent) frequency(percent)
Self
	
141 (79.6)	 107 (79.8)	 0.0003, n.s.
Teacher	 8(4.5)	 5(3.7)	 0.1, n.s.
Other	 128 (15.8)	 22 (16.4)	 0.01, n.s.
Total	 177	 134
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Table 44. Comparison of Referents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of
Children with MLD.
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Self	 144 (39.6)	 19 (31.7)	 0.8, n.s.
Child	 174 (47.9)	 33 (55)	 0.5, n.s.
Self/Child
	
9 (2.4)	 0	 n/a
Other	 36 (9.9)	 8 (13.3)	 0.6, n.s.
Total
	
363
	
60
Table 45. Comparison of Referents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents in Curriculum Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Self
	
91 (72.2)	 4 (33.3)	 n/a
Teacher	 20 (15.8)	 5 (41.6)	 4.0, df = 1, p< 0.05 *
Other	 15 (11.9)	 3 (25)	 n/a
Total	 126	 12
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Table 46. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in as a Proportion
ofAll Frequencies on Functional Use in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA
and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
True mental state 	 349 (84.2)	 734 (93.9)	 2.8, n.s.
Conversational
	
40 (9.6)	 38 (4.8)	 9.5, df = 1, p< 0.01
Idiomatic	 25 (6.0)	 9(1.1)	 22.7, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Total
	
414
	
781
Table 47. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in as a Proportion
of All Frequencies on Functional Use in Group Sessions: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD.
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
True mental state	 163 (87.1)	 130 (94.2)	 0.4, n.s.
Conversational
	
7(3.7)	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 6(3.2)	 0	 n/a
Special code	 11(5.8)	 8(5.8)	 0.001, n.s.
Total	 187	 138
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Table 48. Comparison of Functional Use of MentaiState Utterances in as a Proportion
of All Frequencies on Functional Use in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children with
HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Functional Use	 1-IFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
True mental state
	 384 (81.1)	 51(82.2)	 0.007, n.s.
Conversational	 68 (14.3)	 9 (14.5)	 0.0007, n.s.
Idiomatic	 21(4.4)	 2 (3.2)	 n/a
Total	 473	 62
Table 49. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in as a Proportion
of All Frequencies on Functional Use in Curriculum Sessions: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD.
Functional Use
True Mental State
Conversational
Idiomatic
Special code
Total
HFA
frequency (percent)
118 (84.2)
4 (2.8)
2(1.4)
16(11.4)
140
MLD
frequency (percent)
11(91.6)
0
0
1 (8.3)
12
x2
0.1, n.s.
n/a
n/a
n/a
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Table 50. Comparison of Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances in Group Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of
Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
(1) 289 (69.9)	 330 (42.2)	 39.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 96 (23.1)	 383 (49)	 45.1, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 29 (7)	 68 (8.7)	 0.9, n.s.
Total
	
414
	
781
Table 51. Comparison of Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances in Group Sessions: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
(1) 116 (62)	 60 (43.4)	 5.0, df= 1, p< 0.05
(2) 39 (20.8)	 56 (40.5)	 10.6, df = 1, p< 0.01
(3) 32 (17.1)	 22 (15.9)	 0.06, n.s.
Total	 187	 138
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Table 52. Comparison of Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances in Curriculum Sessions: Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers
of Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
(1) 375 (79.2)	 37 (59.6)	 2.7, n.s.
(2) 74 (15.6)	 23 (37)	 13.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 24 (5)	 2(3.2)	 n/a
Total
	
473
	
62
Table 53. Comparison of Use of Mental States Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances in Curriculum Sessions. Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
(1) 102 (72.8)	 5 (41.6)	 1.5, n.s.
(2) 26 (18.5)	 5 (41.6)	 2.9, n.s.
(3) 12 (8.5)	 2 (16.6)	 n/a
Total	 140	 12
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Table 54. Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State UtLerances as
a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories in Curriculum Sessions:
Teachers of Children with HFA and Teachers of Children with MLD.
Categories
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Total
HFA
frequency (percent)
4(0.9)
181 (40.5)
133 (29.7)
129 (28.9)
447
MLD
frequency (percent)
0
31(51.7)
11(18.3)
18 (30)
60
x2
n/a
1.6, n.s.
2.4, n.s.
0.02, n.s.
Table 55. Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as
a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories in Group Sessions: Children
with HFA and Children with MLD.
Categories	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Self-interest	 4(2.2)	 1)	 n/a
Sophisticated
	
2(1.1)	 1 (0.7)	 n/a
Commentary	 14 (7.7)	 4 (2.9)	 n/a
Information	 138 (76.2)	 129 (94.1)	 2.9, n.s.
Questioning	 23 (12.7)	 3 (2.2)	 n/a
Total	 181	 137
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Table 56. Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as
a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories in Curriculum Sessions:
Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Categories	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency (percent) frequency (percent)
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
1 (0.04)
0
10(4)
110 (44)
129 (51.6)
1 (0.8)
0
5 (41.7)
6 (50)
0
n/a
n/a
28.4, df = 1, p< 0.001 *
0.1, n.s.
n/a
Total	 250	 12
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APPENDIX 5: ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON MENTAL STATE
LANGUAGE: SELF AND OTHERS AT HOME
All Tables in this Appendix are referred to in the text.
Table 1. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and
Children with HFA.
Functional Use	 Parent	 Child
True mental state	 1158
	
728
	
98.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational
	
46
	
45
	
0.01, n.s.
Idiomatic	 45
	
22
	
7.9, df 1, p< 0.01
Table 2. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits. Parents and
Children with HFA (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 215
Conversational 	 31
Idiomatic	 22
Desire
True mental state	 149
Conversational	 6
Emotion
True mental state	 349
Conversational	 1
Cognition
True mental state	 445
Conversational	 8
Idiomatic	 23
138	 16.8, df 1, p< 0.00 1
21	 1.9, n.s.
12	 2.9, n.s.
118	 3.6,df=1,p=0.05
8	 0.3, n.s.
215
	
31.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
1	 n/a
257
	
50.3, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
15	 2.1, n.s.
10
	
5.1,df= l,p<O.OS
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Table 3. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in AllHome- Visits: Parents and
Children with MLD.
Functional Use
	 Parent	 Child	 x2
True mental state	 624	 330
	
90.6, df =1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 38
	
18	 7.1,df= 1, p< 0.01
Idiomatic	 44
	
28
	
3.5, df = 1, p= 0.05
Table 4. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and
Children with MLD (in each mental state).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Child	 x2
Perception
True mental state
	 133
Conversational	 26
Idiomatic	 24
Desire
True mental state	 61
Conversational 	 3
Emotion
True mental state 	 89
Conversational	 2
Cognition
True mental state 	 341
Conversational	 7
Idiomatic	 20
51	 36.5,df= l,p<O.001
5	 14.2, df = 1, p< 0.01
12	 4.0, df = 1, p< 0.05
32	 9.0, df = 1, p< 0.01
0	 n/a
42
	
16.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
0	 n/a
205	 33.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
13
	
1.8, n.s.
16
	
0.4, n.s.
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Table 5. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and Children with
HFA.
Use	 Parent	 Child	 x2
(1) 829	 628	 27.7, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 293	 101	 93.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 127	 121	 0.1,n.s.
Note: (1) Initial Use of Term, (2) Repetition of parent's/other person's use of word in the
previous two turns, (3) Repetition of child's use of word in the previous two turns.
Table 6. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents and Children with
MLD.
Use	 Parent	 Child	 x2
(1) 499	 298	 50.7, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 128	 49	 32.2, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 79	 45	 9.3, df = 1, p< 0.01
Table 7. Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Children with HFA
and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Self
	
280
	
250	 1.7, n.s.
Parent
	 78
	
84
	
0.2, n.s.
Self + Parent
	 0.5
	
2	 n/a
Other	 31
	
41
	
1.4, n.s.
.1 1
Table 8. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents of
Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
True mental state	 550
	
624
	
4.7, df = 1, p< 0.05
Conversational
	
22
	
38
	
4.3, df = 1, p< 0.05
Idiomatic	 21
	
44
	
8.1, df= 1, p< 0.01
Table 9. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents of
Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 102
Conversational 	 15
Idiomatic	 10
Desire
True mental state	 71
Conversational 	 0
Emotion
True mental state	 166
Conversational 	 0.5
Cognition
True mental state	 211
Conversational	 4
Idiomatic	 11
133	 4.1,df= I, p< 0.05
16	 2.9,n.s.
24	 5.8,df= 1, p= 0.01
61	 0.7, n.s.
3	 n/a
89
	
23.2, df = 1, p< 0.001
2	 n/a
341
	
30.6, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
7	 n/a
20
	
2.6, n.s.
313
32
	
6.5, df = 1, p= 0.01
0	 n/a
42
	
25.0, df= 1, p< 0.001
0	 n/a
205	 21.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
13
	
1.8, n.s.
16
	
5.8, df = 1, p= 0.01
16
	
2.4, n.s.
Table 10. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
True mental state	 346
	
330
	
0.4, n.s.
Conversational	 21
	
18
	
0.2, n.s.
Idiomatic	 10
	
28
	
8.5, df = 1, p< 0.01
Special code	 26	 16
	
2.4, n.s.
Table 11. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Functional Use
	
HFA
	
MLD	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 65
Conversational 	 10
Idiomatic	 6
Desire
True mental state	 56
Conversational 	 4
Emotion
True mental state	 102
Conversational 	 0.5
Cognition
True mental state	 122
Conversational	 7
Idiomatic	 5
Special code
	
26
51
	
1.7, n.s.
5
	
1.7, n.s.
12
	
2.0, n.s.
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Table'12; Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Parents Children with HFA
and Parents of Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to
length of observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
(1) 394	 499	 12.3, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 139	 128	 0.4, n.s.
(3) 60	 79	 2.6, n.s.
Note: (1) Initial Use of Term, (2) Repetition of parent's/other persoh's use of word in the
previous two turns, (3) Repetition of child's use of word in the previous two turns.
Table 13. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group standardised to length of
observations of the MLD group).
Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
(1) 298	 298	 n/a
(2) 0.3	 49	 n/a
(3) 57	 45	 1.4, n.s.
Table 14. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits. Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD (observations of
the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Categories	 HFA
Didactic	 5
Commentary	 294
Questioning	 233
Guiding	 38
MLD
11
473
160
108
x2
2.2, n.s.
41.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
13.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
33.6, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
315
Table 15. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits. Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD (observations of
the HFA group standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Categories	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
1
50
36
29
1
29
38
5
1
68
97
1
1
147
62
3
Perception
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Desire
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Emotion
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Cognition
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
8	 n/a
116	 26.2, df 1, p< 0.001
29	 0.7, n.s.
98	 37.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
2	 n/a
38	 1.2, n.s.
23	 3.7, df= 1, p= 0.05
1	 n/a
0	 n/a
42	 6.1,df= 1, p= 0.01
47	 17.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
2	 n/a
1	 n/a
277	 39.8, df= l,p<O.00l
61	 0.008, n.s.
7	 n/a
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0
3
268
49
51
5
14
190
109
27
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
n/a
n/a
13.3, df = 1, p< 0.001
22.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
7.4, df = 1, p< 0.01
Table 16. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits. Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Categories	 FIFA
	
MLD	 x2
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Table 17. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home
Visits: Children with HFA and Children with MLD (observations of the HFA group
standardised to length of observations of the MLD group).
Categories	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
Perception
Self - Interest	 2	 0	 n/a
Sophisticated	 3	 2	 n/a
Commentary	 52	 42	 1.1, n.s.
Information	 5	 2	 n/a
Questioning	 12	 7	 1.3, n.s.
Desire
Self-interest	 1	 0	 n/a
Sophisticated	 2	 0	 n/a
Commentary	 43	 34	 1.0,
Information	 8	 1	 n/a
Questioning	 6	 5	 0.1, n.s.
Emotion
Self-interest	 0	 0	 n/a
Sophisticated	 3	 0	 n/a
Commentary	 68	 36	 9.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
Information	 25	 2	 n/a
Questioning	 8	 3	 n/a
Cognition
Self-interest	 2	 0	 n/a
Sophisticated	 6	 1	 n/a
Commentary	 27	 156	 90.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
Information	 71	 44	 6.3, df = 1, p< 0.05
Questioning	 0	 36	 n/a
318
Table 18. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and in Group Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of
home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Mental States	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception	 53
	
115	 22.9, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Desire	 31
	
43
	
1.9, n.s.
Emotion	 70
	
64
	
0.3, n.s.
Cognition	 96
	
192
	
32, df= 1, p< 0.001
Table 19. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and in Curriculum Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations
of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Mental States	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception	 76
	
132
	
15.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
Desire	 45
	
77
	
8.4, df = 1, p< 0.01
Emotion	 101
	
51
	
16.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 138
	
213
	
16, df = 1, p< 0.001
Table 20. Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Referent	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Self	 89	 105	 1.3, n.s.
Child	 123	 218
	
26.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
Other	 25	 31
	
0.6, n.s.
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Table 21. Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Curriculum
Sessions. Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Referent	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Self
	
128	 144
	
0.9, n.s.
Child
	
177
	
174
	
0.02, n.s.
Other	 35
	
36	 0.01, n.s.
Table 22. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
True mental state	 232	 349
	
23.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 9	 40	 19.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Idiomatic	 9	 25	 7.5, df = 1, p< 0.01
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Table 23. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 43
Conversational	 6
Idiomatic	 4
Desire
True mental state 	 30
Conversational	 1
Emotion
True mental state 	 70
Conversational	 1
Cognition
True mental state 	 89
Conversational	 2
Idiomatic	 5
93	 18.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
14	 3.2, n.s.
8	 n/a
25	 0.4, n.s.
18	 n/a
64
	
0.3, n.s.
0	 n/a
167	 23.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
8	 n/a
17
	
6.5, df= 1, p= 0.01
Table 24. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in
Curriculum Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Functional Use	 Parents	 Teachers	 x2
True mental state	 333	 384	 3.6, df = 1, p= 0.05
Conversational 	 13	 68	 37.3, df =1, p< 0.001
Idiomatic	 13	 21	 1.9, n.s.
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Table 25. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and. in
Curriculum Sessions. Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
True mental state
	 62	 102	 9.7, df = 1, p< 0.01
Conversational 	 9	 15	 1.5, n.s.
Idiomatic	 6	 15	 4.5, df = 1, p< 0.05
Desire
True mental state	 43	 27	 3.6, df = 1, p= 0.05
Conversational	 2	 50	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state	 101	 51	 16.4, df= 1, p< 0.001
Cognition
True mental state	 128	 204	 17.4, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Conversational 	 2	 3	 n/a
Idiomatic	 7	 6	 0.1, n.s.
Table 26. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group Sessions:
Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of home standardised to
observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
(1) 166	 289	 33.2, df =1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 59	 96
	
8.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
(3) 25	 29	 0.3, n.s.
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explained: "It's because he always keeps quiet; he has good manners.". Then Michelle,
another teacher turned to Patrick saying: "Being praised again!"; Patrick blushed and she
asked him: "You're embarrassed, aren't you? ". Patrick just gave a smile and did not say
anything.
Embarrassment was also expressed verbally by the same high-functioning adolescent. His
teacher, Michelle asked Patrick whether he liked watching himself on the video and he
- said; "no". When she asked him: "what he didn't like about it", he said that he felt
"embarrassed".
Recognition of another 'sfeeling state
Here, the existing evidence has shown that autistic children did not have difficulty in
understanding simple emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger), but they were not able to
recognise complex emotions, arising from beliefs (i.e., surprise) (Baron-Cohen, 1991d).
All the incidents reported below support autistic children's ability to predict another
person's simple emotions, such as happiness, frustration and dis!ike.
The following incident shows that a person with HFA/AS can make an apposite prediction
of others' feelings (first-order theory of mind), although its verbal expression does not
include an explicit reference to emotional states. For example, when Patrick was sitting
next to his teacher, Michelle, during dinner time, he gave her a pat on the back and said
with a little smile: "You are lucky to be here for lunch.". Michelle nodded and smiled to
him. Then, the teacher explained to me that the normal arrangement was not to have lunch
with the children (as was happening on that day) but to be on her break at that time, so
that she would be with them when they would be playing in the garden. However, she did
not like being outside, "unless it's a really warm day" (as Patrick added a few minutes
later). Patrick knew that. Michelle had been lucky to be with the children at dinner time,
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Table 56. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA. Home and Curriculum
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Use	 Home	 School	 x2
36
6
6
27
3
5
42
12
8
75
7
15
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
23
	
2.9, n.s.
6	 n/a
2	 n/a
7	 11.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
2	 n/a
0	 n/a
20	 7.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
5	 2.9, n.s.
1	 n/a
52	 4.1, df = 1, p< 0.05
13
	
1.8, n.s.
9	 1.5, n.s.
Table 57. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Children with
HFA: Home and Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of
Group Sessions).
Categories
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
Home
2
6
44
45
48
School
4
2
14
138
23
x2
n/a
n/a
15.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
47.3, df = 1, p< 0.001
8.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
336
Table 31. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and Curriculum Sessions. Parents and Teachers of Children with HFA (observations of
home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Categories	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Didactic	 3
	
4	 n/a
Commentary	 178
	
181
	
0.02, n.s.
Questioning	 141	 133	 0.2, n.s.
Guiding	 23
	
129	 73.9, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Table 32. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and in Group Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of
home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Mental states	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception	 66
	
86
	
2.6, n.s.
Desire	 23
	
26
	
0.2, n.s.
Emotion	 33
	
342
	
254.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 134
	
327
	
80.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
Table 33. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in Afl Home Visits
and in Curriculum Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations
of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Mental States	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception	 19
	
11
	
2.1, n.s.
Desire	 6
	
15
	
3.8, df = 1, p< 0.05
Emotion	 9
	
6
	
0.6, n.s.
Cognition	 37
	
30
	
0.7, n.s.
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Table 34. Referents of Mental State Utterances in All Home visits and in Curriculum
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Referent	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Self
	
29
	
19
	
2.1, n.s.
Child
	
29
	
33
	
0.2, n.s.
Self/Child
	
1
	
0	 n/a
Other	 10
	
8
	
0.2, n.s.
Table 35. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home
standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
True mental state	 226	 734
	
268.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational	 14	 38
	
11.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
Idiomatic	 16	 14
	
1.9, n.s.
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Table 36. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group
Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home
standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
True mental state 	 48	 65	 2.5, n.s.
Conversational	 9	 14	 1.1, n.s.
Idiomatic	 9	 7	 0.2, n.s.
Desire
True mental state	 22	 9	 5.4, df = 1, p< 0.05
Conversational	 1	 17	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state 	 32	 342	 256.9, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Conversational	 1	 0	 n/a
Cognition
True mental state	 124	 318	 85.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
Conversational 	 2	 7	 n/a
Idiomatic	 7	 2	 n/a
Table 37. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in
Curriculum Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
True mental state 	 63	 51	 1.3, n.s.
Conversational	 4	 9	 n/a
Idiomatic	 4	 2	 n/a
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Table 38. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in
Curriculum Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of hone
standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Functional Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
True mental state	 14	 11	 0.4, n.s.
Conversational	 3	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 0	 n/a
Desire
True mental state	 6	 6	 n/a
Conversational	 1	 9	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state	 9	 6	 0.6, n.s.
Conversational 	 1	 0	 n/a
Cognition
True mental state	 35	 28	 0.8, n.s.
Conversational	 1	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 2	 n/a
Table 39. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group Sessions.'
Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home standardised to
observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
(1) 181	 330	 43.4, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 43	 383	 271.4, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(3) 29	 68	 15.7, df= l,p< 0.001
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Table 40. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Group Sessions:
Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home standardised to
observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
(1) 47	 68	 3.8, df = 1, p= 0.05
(2) 17	 13	 0.5, n.s.
(3) 4	 5	 n/a
Desire
(1) 18	 22	 0.4, n.s.
(2) 0	 4	 n/a
(3) 2	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 21	 104	 55.1,df=1,p<0.001
(2) 6	 183	 165.8, df 1, p< 0.001
(3) 6	 55	 39.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
Cognition
(1) 95	 136	 7.3, df = 1, p< 0.01
(2) 22	 183	 126.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
(3) 6	 8	 0.28, n.s.
Table 41. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Curriculum Sessions:
Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home standardised to
observations of curriculum sessions).
Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
(1) 51	 37	 2.2, n.s.
(2) 12	 23	 3.4, n.s.
(3) 8	 2	 n/a
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Table 42. Use of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits and in Curriculum Sessions:
Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of home standardised to
observations of curriculum sessions).
Use	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Perception
(1) 13	 6	 2.6, n.s.
(2) 4	 4	 n/a
(3) 1	 1	 n/a
Desire
(1) 5	 9	 1.1, n.s.
(2) 0	 6	 n/a
(3) 1	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 6	 4	 n/a
(2) 2	 1	 nJa
(3) 2	 1	 n/a
Cognition
(1) 27	 18	 1.8, n.s.
(2) 6	 12	 2.0, n.s.
(3) 5	 0	 n/a
Table 43. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and in Group Sessions: Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations of
home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Categories	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Didactic	 4
	
3	 n/a
Commentary	 172
	
375
	 75.3, df= 1, p< 0.001
Questioning	 558	 286	 85.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Guiding	 39
	
113
	 36.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
ii
Table 44. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in All Home Visits
and in Curriculum Sessions. Parents and Teachers of Children with MLD (observations
of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Categories	 Parent	 Teacher	 x2
Didactic	 1
	
0	 n/a
Commentary	 48
	
31
	
3.6, df = 1, p= 0.05
Questioning	 16	 11	 0.9, n.s.
Guiding	 11
	
18
	
1.7, n.s.
Table 45. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in Children with
HFA: Home and Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of
Group Sessions).
Mental States	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
Perception	 34
	
44
	
1.3, n.s.
Desire	 25
	
12
	
4.6, df = 1, p< 0.05
Emotion	 43
	
56
	
1.7, n.s.
Cognition	 67
	
75	 0.4, n.s.
Table 46. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in Children with
HFA: Home and Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to
observations of curriculum sessions).
Mental States	 Home	 Curriculum	 x2
Perception	 49
	
31
	
4.0, df = 1, p< 0.05
Desire	 36
	
9
	
16.2, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Emotion	 62
	
26
	
14.7, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
Cognition	 97
	
74
	
3.1, n.s.
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Table 47. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Referent	 Home	 School	 x2
Self
	
118
	
141
	
2.0, n.s.
Teacher/Parent	 32
	
8
	
14.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
Other	 13
	
28
	
5.5, df= 1, p< 0.05
Table 48. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and
Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum
sessions).
Referent	 Home	 School	 x2
Self
	
170
	
91
	
23.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
Teacher/Parent
	 46
	
20
	
10.2, df = 1, p< 0.01
Other	 19
	
15
	
0.5, n.s.
Table 49. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and
Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use
	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
True mental state	 146
	
163
	
0.9, n.s.
Conversational
	
9
	
7
	
0.2, n.s.
Idiomatic	 4
	
6	 n/a
Special code	 11
	
11	 n/a
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Table 50. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and
Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
Perception
True mental state
	 28	 44	 3.5, df = 1, p= 0.05
Conversational 	 4	 0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 0	 n/a
Desire
True mental state	 24	 11	 4.8, df= 1, p< 0.05
Conversational	 2	 1	 n/a
Emotion
True mental state	 43	 56	 1.7, n.s.
Conversational	 1	 0	 n/a
Cognition
True mental state	 51	 52	 0.009, n.s.
Conversational 	 3	 6	 n/a
Idiomatic	 2	 6	 n/a
Special code	 11	 11	 n/a
Table 51. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and
Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum
sessions).
Functional Use	 Home	 Curriculum	 x2
True mental state	 210
	
118
	
25.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
Conversational
	
13
	
4	 n/a
Idiomatic	 6
	
2	 n/a
Special code	 16
	
16	 n/a
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34
	
8
	
16.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
2	 1	 n/a
62	 26
	
14.7, df 1, p< 0.001
1
	
0	 n/a
74
	
54
	
3.1, n.s.
4
	
2	 n/a
3
	
2	 n/a
16
	
16	 n/a
Table 52. Functional Use of Mentai State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and
Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum
sessions).
Functional Use	 Home	 Curriculum	 x2
Perception
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Desire
True mental state
Conversational
Emotion
True mental state
Conversational
Cognition
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Special code
55
	
30
	
1.4, n.s.
6	 1	 n/a
3
	
0	 n/a
Table 53. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Home	 School	 x2
(1) 126	 116	 0.4, n.s.
(2) 20	 39	 6.1,df= 1, p< 0.05
(3) 24	 32	 1.1, n.s.
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Table 54. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Home	 School	 x2
Perception
(1) 25	 29	 0.3, n.s.
(2) 4	 10	 n/a
(3) 4	 5	 n/a
Desire
(1) 19	 9	 3.6, df = 1, p= 0.05
(2) 2	 3	 n/a
(3) 4	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 29	 28	 0.01, n.s.
(2) 8	 9	 0.05, n.s.
(3) 6	 19	 6.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
Cognition
(1) 52	 50	 0.03, n.s.
(2) 5	 17	 6.5,df=1,p=0.01
(3) 10	 8	 0.2, n.s.
Table 55. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA: Home and Curriculum
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Use	 Home	 School
(1) 181	 102	 22, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 29	 26	 0.2, n.s.
(3) 35	 12	 11.2, df= 1, p< 0.001
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2
6
44
45
48
4
2
14
138
23
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
n/a
n/a
15.5, df= l,p<O.00l
47.3, df= l,p<O 1)01
8.8, df = I, p< 0.01
Table 56. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with HFA. Home and Curriculum
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum sessions).
Use	 Home	 School	 x2
36
6
6
27
3
5
42
12
8
75
7
15
Perception
(1)
(2)
(3)
Desire
(1)
(2)
(3)
Emotion
(1)
(2)
(3)
Cognition
(1)
(2)
(3)
23
	
2.9, n.s.
6	 n/a
2	 n/a
7	 11.8,df=1,p<0.001
2	 n/a
0	 n/a
20	 7.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
5	 2.9, n.s.
1	 n/a
52
	
4.1, df= 1, p< 0.05
13
	
1.8, n.s.
9
	
1.5, n.s.
Table 57. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental Slate Utterances in Children with
HFA: Home and Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to ob.servatIon of
Group Sessions).
Categories	 Home	 School	 x2
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Table 58. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Children with
HFA: Home and Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to
observations of curriculum sessions).
Categories
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
Home
3
8
63
65
70
School
1
0
10
110
129
x2
n/a
n/a
12.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
11.6, df= 1, p< 0.001
17.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
Table 59. Frequencies of Each Category of Mental State Utterances in Children with
MLD: Home and Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of
Group Sessions).
Mental States	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
Perception	 21
	
11
	
3.1, n.s.
Desire	 15	 3	 n/a
Emotion	 15
	
103
	
65.6, df = 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 91
	
21
	
43.7, df = 1 , p< 0.001
Table 60. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD: Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Referent	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
Self	 90	 107	 1.5, n.s.
Teacher/Parent	 30	 5
	
17.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
Other	 15	 22	 1 .3, n.s.
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TabLe 61. Referents of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD: Home and
Curriculum Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of curriculum
sessions).
Referent	 Home	 Curriculum	 x2
Self
	
25
	
4	 n/a
Teacher/Parent
	 4
	
5	 n/a
Other	 4
	
3	 n/a
Table 62. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD: Home and
Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
True mental state 	 120
	
130
	
0.4, n.s.
Conversational
	
6
	
0	 n/a
Idiomatic	 10
	
0	 n/a
Special code	 6
	
8
	
0.3, n.s.
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Table 63. Functional Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD: Home and
Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Functional Use	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
11
0
0
3
0
103
13
0
0
8
Perception
True mental state 	 9
Conversational	 2
Idiomatic	 4
Desire
True mental state 	 12
Conversational	 0
Emotion
True mental state	 7
Cognition
True mental state	 35
Conversational	 5
Idiomatic	 6
Special code
	
6
0.2, n.s.
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
83.8, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
10.1, df= l,p<O.Ol
n/a
n/a
0.3, n.s.
Table 64. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD: Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
(1) 108	 60	 13.7, df = 1, p< 0.0101
(2) 18	 56	 19.5, df= 1, p< 0.001
(3) 16	 22	 0.9, n.s.
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0
1
97
8
18
0
1
4
129
3
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
n/a
n/a
n/a
106.9, df = 1, p< 0.001
n/a
Table 65. Use of Mental State Utterances in Children with MLD. Home and Group
Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of Group Sessions).
Use	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
Perception
(1) 8	 9	 0.05, n.s.
(2) 3	 2	 n/a
(3) 1	 0	 n/a
Desire
(1) 12	 3	 n/a
(2) 1	 0	 n/a
(3) 2	 0	 n/a
Emotion
(1) 7	 32	 16, df = 1, p< 0.001
(2) 1	 50	 n/a
(3) 0	 21	 n/a
Cognition
(1) 66	 16	 30.5, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
(2) 12	 4	 n/a
(3) 13	 1	 n/a
Table 66. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances in Children with
MLD: Home and Group Sessions (observations of home standardised to observations of
Group Sessions).
Categories	 Home	 Group Sessions	 x2
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Table 67. Comparison of Frequencies of Mental State Utterances for Each, Category of
Psychological State as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances: Parents of
Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD.
Mental States
	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
fre quency (percent)
	 frequency (percent)
Perception	 265 (21.2)	 183 (25.9)	 4.3, df = 1, p< 0.05
Desire	 156 (12.4)	 64 (9.0)	 4.7, df = 1, p< 0.05
Emotion	 350 (28.0)	 91(12.8)	 152.1, df = 1, p< 0.001
Cognition	 478 (38.2)	 368 (52.1)	 20 0, df = 1, p< 0.001
Total	 1249	 706
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
Table 68. Comparison of Frequencies of Mental State Utterances for Each Category of
Psychological State as a Proportion of All Psychological State Utterances: Children with
HFA and Children with MLD.
Mental States
Perception
Desire
Emotion
Cognition
HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent) fre quency (percent)
171 (20.1)	 58 (14.7)	 4.1, df = 1, p< 0.05
126 (14.8)	 42 (10.7)	 3.3, n.s.
216 (25.4)	 42 (10.7)	 27.9, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
337 (39.6)	 250 (63.7)	 33.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
Total	 850	 392
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Table 69. Comparison of Reftrents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents: Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of Children with MLD.
Referent	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 frequency(percent)
Self
	
445 (37.0)	 284 (41.9)	 2.7, n.s.
Child
	
614 (51.0)	 285 (42.0)	 7.3,df= l,p< 0.01
Self/Child
	
20 (1.66)	 13 (1.92)	 0.2, n.s.
Other	 123 (10.23)	 95 (14.03)	 5.4, df = 1, p<0.05
Total
	 1202
	
677
Table 70. Comparison of Referents of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of All
Referents: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Referent	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 frequency(percent)
Self
	
590 (72.2)	 250 (66.3)	 1.3, n.s.
Parent
	 161 (19.7)	 84 (22.2)	 0.8, n.s.
Self/Parent	 1(0.1)	 2(0.5)	 n/a
Other	 65 (7.9)	 41(10.8)	 2.5, n.s.
Total	 817	 377
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x2
0.9, n.s.
3.0, n.s.
6.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
Table 71. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
All Frequencies on Functional Use: Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of
Children with MLD.
Functional Use
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Total
HFA	 MLD
frequency (percent) frequency(percent)
1158 (92.7)	 624 (88.3)
46 (3.6)	 38 (5.3)
45 (3.6)	 44 (6.2)
1249	 706
Table 72. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
All Frequencies on Functional Use: Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of
Children with MLD.
Functional Use
Perception
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Desire
True mental state
Conversational
Emotion
True mental state
Conversational
Cognition
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Total
215 (17.2)	 133 (18.8)
31(2.4)	 26 (3.6)
22(1.7)	 24(3.3)
149(11.9)	 61(8.6)
6 (0.4)	 3 (0.4)
349 (27.9)	 89 (12.6)
1(0.08)	 2(0.2)
445 (35.6)	 341 (48.3)
8(0.6)	 7(0.9)
23(1.8)	 20(2.8)
1249	 706
HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent) frequency(percent)
0.7, n.s.
2.2, n.s.
5.1, df= 1, p< 0.05
4.5, df 1, p< 0.05
n/a
47.3, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
n/a
18.0, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
0.7, n.s.
2, n.s.
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118 (13.4)	 32 (8.1)	 7.3,df= l,p<O.Ol
8 (1)	 0	 n/a
215 (25.2)	 42(11)	 27.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
1(0.1)	 0	 n/a
257 (30.2)	 205 (52.2)	 35.1, df= 1, p< 0.001
15 (1.8)	 13 (3.3)	 2.9, n.s.
10 (1.1)	 16 (4.1)	 10.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
55 (6.5)	 16 (4.1)	 2.7, n.s.
Table 73. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
All Frequencies on Functional Use: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Functional Use
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Special code
HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 frequency (percent)
728 (85.6)	 330 (84.1)	 0.1, n.s.
45 (5.2)	 18 (4.5)	 0.3, n.s.
22 (2.5)	 28 (7.1)	 13.8, df = 1, p< 0.001
55 (6.4)	 16 (4.0)	 2.7, n.s.
Total
	
850
	
392
Table 74. Comparison of Functional Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
All Frequencies on Functional Use: Children with HFA and Children with MLD
Functional Use
Perception
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Desire
True mental state
Conversational
Emotion
True mental state
Conversational
Cognition
True mental state
Conversational
Idiomatic
Special code
HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency (percent)
	 fre quency (percent)
138 (16.2)	 51(13.0)	 1.8, n.s.
21(2.5)	 5 (1.3)	 1.2. n.s.
12(1.4)	 12(3.1)	 n/a
Total	 850	 392
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Table 75. Comparison of Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances. Parents of Children with HFA and Parent of Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA	 MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 fre quency (percent)
(1) 829 (66.4)	 499 (71)	 1.2, n.s.
(2) 293 (23.4)	 128 (18.1)	 5.9,df=1,p=0.01
(3) 127 (10.1)	 79 (11.2)	 0.4, n.s.
Total	 1249	 706
Table 76. Comparison of Use of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of the Overall
Use of Utterances: Children with HFA and Children with MLD.
Use	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)	 frequency(percent)
(1) 628 (73.9)	 298 (76)	 0.2, n.s.
(2) 101 (11.9)	 49 (12.5)	 0.1, n.s.
(3) 121 (14.2)	 45 (11.5)	 1.5, n.s.
Total	 850	 392
Table 77. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories: Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of
Children with MLD.
Categories
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Total
HFA
frequency(percent)
10 (0.8)
618 (51.5)
491 (40.9)
81(6.7)
1200
MLD
frequency(percent)
11(1.5)
473 (62.9)
160 (21.3)
108 (14.4)
752
x2
1.7, n.s.
10.7, df = 1, p= 0.001
53.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
27.7, df = 1, p< 0.001
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Table 78. Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as a Proportion of
the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories. Parents of Children with HFA and Parents of
Children with MLD.
Categories
Perception
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Desire
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Emotion
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
Cognition
Didactic
Commentary
Questioning
Guiding
HFA
frequency(percent)
3 (0.2)
104 (8.7)
75 (6.2)
61(5.1)
2 (0.2)
61(5.1)
81(6.7)
11(0.9)
2(0.2)
143 (11.9)
205 (17.1)
2(0.2)
3 (0.2)
310 (25.8)
130 (10.8)
7(0.6)
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)
8(1.1)	 n/a
116 (15.4)	 18.7, df = 1, p< 0.001
29 (3.8)	 4.9, df = 1, p< 0.05
98 (13.0)	 35.8, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
2 (0.3)	 n/a
38 (5.0)	 0.008, n.s.
23 (3.0)	 11.8, df = 1, p< 0.01
1(0.1)	 n/a
0	 n/a
42 (5.6)	 19.5, df = 1, p< 0.001
47 (6.2)	 42.0, df = 1, p< 0.001
2 (0.3)	 n/a
1(0.1)	 n/a
277 (36.8)	 18.6, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
61(8.1)	 3.5,n.s.
7 (0.9)	 n/a
Total	 1200	 752
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Table 79. Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as
a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD.
Categories	 HFA
	
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent) frequency(percent)
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
10 (1.4)
29 (4)
399 (55.1)
136 (18.8)
56 (7.7)
0
3 (0.8)
268 (72.2)
49 (13.2)
51(13.7)
n/a
n/a
11.8, df= 1, p< 0.001
4.5, df = 1, p< 0.05
9.1,df= 1, p< 0.01
Total	 724	 371
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TabLe 80. Comparison of Categories of Pragmatic Context of Mental State Utterances as
a Proportion of the Overall Use of Pragmatic Categories: Children with HFA and
Children with MLD.
Categories
Perception
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
Desire
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
Emotion
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
Cognition
Self-interest
Sophisticated
Commentary
Information
Questioning
HFA
frequency(percent)
5 (0.7)
6 (0.8)
110 (15.1)
10 (1.4)
26 (3.5)
1(0.1)
4(0.5)
90 (12.4)
17 (2.3)
13 (1.7)
0
6(0.8)
143 (19.7)
53 (7.3)
17 (2.3)
4(0.5)
13 (1.8)
56 (7.7)
150 (20.7)
0
MLD	 x2
frequency(percent)
0	 n/a
2 (0.5)	 n/a
42 (11.3) -	 2.6, n.s.
2(0.5)	 n/a
7(1.8)	 2.4, n.s.
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
34 (9.1)	 2.3, n.s.
1 (0.3)	 n/a
5(1.3)	 0.3, n.s.
0	 n/a
0	 n/a
36 (9.7)	 15.4, df = 1, p< 0.001
2 (0.5)	 n/a
3 (0.8)	 n/a
0	 n/a
1 (0.3)	 n/a
156 (42.0)	 149.2, df = 1, p< 0.00 1
44(11.8)	 10.9, df= 1, p= 0.001
36(9.7)	 n/a
Total	 724	 371
349
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restaurant relieves diners of the obligation to shape the world
around them. Going to a restaurant would thus be a way of
surrendering, of giving in to society's norms and standards and by
accepting the restaurant's mores and habits, individuality and
inventiveness suffer. 5' Finkelstein's argument is perhaps valid if
diners sheepishly accept and conform to the "law" of each
restaurant. This is the case neither with Hulot nor with Mitsou,
who both mount a certain degree of resistance to their respective
restaurants and do not entirely accept the microcosms the
restaurants propose.
Claude Chabrol features lower-class diners disturbing the
world as it is ordered by the restaurant in his 1984 Poulet au
vinaigre (English title: Cop au Vin). At one point in this film a
young couple steal money from the till at the post office where
they work and have a night out at Château Gerbeau, the local chic
restaurant, in which they are extremely conspicuous. They order
foie gras, veal sweetbreads, and champagne. The couple in this
scene cannot hide their class status and their posture before their
food is "lower class": they "dig in" to their meal, laugh
abrasively, get food on their faces and generally lack the finesse,
discretion and sobriety that such a place usually demands of its
customers. Like Mitsou and Hulot, they go against the grain of the
restaurant, revealing their class status by exposing the staging
'	 Joanne Finkelstein, Dining Out: A Sociology of Modern
Manners (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), p. 5.
podiatry was alone amongst the PSM professions in facing widespread
competition from unregulated practitioners operating in the private
sector 11 . Critics again cited the public safety issue as central to the
problem and used it as a justification for the rejection of partial,
"indicative" closure'2.
The Government had also sought to increase the available numbers of
registered podiatrists for NHS work by expanding the number of state
recognised training schools, establishing four new schools in as many
years. Although the Chiropodists Board had vociferously opposed this
development, claiming the expansion was carried out with excessive
haste, it had been over-ruled by the Privy Council 13 . In addition,
the Royal Commission Report on the NTIS of 1979 had concluded that
there was evidence that the profession was "trying to restrict entry
for monopolistic reasons", and could not reasonably justify such
opposition1 4•
AU plans for a functional closure of podiatry comparable with that for
dentistry or midwifery were crushed following the publication of a
DHSS consultative document, which highlighted the basis of
government opposition based on ideological and pragmatic grounds,
particularly manpower provision15.
Editorial (1981), Therapy, 8:23, 3rd December,1981.
12 Watts WD (1981), "Indicative Closure Will Not Protect Public", BJC, 45:2, p.30.
13 Dagnall JC (1981), Editorial, BJC, 46:11, p.244.
14 Dagnall JC (1980), "Expanding Chiropodial Education", Editorial, BJC, 45:3,
p.55.
15 DHSS (1981), "Proposals for Statutory Protection of Professional Title under the
Professions Supplementary to Medicine Act 1960 and Closure of the Speech Therapy
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it39.
If managers could be convinced of the benefits to patients and purse
alike of podiatric surgery, then medical objection alone would be
insufficient to prevent the establishment of podiatric surgery within
the NHS40. This potential had been recognised by the Podiatry
Association in advance of the Griffiths reforms, which set the agenda
for later progress within the new NHS 41,42,43
It was at this time that the Podiatry Association sought to limit the use
of the word "podiatry" to signify only podiatric surgical practice,
distinct from the title "chiropodist", which was to be left to describe
the traditional skills associated with that name by public and medicine
alike44. The internal closure mechanism employed, which required
stringent post-registration qualifications for membership, ensured
the Podiatry Association course the distinction of being the only
adequate surgical training which could withstand medical
DoH (1989), "Working for Patients",para 2.13.
40 Schreiber C (1994), PA Newsletter, July Edition, p.4.
41 "...nor only would we save the Government millions of pounds...but would also
save the general public considerable discomfort and waiting time... With the
introduction of General Managers...we will be making representations to show how we
could assist to this end.". Cited in Bell DRC (1985), "Chairman's Message", PA
Journal, July, 1985, p.2.
42 Although one individual podiatric surgeon had succeeded in securing a recognised
post within the NHS as early as 1977, this success was considered so vulnerable that
the postholder requested the Podiatry Association Executive to refrain from
mentioning it in discussions with the British Medical Association, for fear it might
"jeopardise the precedence to be set within the NHS". Cited in Allard-Williams M
(1977), personal correspondence to Laxton RL, 26th July, 1977.
Allard-Williams M (1978), personal correspondence to Laxton RL, 8th March
1978; Bell DRC (1985), "Chairman's Message", PA journal, April,1985,p.2
Minutes of Meeting (1985), PA Executive Committee, 27th November,1985.
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which resulted from this decision led to a new confidence previously
unseen in podiatric relations with medicine. This confidence was
enhanced by the introduction of general management within the NHS,
which shielded podiatric surgery from the threat of exclusion by
medicine.
10.4. Podiatry and Medical Dominance : The Impact of
Man a g en all s m
The introduction of general management did not inirnediately signal a
lessening in medical dominance in relation to podiatry, but it did reflect
an increasing accountability to management. Under the Griffiths
reform the new District podiatry managers were separated by several
tiers from senior management, and hence the decision making process.
As the "new" NHS reforms took shape the emphasis upon primary care
and the internal market presented significant opportunities and threats
for NHS podiatry.
The generalist and specialist forms of podiatry performed differently
under the new reforms, the former increasingly threatened with down-
sizing, whilst the latter emerged as a prized service.
Medical dominance was clearly strengthened under GP fundholding, and
podiatric professional autonomy compromised, as state registered
practitioners became directly accountable to GPs. Directly employed
podiatrists became salaried at rates determined by the GP, and were
required to accept referrals from the GP. Length of treatment time,
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